Policing Post Election Violence in Kenya

1. Policing Post Election Violence in Kenya Mutuma Ruteere Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies

2. Post-Election Violence in Kenya • December 2007 elections pitted incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki of PNU against Raila Odinga of ODM. • Campaigns preceded by divisive campaigns with ethnic mobilization. • Dispute over presidential results sparked off ethnic violence in six out of the eight provinces. • The epicentre of the violence was multi-ethnic Rift Valley Province • Violence ended in Feb 2008 following mediation by African Union team led by Kofi Annan.

3. Post-Election Violence in Kenya Cont’d • The National Accord created a coalition government with Mwai Kibaki as president and challenger Raila Odinga as Prime Minister • Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) concluded that 1,113 were killed and about 600,000 internally displaced. • CIPEV report and independent reports concluded that Kenyan police used excessive force, were unprofessional and failed to protect life and property. • Official inquiry also concluded that the police were overwhelmed by the violence.

4. A Clarification on Kenyan Police • Kenya has two police forces- Kenya Police Force and Administration Police. • Kenya Police Force a largely urban force with responsibility for crime prevention and management. • Administration Police largely rural with principal responsibility of supporting state administrators, protection of state property and border protection. • Under new constitution, both forces to be headed by an Inspector General of Police

5. Police (Mis)Conduct During PEV • Of the 1,113 people killed, 405 were suspected to have been killed by the police. • In Nyanza Province (home of opposition candidate Raila Odinga), 134 people died, 107 of them (80%) from gunshot wounds. • Of 214 people admitted to hospital, 48 had gunshot wounds. • In Kisumu City (the capital of Nyanza Province and political bastion of ODM candidate Raila Odinga), 50 of the 56 bodies examined by a pathologist had gunshot wounds. • Of those 50 killed, 30 were shot from behind.

6. Police (Mis)Conduct During PEV Cont’d • In Western Province (another key opposition area), of the 98 people killed, 70 died of gunshot wounds. • In Rift Valley Province (another key opposition area and epicentre of violence) of the 779 killed, 194 of them died from gunshot wounds. • CIPEV report concluded that many of these people were killed by the police. • There were also cases of rapes by police officers.

7. Police as Executive Tools • According to scholarly studies: • Kenyan police have no autonomy from the executive branch of government • The policies and operations of Kenyan police are determined by the interests of the political regime of the day • From this view then, the police can be seen as doing the bidding of the government of the day.

8. Police as Executive Tools Cont’d • Most of those suspected to have been killed by the police were opposition supporters. • The International Criminal Court is seeking to indict the then Commissioner of Police for failure to protect opposition supporters. • Kenyan police blocked opposition supporters from marching to the central square in Nairobi, Uhuru Park. • They also blocked opposition supporting residents of poor neighborhoods from moving out of their neighborhoods.

9. Police as Executive Tools Cont’d • Kenya police generally acted to preserve the government of the day. • Should we be surprised by this? • Everywhere in the world, police forces are conservative organizations. They support the status quo. • If we extend this recognition to Kenyan police, we must explore additional explanations for their conduct.

10. Police (In)Capacity • The question of capacity deficits within the police largely lost in the discussion on PEV. • CIPEV report however notes that Kenyan police were largely unprepared to deal with such large scale violence. • Serious incapacity to process and utilize crime data and intelligence. • Lack of intelligence coordination between the National Security Intelligence Service and Kenya police forces.

11. The Question of Capacity Cont’d • Limited numbers: total force complement of some 73,956 officers for a population of 38 million. • In 2007, 55,110 officers were already engaged in electoral duties by the time the violence broke out • A further 3,000 officers regularly deployed in non-core policing functions. • Consequently, only 15,846 officers were available to respond to violence in six of the eight provinces.

12. Police as Vigilantes and Private Profiteers • Kenyan police have a long history of tolerating rogue units. • Many such units (e.g. Kwekwe Squad, Rhino Squad) set up to deal with emerging criminal groups. • By 2007, some of the units had metamorphosed into vigilantes, carrying out summary executions of suspected criminals. • During the PEV, such police vigilantes ended up supporting their ethnic kin and political allies. • Some police officers also became “war profiteers” working with criminal mobs to loot.

13. Police as Ethnic Partisans • The PEV was essentially an ethnic conflict as much as it was a political one. • A significant number of police officers deployed to respond to the violence ended up taking sides on an ethnic basis • In some cases, police officers failed to protect victims of different ethnicities. • Ethnicity is an unaddressed question in Kenyan security institutions. • Though every administrative unit (district) is awarded a quota in recruitment, police leadership is skewed in favour of the president’s ethnic kin.

14. Police as Ethnic Partisans Cont’d • We do not know how this has affected policing priorities in Kenya. • However, it has resulted in suspicion that the police are biased in favour of the president. • Suspected use of Administration Police in spreading hate leaflets against the opposition ODM before the elections further eroded confidence in the police. • The police not seen as “neutral instruments of a supra-ethnic state entity.”

15. Conclusions • Police forces in many African countries have not been sufficiently studied as actors in their own right. • Bulk of the research reduces them to cardboard images of executive puppets. • This view ignores the many other interests, processes and factors that shape police conduct in public order policing. • The view also limits police reform efforts to just securing legal and institutional independence from the executive. • A criminal accountability model in reviewing police conduct in public order maintenance is not sufficient.

16. Thank You Questions?