The Economics of the South Stream Pipeline in the Context of Russo-Ukrainian Gas Bargaining

1. The Economics of the South Stream Pipeline in the Context of Russo-Ukrainian Gas Bargaining Chi-Kong Chyong Judge Business School & Electricity Policy Research Group University of Cambridge 30th USAEE/IAEE North American Conference – 11 October 2011 Thanks to ESRC (UK) and NearCO2 (EU) for funding

2. Contents • The context • The South Stream System • South Stream Cost • South Stream Value • South Stream and Ukraine’s transit profits • Conclusions

3. The context • EU-Russia gas trade is important for • Russia: • Gas exports generate 4.5% of Russian GDP or half of Gazprom's revenue • Tax receipts from gas exports amount to 30% of Russia's defence budget • and for Europe: • 25% of European consumption is covered by Russian gas

4. The context (2) The EU-Russia gas trade is highly dependent on Ukraine

5. The context (3) • Several transit disruptions through Ukraine since the fall of the USSR raised concerns about its realiability…

6. The context (4) Gazprom’s solution: Export route diversification strategy since early 1990s

7. Research question • Given that Nord Stream is under contruction Will South Stream be built?

8. Contents • The context • The South Stream System • South Stream Cost • South Stream Value • South Stream and Ukraine’s transit profits • Conclusions

9. The South Stream system • Off-shore pipeline under the Black Sea (A-B): Total Capacity: 63 bcm; Length:~900 km • Northern route: • Bulgaria-Serbia (B-F): ~960km; • Serbia-Hungary (F-G): ~530km • Hungary-Slovenia (G-H): ~610km • Hungary-Austria (G-J): ~350km • Slovenia-Austria (H-I): ~220km • Southern route: • Bulgaria-Greece (B-C): ~416km • Greece (C-D): ~690km • Greece-Italy (D-E): ~200 km • Cost estimates: • Gazprom (2010): €15.5 Bn Source: based on South-stream.info

10. The South Stream System in Russia • South Stream would begin at Pochinki • From Pochinki to Beregovaya (South Stream offshore): • Existing lines ~ 32 bcm; • A new pipeline from Pochinki to Beregovaya ~ 32 bcm • Possible gas sources: • Fields in operation: Nadym-Pur-Taz (NPT) region • Yamal Peninsula (Gryazovets-Pochinki bi-directional pipeline ~ 36 bcm) • Central Asia • Total anticipated pipeline expansion in Russia ~2200 km Existing fields Source: adapted from eegas.com

11. Contents • The context • The South Stream System • South Stream Cost • South Stream Value • South Stream and Ukraine’s transit profits • Conclusions

12. South Stream Construction Cost • Cost of onshore pipelines: • Based on engineering model (WB, 2010) • Cost of offshore pipelines: • Based on econometric estimation • Project-related uncertainties: • Monte-Carlo simulation with key assumptions Average 90% Conf. interval Gazprom’s most recent estimate

13. Transporting gas to Germany and Italy • On average, it is cheaper to use the Ukrainian route to export gas to Germany and Italy • Transporting gas from Azerbaijan is cheaper through South Stream

14. Transporting gas to Southern Europe

15. Contents • The context • The South Stream System • South Stream Cost • South Stream Value • South Stream and Ukraine’s transit profits • Conclusions

16. Deriving South Stream value • South Stream value = changes in Gazprom’s profit when South Stream is built versus when it is not built. • A computational, strategic gas market model (Chyong & Hobbs, 2011) is used to calculate the South Stream value under: • Different demand scenarios, and • Different values of transit fees through Ukraine • Major assumptions: • Nord Stream is built by 2013 (55 bcm) • Ukraine’s transit fee is fixed exogenously

17. South Stream Value Average 90% Conf. interval

18. Contents • The context • The South Stream System • South Stream Cost • South Stream Value • South Stream and Ukraine’s transit profits • Conclusions

19. Ukraine’s transit profits

20. Ukraine’s net benefit of not raising the transit fee over 30 years An impatient Ukraine would raise its transit fee, triggering the construction of South Stream Naftogaz’s WACC* *Source: (Vitrenko, 2008; Kovalko&Vitrenko, 2009)

21. Conclusions • The value of South Stream investment is only positive when: • Gas demand in Europe is expected to be very high (+1.9% p.a.), or • When Ukraine raises its transit fee considerably • Naftogaz’s corporate governance issues make its discount rate very high, which explains its willingness to bargain with Russia • If Ukraine bargains to raise its transit fee sufficiently high, then South Stream would be built leading to the undesirable longer-term outcome of being completely bypassed by Gazprom • To avoid this outcome, Ukraine would need to find ways to reduce the very high discount rate of Naftogaz, perhaps via restructuring and privatization

22. THANK YOU

23. Back-up slides

24. The Economics of Nord Stream • Nord Stream investment is profitable : • The Nord Stream route is shorter than the Ukrainian one • If Ukraine lowers its transit fee, the Nord Stream value would increase significantly • The Nord Stream security of supply value is marginal The paper can be downloaded from www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk

25. Methodology & assumptions • Assumptions • Shareholding structure: Gazprom 51% • Financing strategy • 30/70 equity-debt financing • Cost of equity financing: • Gazprom 9-15%; • Non-Gazprom: 9-10% • Cost of debt financing: margin+EURIBOR (1.24-5.4%) • O&M costs (fraction of initial investment cost): • For compressors 4% p.a. • For pipelines – 0.3% p.a. • Taxation and depreciation based on national laws Onshore pipeline costing Offshore pipeline costing Source: (World Bank, 2009)

26. Model DescriptionMarket structure • Producers, traders and transit countries maximize profits • Producers’ behaviour: • Oligopoly -> Cournot game (against traders’ derived demand) • Perfect competition • Pipeline transmission & LNG terminals -> Competitive (Tariff + “Congestion Price”) • Traders have two options for behaviour: • Oligopoly -> Cournot game (against Consumer demand) • Perfect competition • Transit countries: 'conjectured transit demand curve'

27. Model DescriptionRepresenting market power in the gas supply chain • Producers anticipate traders’ reaction (Asymmetric/Leader-Follower game) • Traders and Producers: Cournot Game (i.e., game in quantities) -> the player believes that if he changes his output (gas sales), his competitors will maintain sales by cutting or raising their prices • Market power of transit countries: • transit market power is represented by the conjectured transit demand curve approach, which assumes that large transit countries (e.g., Ukraine and Belarus) believe that they face a declining effective demand curve for their services with an assumed slope (exogenous parameter) • Consumers are represented by aggregate inverse demand functions of each market in the model

28. Current ModelOther features • Model data set: • 25 gas markets from Western, Central and Eastern Europe and from the FSU • 27 producing regions (FSU, Europe, MENA) • Detailed presentation of the FSU gas network • Production costs: various sources • Production capacities and outlooks: IEA, EIA and other public data • Details on transmission network in Europe: ENTSOG • Details in (Chyong and Hobbs, 2011) *Baltic States: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia **Balkan States: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania