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Ronald Wintrobe (1990): The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship

Ronald Wintrobe (1990): The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship. Presented for The Political Economics Reading Group at ESOP 25/5 2009, Carl Henrik Knutsen. Politics in dictatorships.

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Ronald Wintrobe (1990): The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship

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  1. Ronald Wintrobe (1990): The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship Presented for The Political Economics Reading Group at ESOP 25/5 2009, Carl Henrik Knutsen

  2. Politics in dictatorships • Wintrobe’s early contribution (1990). A growing political economic literature. Some exemplary studies: Olson (1993), Wintrobe (1998), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). + papers discussed in pol.ec. group and several others… • What motivates different dictators? • How do dictators respond to exogenous changes, especially economic shocks? • What policies should Western countries pursue when dealing with different dictatorships?

  3. Wintrobe’s contribution • The importance of modelling heterogeneous dictators; more specifically: Explicitly taking into account that different dictators/regimes are motivated by different objectives.. • Wintrobe’s two main types of dictators: The Tinpot and the Totalitarian. • 1998 book: Adds the Tyrant and the Timocrat • Elaborating on the means at the dictators disposal (loyalty and repression) • Explaining heterogeneous policy responses to similar shocks.  heterogeneous interactions between political actors/structures and the economy. • Policy implications for democratic leaders wanting to maximize freedom abroad

  4. Some comments • The historical backdrop. 1990 and the end of Communism. Do Totalitarians still exist? • Other and more refined classifications • Geddes • Linz and Stepan • Hadenius and Teorell • Classifications related to motivation, institutional structure, democracy-dictatorship continuum, other variables?

  5. Notation and assumptions • π (L, R) = productionfunction for power, where L is loyalty and R is repression • π’L and π’R > 0 • π’’LR > 0 • π’’LL and π’’RR < 0 • PR , PL: price/costofrepression, loyalty. Somedistinctions in paperbetweenofpricepaid by dictator for loyalty and pricereceived by suppliersofloyalty. • PL = PL (L, R, PE) • dPL/dL>0, dPL/dR<0, dPL/dPE<0 • PE: economicperformance • Dictator’sexpenditurefunction: • B = PRR + PL (L, R, PE)L

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