FAAM AMMA INFORMATION

1. FAAM AMMA INFORMATION Ruth Purvis

2. Overview Aim and Scope H & S Pack-up Risk Mitigation Vaccinations Malaria VISAS

3. Detachment Health and Safety Organisation On any detachment there is a need to export an adequate system of management of ground risks and a clear policy on Health and Safety. FAAM will lead on promoting Health and Safety compliance on those detachments where FAAM staff are present and where FAAM had an instrumental part in the planning and preparation.

4. Detachment Health and Safety Organisation All participants in a detachment have a responsibility for safety. The FAAM Detachment Manager has the overall authority to ensure that adequate Health and Safety procedures are addressed whilst on detachment. The Detachment Safety Committee comprises the FAAM and Directflight Detachment Managers and the lead PI from each institution represented on the detachment. The Committee: - Monitors all aspects of H&S arrangements. - Considers reports from safety advisers or staff. - Makes recommendations for improving H&S arrangements. - Meets at least once in each detachment location.

5. Detachment Health and Safety Organisation NERC FAAM Detachment Manager DFL Detachment Manager Met Office University 1 PI e.g. Leeds University 2 PI e.g. York University n PI e.g. UEA Avalon Detachment Manager FAAM Staff DFL Staff Avalon Staff Met Office Staff Uni. 1. Staff Uni. 2. Staff Uni. n. Staff

6. Detachment Health and Safety Organisation Pack-Up Contents Operational Procedures Unfamiliar Diseases and Medical Conditions Cultural Differences Security Local Travel

7. Detachment Health and Safety Organisation Theatre Specifics Africa January/February 2006 (DABEX/DODO) Identified Hazards Risk Assessments/Safe Systems of Work COSHH Assessments Personnel Details including Competencies Emergency Contact Details Detachment Medical Equipment In Country Recce Reports Security Reports Health Brief

8. Niger - General Political Risk - M Niger has had a history of political instability and military rule since independence in 1960. Current Civilian President was re-elected in free and fair elections in December 2004. The country is now set on a course of economic reform, but poverty remains a major challenge. The influence of the formerly powerful military has diminished since 1999. The Islamist movement, which was formerly growing in influence, is now less militant and does not pose a major threat. Infrastructure is poor.

9. Niger - General Security Risk – M (H) Sporadic public-sector protests over poor pay and standards of living pose the main security risks in the capital Niamey. Such action is normally peaceful and does not pose a major threat to expatriates or the overall security of the country. Anti-military violence exists in the north and foreigners are occassionally targeted in opportunistic attacks. Banditry is a problem. Crime is low in comparison with Nigeria but banditry on the Nigerian border increases risk levels.

10. Niger - General Terrorism Risk – M The risk of Islamic militants perpetrating terrorist acts is low. There are no known local terrorist groups or associates. Terrorists are active in neighbouring countries, such as Algeria.

11. Niger - General Travel Risk – L (H) Travel to many parts of Niger is possible. Travel to the Libyan and Nigerian border areas generally poses enhanced risks. Banditry is a more general risk outside towns and cities and Escorted overland travel is advisable. Residents in Islamic strongholds such as Zinder are resentful of Westerners, though attacks on foreigners have so far been rare. Citizens of countries that are participating in the US-led war on terrorism should remain vigilant in facilities in Niamey, and especially in rural areas where security forces have little control.

12. Niger - Niamey Niger is the second poorest country in the world; this has fuelled crime including thefts, carjacking and armed robberies. The principal security risk in Niamey is petty theft, both during the day and at night. There has also been an increase in residential robberies and serious carjacking incidents in the capital this year. Do not go walking on foot at night; vehicle travel at night should be restricted. Criminals will often operate in groups, with one or 2 members sent to create a distraction and others attacking the unsuspecting victim. Any travel outside Niamey should only be undertaken with adequate security.

13. Niger - Niamey There is likely to be a rise in crime rates during the period of the Francophone games. Niger’s security forces are inadequately equipped and under-resourced, and have poor weapons handling skills. Personnel should be cautious in approaching security forces and armed police. There is a risk of incidental violence during sporadic public protests.

14. Niger - Niamey Avoid all protests and large gatherings to avoid being caught up in violence. There is no real anti-Western sentiment in Niamey. Do not to carry large amounts of cash. Any essential nighttime travel should be done in the company of an experienced local and with adequate security. Personnel are advised to keep a low profile and are also advised to vary their routines and routes in light of rising carjacking incidents. It is highly unadvisable not to put up resistance when attacked.

15. Senegal Political Risk – L Democratic elections 2000. Widespread poverty may shore up future dissent. Hopes remain that a peace deal will eventually be signed in the separatist region of Casamance. Senegal continues to depend on the IMF and World Bank for support, which will partly ensure the continuity of business-friendly policies. The principal obstacles to business are bureaucracy, corruption and the poor state of the infrastructure outside the capital Dakar.

