Julian Whichello Bernie Wishard Division of Technical Support

1. USSP-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for SafeguardsSanta Fe, USA, 23 - 27April 2007Research and Development Activities at the IAEA Julian Whichello Bernie Wishard Division of Technical Support

2. Presentation Overview • Objectives • Part 1: “New” technologies • Non-destructive analysis (NDA) • Unattended radiation monitoring systems (UMS) • Other measurement and monitoring systems • Surveillance • Containment • Part II: “Novel” technologies • On-site verification • On-site complementary access and forensics • Stand-off detection • Nuclear fuel cycle • Indicators and signatures • Source location

3. Verification & Detection Technologies “New” Instruments and methodologies already in use by the Agency for safeguards applications “Novel” Instruments and methodologies not applied previously to safeguards applications

4. Trends in Methods & Instruments Development in Support of SG Approaches Includes methods and instruments in support of traditional on-site inspection activities and unattended monitoring to ensure continuity of knowledge between site visits and the absence of undeclared activities and materials “Traditional” Safeguards approach (Declared activities at declared locations) e.g. Material accountancy, radiation measurement (γ & n), surveillance, seals, etc. Includes methods and instruments in support of expanded safeguards implementation approaches Integrated Safeguards approaches (incl. Additional Protocol) (Undeclared activities at declared locations) e.g. Environmental sampling (solids), information analysis, monitoring illicit trafficking, satellite imagery and other “new” technologies Includes methods and instruments in support of enhanced complementary access capabilities and other inspection activities Complementary access and other investigative inspection activities (Undeclared activities at undeclared locations) e.g. “novel” technologies for complementary access, forensics and detection ------------------------------------------------------------------> 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

5. IAEA Strategic Objectives 2006 – 2011 Requires: • Enhanced detection capabilities through the development of new, or improved, safeguards approaches and techniques, and acquire more effective verification equipment. Strategy: • Improve present detection capability and pursue R&D activities in the development of novel technologies for detection of undeclared activities • Utilize, inter alia, Member States Support Programme mechanisms as well as internal resources and expertise

6. Safeguards Verification Equipment Power reactors and storage facilities Materials: Irradiated fuel Conversion and fuel fabrication plants Materials: U, Pu oxides and MOX Reprocessing plants Materials: U and Pu nitrates Enrichment Plants Material: UF6 Gamma ray spectrometry, neutron counting, weighing, destructive analysis, surveillance Video surveillance, fuel flow monitoring, Cerenkov glow detection, gamma ray detection, neutron detection Weighing, destructive analysis, fuel flow monitoring, gamma ray detection, neutron detection, surveillance Gamma ray spectrometry, weighing, destructive analysis

7. Challenges at Research Reactors Verification objectives: • Verify non-production of fissile material (irradiation) • Verify the non-diversion of nuclear fuel in a complex working environment Developments in UMS: • Advanced Thermal Power Monitor (ATPM)

8. New TechnologyAdvanced Thermal Power Monitor - ATPM Screen Shot Ultrasonic and Thermal Detectors Advanced Thermal Power Monitor (ATPM)

9. Challenges at Enrichment Plants Verification objectives: • Verify enrichment non-intrusively • Confirm the absence of HEU without full access • Quantify materials to guard against excess production Developments in UMS: • Laser spectroscopy to analyze UF6 and reduce DA samples • Continuous flow verification of UF6 cylinders by Laser item identification system (LIIS)

10. New TechnologiesTuneable Diode Laser Spectroscopy (TDLS) Source: Canberra Needs:(i) Possible applications as a continuous gaseous uranium enrichment monitor based on precise specific isotopic species excitation (ii) Non-intrusive, real time method to detect the presence of HF/UF6 in the vicinity of a suspected facility (Novel!)

11. Challenges of Plutonium Facilities Verification objectives: • Bulk material in various forms mixed with impurities • Total uncertainties often >> 1 SQ • Large facilities require networking and integration of unattended radiation systems with C/S Developments: • Sophisticated software for near real time monitoring • Monte Carlo Simulations crucial for design and calibration • Better authentication • Higher reliability • Quick replacement of components

12. New TechnologyUnattended Radiation Monitoring - VIFB VIFB Detectors VIFB Screen Shot VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor CANDU Bundle Counter (VIFB)

13. New TechnologyUnattended Radiation Monitoring - VIFC VIFC Wall-mount Detector VIFC Floor-mount Detector VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor CANDU Core Discharge Mon. (VIFC)

14. Modern, fast electronics are making an old idea realizable. Both neutron and gamma-ray information from a single detector. Fast response to measure higher order multiplicities and/or materials with large (alpha,n) emissions PMT Glass NE- 213 Glass PMT New TechnologiesLiquid Scintillators for Safeguards Conceptual diagram of a liquid scintillator based assay instrument

15. New TechnologiesMonte Carlo Calculations IAEA has substantial Monte Carlo simulation capabilities using parallel computer based on 16 CPU In the future, a Monte Carlo model must be included in the delivery of all gamma and neutron sensors

16. Challenges for Dry Spent Fuel Verification objectives: • Must be verified before loading • Continuity of knowledge (CoK) during transfer • Storage cask difficult to access • Inspection resources to cover transfer activities • Quantify content by independent NDA method Developments: • Mobile Unit Neutron Detector (MUND) for transport Small, battery operated (8 weeks continuous operation) Quick service by modular swapping • Reproducible Gamma and neutron fingerprints • Dry storage loading by Silo Entry Gamma Monitor (SEGM) Gross gamma silicon detectors Direction sensitive Easy to relocate to empty silos

17. Challenges for Wet Spent Fuel Verifications Verification objectives: • Spent fuel increases worldwide • NDA is the only practical verification, but intrusive • Underwater measurements are resource intensive • Pin removal extremely difficult to detect Developments: • Passive gamma tomography under development • Optical fiber sensitive to gamma emission for insertion between bundles

18. New TechnologiesAdvanced CZT Array for Spent Fuel Tomography An example of sensor array under development: • Passive Gamma Emission Tomography developed by MSSPs • Addresses the problem of the partial defect of spent fuels to the pin level. • 2 detector arrays each formed by a stack of 104 special CZT detectors embedded in a tungsten collimator.

19. Challenges for Waste Verification objectives: • Facilities generate lots of waste • Normally very low conc. NM and non-homogeneous • No representative sampling means NDA • Uncertainties often exceed specified goal Developments • ISOCS (In Situ Object Counting System) extremely valuable for gamma spectroscopy • Specialized neutron coincidence counters for in process materials and hold-up under development

20. New Developments for Sensors and Platforms R&D activities focused on technologies that can be implemented in less than 2 years IAEA continually seeks to exploit emerging sensor technologies that: • Address present measurement deficiencies • Higher reliability • Ensure the security of information • Multiple functions

21. Platforms for Sensors IAEA requires the next generation of unattended processors (NGPs) that consolidates inputs and provides authentication from the sensors. NGPs are being developed for surveillance and radiation processing. Capabilities include: • Autonomy of operation • Tamper indicating enclosures • Small and radiation tolerant for location close to sensor • Programmable functionality to emulate multiple functions (i.e. Multi-channel analyzers or shift registers)

22. Future of Sensors or Platforms • Smaller, low-power, smart portable • Greater degree of autonomy • Robust with multipurpose detection functions • Wireless transmission • Enhanced mobility for the inspector • Authentication from sensor to cabinet • Use of other emanations

23. New TechnologiesSurveillance - NGSS

24. New TechnologiesSurveillance - NGSS

25. New TechnologiesSurveillance - NGSS

26. New TechnologiesSurveillance - NGSS

27. New TechnologiesSurveillance - NGSS The work for the design, testing, and production of the NGSS is performed in four separate Phases: • Phase 1 (Conceptual Design): Parts I and II (completed) • Phase 2 (Detailed Design) (completed) • Phase 3 (Prototype Development) • Phase 4 (Pre-production qualification testing, start of field testing) • Final delivery of NGSS product samples, commencing with Cat. A authorization process

28. Novel Verification TechnologiesGround Penetrating Radar (GPR) Needs: Verification of declared underground movements of Safeguarded items Detection of undeclared underground facilities Techniques include: • Ground penetrating radar (HF centimetres of penetration – VHF metres of penetration) • Acoustic sonar (either from a sound source, a pneumatic hammer or controlled explosive) • Passive magnetic mapping • Resistance mapping • Magneto-telluric (MT), with either natural (lightning strikes) or controlled sources (kilometres) • Gravity anomaly measurements • Terahertz imaging (tens of centimetres) Remark(s): (i) Different techniques offer different levels of ground penetration and object resolution (ii) The Agency has established the Application of Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) group of experts to advise on a future integrated safeguards approach for geological sites.

29. New TechnologiesSurveillance – NGSS Design Goals • Integration of camera assembly and SCC to diminish vulnerabilities • Picture Taking Interval (PTI) as fast as 1 image per second • Support for high resolution and full color images • TCP/IP networking over Ethernet • Scalable removable storage media • Low power consumption (48 hours on battery) • High reliability under harsh environmental conditions (e.g., radiation) • Co-existence of NGSS with DCM-14 (DIS) • COTS and non-proprietary components where possible

30. New TechnologiesSummary • Smaller, low-power, smart portable • Greater degree of autonomy • Robust with multipurpose detection functions • Wireless transmission • Enhanced mobility for the inspector • Authentication from sensor to cabinet

31. “New” Technologies www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/sv.html www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ Safeguards/Teaming_Inspectors/ Find out more at:

32. “Novel” Technologies Target applications: Verification Complementary access & forensics Detection

33. “Novel” Technologies Target example applications: Verification Neutron imaging Magnetic resonance for flow & enrich. mon. Antineutrino detection γ-ray Imaging with 3-D LIDAR* Complementary access Laser spectrometry techniques (LIBS, LALIF) & forensics Optically stimulated emission (OSL) Laser spectroscopy Solid state chemical sensors Stand-off Detection Mobile laser spectroscopy Mobile atmospheric gas sampling & analysis Energy emission detection and analysis * LIDAR = Light Detection and Ranging

34. Novel Verification TechnologiesNeutron Detection Matrix & Imaging Source: LANL Proposed need: To detect the presence (or to verify the absence) of enrichment above declared levels in a declared LEU GCEP (e.g countering undeclared production or embedded micro-cascade scenarios) Novel features: Low-power, self-organizing network of neutron detectors Description:

35. Novel Verification TechnologiesNon-intrusive Enrichment & Flow Monitor based on Magnetic Resonance Determining UF6 enrichment and flow without penetrating cascade pipe-work 235UF6/238UF6 enrichment Centrifuge cascade pipe work UF6 flow rate

36. Source: LANL Novel Verification TechnologiesNon-intrusive Enrichment & Flow Monitor based on Magnetic Resonance Proposed need: Non-intrusive enrichment and flow monitoring for a gas centrifuge facility Novel features: Measures both enrichment and material flow rate without penetrating cascade pipe-work Relatively low magnetic field requirement Description: Remark(s): Initial work on surrogate materials and studies, using uranium, look promising.

37. Source: LANL Novel Verification TechnologiesRFID Tags for real-time SG Item Tracking Perceived need: To track items of safeguards significance in real time (e.g. cylinders in a GCEP) Novel features: Low power consumption tag Self-healing topographies when networked End-to-end information security Range: metres to 10s of metres (RuBee 134 kHz) Rugged, commercial product (~$10/tag) Description: Remark(s): Recent work has identified brands of RFID which will not suffer irreparable damage at elevated temperatures.

38. Novel Verification TechnologiesAnti-neutrino Detectors for Reactor Monitoring Source: LLNL/SNL Proposed need: Monitor the core operating conditions of a nuclear reactor (power) Novel features: Tracks the core operating conditions directly Unattended continuous monitoring – rel. “non- intrusive” Self-calibrating, & claimed low capital & maintenance costs Description: Remark(s): Current “footprint” = 2.5 x 3 m Projected “footprint” = 1.25 x 1.25 m For research reactor monitoring? Remark(s): Field test conducted at San Onofre NPP