16. Senegal Security Risk - L (M) Security conditions are generally good, with the exception of the Casamance region. Despite a Muslim-majority population, there is no risk of terrorism to Westerners or Western interests that is higher than the overall worldwide threat of Islamic extremist terrorism. Growing Islamist sentiment prompts occasional demonstrations in Dakar. Strikes are common.

17. Senegal Terrorism Risk – L Senegal has no recent history of terrorism and there are no local terrorist groups. The risk of transnational extremist groups targeting foreign interests is low.

18. Senegal Travel Risk - L (M) The security situation is acceptable for travel to most of the country and most visits are trouble-free. Petty theft remains a problem in the main business and tourist areas. Travel to the southern Casamance area beyond the coastal tourist resorts is inadvisable because of banditry and a proliferation of landmines. The area bordering Guinea-Bissau has the highest travel risk.

19. Senegal - Dakar Dakar is also considered a high crime risk city. Minor crimes such as pick pocketing, thefts from vehicles, minor assaults and burglaries are common and more violent crimes and crimes involving the use of weapons have increased. It is unsafe to walk the streets at night and doing so by day is likely to result in approaches from aggressive vendors and exposes the individual to opportunist crimes such as pick-pocketing or mugging.   Public protests, demonstrations and strikes occur regularly and should be avoided as police are likely to use batons and tear gas to control crowds.  Senegalese law requires that you have valid identifying documents on your person at all times so visitors are advised to carry photocopies of passports, driving licenses and other ID.

20. Ouagadougou Airport, Burkina Faso No major security issues are identified in relation to Ouagadougou airport.

21. Cotonou Airport, Benin No major security concerns identified. Elections in March 2006 are likely to fuel tensions in the run-up but this is unlikely to affect airport security. 

22. Bamako Airport, Mali No major security issues were identified.  Mali’s land-locked position and porous borders increase the airport’s exposure to cross-border crimes.

23. African Airports - General A degree of security awareness whilst refueling at African airports is necessary: - Keep aircraft locked whenever possible to avoid looting. - Be wary of being invited to do anything which involves leaving the aircraft alone, such as visiting the terminal or air traffic control. - Be aware that the airport’s perimeters are not likely to be intact. - Be discreet about presence of expensive equipment in aircraft.

24. UK Political Risk – L Security Risk – L (M) Terrorism Risk - M Travel Risk – L

25. Vaccinations • YELLOW FEVER • Certificate of vaccination is required to enter Niger • The certificate is valid 10 days after inoculation • Recommended immunisations • Polio • Hepatitis A • Typhoid Fever • Tetanus • Diptheria • Considered immunisations • Hepatitis B • TB • Rabies (Clinic in Niger has treatment in case of infection, not considered a big risk in Niamey / Dakar)

26. Malaria • Malaria is present in all areas of Niger and Senegal • Recommended anti-malarial drugs • Doxycycline (sensitive to the sun) • Malarone • - Mefloquine

27. VISAS • A VISA is required for entry into NIGER (valid for three months) • SENEGAL – EU OK for less than three months, but individuals responsibility to check • VISA forms available on • http://www.action-visas.com • Can order them through the website or take forms to Niger Embassy in Paris

28. DFL PASSES A DFL Pass is required to fly on the UK ARA This involves getting clearance through Disclosure Scotland http://www.disclosurescotland.co.uk And references More info on www.faam.ac.uk or contact me or Jamie Trembath

29. Dress Code Feedback from the recce is that to move around the airport freely some kind of uniform will be required, more information will come out from this campaign No open toe shoes to be worn on the aircraft – it should be treated like working in a lab

30. AIRCRAFT FIT

31. AIRCRAFT WEIGHTS

32. What FAAM need to know • Is there a requirement for a science transit? • This needs to be known ASAP as it affects planning and logistics • Suitcase flights? – landing permissions important • Mission scientist training – May 2006 • Flight plans, aircraft tool kit • Separate warm up / flight operators

33. Information from FAAM • Jamie Trembath – AMMA Campaign Specialist • (jatr@faam.ac.uk, 01234 754520) • Bob Wells – FAAM Operations Manager • (rowel@faam.ac.uk, 01234 754864) • Steve Devereau – FAAM Technical Manager • (stde@faam.ac.uk, 01234 754523)

34. Info from DABEX • Hotel • Early breakfasts (before 6am) available • Hotel now takes VISA • Hotel rooms have safes • Airport • Engineers room complete, air con and power on airport secure supply • Toilet renovated • Store room completed and cleaned • Upstairs lab incomplete – hoping to be completed by 15 Jan • DFL Office in control tower complete but installation of telephone line problematic • Air con unit for aircraft, complaints that it is too cold! • Access to airport with DFL pass

35. Info from DABEX Internet Vsat system not working, the satellite dish supplied was not large enough 256kB wireless system obtained for £300, seems to be sufficient at present. If works out OK will not pursue Vsat for AMMA R/BGAN reliable but expensive ($1000 in first week) Telephones Mobile phones have been purchased for all personnel, SIM cards purchased to allow phones to be used on ASECNA network, meaning calls between these mobiles are free. Can be reached from the UK 00227######