39. Novel Verification Technologiesγ-ray Imaging with 3-D LIDAR Source: JRC/LLNL/ORNL Proposed need: Design information and nuclear materials distribution verification verifier for complex nuclear facilities Novel features: Combines the Agency’s 3-D Laser Range Finder a LLNL-developed Compton γ camera New semiconductor technology -> high-spatial resolution collimator-less imaging Description: IAEA 3D-LRF Remark(s): Possible other applications in the verification of process hold-up in difficult-to-access areas and cascades

40. “Novel” Technologies Target example applications: Verification Neutron imaging Magnetic resonance for flow & enrich. mon. Antineutrino detection γ-ray Imaging with 3-D LIDAR* Complementary access Laser spectrometry techniques (LIBS, LALIF)* & forensics Optically stimulated emission Laser spectroscopy Solid state chemical sensors Stand-off Detection Mobile laser spectroscopy Mobile atmospheric gas sampling & analysis Energy emission detection and analysis *LIBS = Laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy LALIF = Laser ablation / laser-induced fluorescence

41. Novel CA & Forensics TechnologiesLaser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) Source: CSSP

42. Novel CA & Forensics TechnologiesLaser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) Source: LANL Proposed need: In-situ sample analysis to determine elemental, & isotopic compositions. Novel features: Field-portable instrument Determines elemental and isotopic composition Stand-off analysis (metres from the material of interest possible) Description: All elements & isotopes emit specific wavelengths when excited to sufficiently high temperatures. LIBS is based on atomic emission spectroscopy, utilising a laser pulse as excitation source, and spectrograph. Remark(s): A LIBS task already initiated under CAN A 1626

43. Novel CA & Forensics TechnologiesOptically Stimulated Luminescence in Forensics (OSL) Source: CSSP

44. Novel CA & Forensics Technologies Optically Stimulated Luminescence in Forensics (OSL) Source: PNNL Proposed need: U-enrichment sensor for GCEP over time (countering the “micro-cascade” scenario) Novel features: Simple, robust, low-cost, reusable passive sensor devices 108 dynamic range & high sensitivity to 0.01mR Description: Remark(s): The development of a different application of OSL initiated under task CAN A 1627

45. Novel CA & Forensics TechnologiesLaser Ablation / Laser-Induced Fluorescence (LALIF) Source: PNNL Proposed need: More rapid, on-site material analysis for the detection of undeclared enrichment, or reprocessing activities Novel features: Tuneable for 235U/238U, and other elements & isotopes Can easily detect 10μm particles (nanograms) Suggested method for pre-screening ES on-site Description: Remark(s): Technique is orders of magnitude less sensitive than NWAL route. However, it does provide other benefits, including on-site detection of 236U.

46. Novel CA & Forensics TechnologiesSolid-State Chemical Detectors Source: SNL/RF MSSP Proposed need: To detect specific chemical compounds associated with NFC processes Description: Sandia's µChemLab™ BD (bio-detection) unit has detected seven different forms of the bio-toxin ricin successfully. Photo by Bud Pelletier. Proposed solid-state sensor for the detection of fluorine and HF, produced by the release of UF6 from nuclear processes.

47. “Novel” Technologies Target example applications: Verification Neutron imaging Magnetic resonance for flow & enrich. mon. Antineutrino detection γ-ray Imaging with 3-D LIDAR* Complementary access Laser spectrometry techniques (LIBS, LALIF) & forensics Optically stimulated emission (OSL) Laser spectroscopy Solid state chemical sensors Stand-off Detection Mobile laser spectroscopy Mobile atmospheric gas sampling & analysis Energy emission detection and analysis

48. Novel Detection Technologies Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC)

49. Novel Detection TechnologiesNFC Enrichment

50. Enrichment using UF6 • Diffusion • Gas Centrifuge • Molecular Laser • Aerodynamic Enrichment using UCl4 • Chem. Exchange • Ion Exchange • Electromagnetic Enrichment using Umet • Atomic Vapor Laser (AVLIS) • Plasma methods Novel Detection TechnologiesNFC Enrichment UF6 UF6 UCI4 UCI4 Feed Product U met. U met. Diverted UF6, UCI4 or U met. highly enriched in 235U Waste (Tails)