Peter Railton : “Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality”

1. Peter Railton: “Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality” Does sophisticated consequentialism avoid being too demanding?

2. Alienation R. explicitly references the ‘demands of morality.’ Moral schizophrenia is not explicitly about the demands of morality. The things one is alienated from though are “one’s feelings or sentiments, from other people, or even from morality itself.” It is characterized by “a kind of estrangement, distancing or separateness…resulting in some sort of loss.” Neither need be “attended to” or “noticed.” (134)

3. 2 examples John and Anne: John seems like “a model husband. He almost invariably shows great sensitivity to his wife’s needs, and he willingly goes out of his way to meet them. He plainly feels great affection for her.” When a friend comments, he says “I’ve always thought that people should help each other when they’re in a specially good position to do so. I know Anne better than anyone else does, so I know what she wants and needs…it’s no great burden…I get a lot of satisfaction…Just think how awful [marriage/life] would be if people didn’t take special care of the people they love.” (135) What’s wrong with John?

4. Example 2 Lisa has been depressed and thanks her friend Helen for sticking by her. Helen says. “You don’t have to thank me…you deserved it. It was the least I could do after all you’ve done for me. We’re friends, remember? And we said a long time ago that we’d stick together no matter what. Some day I’ll probably ask the same thing of you, and I know you’ll come through. What else are friends for?” (136) What’s wrong with Helen’s answer?

5. The Moral Point of View The defect in John and Helen’s responses, according to Railton, is that they think “impersonally” about their relationships. But morality clearly requires that we take up an impartial point of view at times. But Railton thinks this is too complacent: Loving relationships are part of a good life. If moral considerations are overriding then they override these and other goods.

6. Radical Impartiality and Psychological Realism Rawls in A Theory of Justice describes a perspective of impartiality across “all individuals and times…and this is ‘a form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt in the world…” It would be “purity of heart.” Railton: This is not a standpoint we can adopt. So is impartiality psychologically unrealistic?

7. The ‘Paradox’ of Hedonism *Quotes: Because it is not a logical paradox. If we adopt the end of maximum happiness we would miss out on the kinds of things that would actually make us happy. This could mean two things (1) We cannot pursue happiness directly and (2) The things that are part of a happy life might also be difficult and not conducive to immediate happiness. (?) Acting for the sake of the other person in a relationship is part of what makes us happy in relationships. (141)

8. Commitment A commitment to an end as such need not be an overriding commitment. Commitments usually have contingencies. Most of our non-moral commitments will be conditional. E.g., “if a planned life project proves less engaging or practical than one had imagined…if members of a relationship came to believe that they would be better off without it…” “A sensible hedonist would not forever be subjecting his affections or commitments to egoistic calculation…” (142)

9. Distinguishing kinds of hedonism resolve the ‘paradox’ Subjective hedonism=Adopt the hedonistic point of view for each action. Objective hedonism=“one should follow that course of action which would in fact most contribute to one’s happiness, even when this would involve not adopting the hedonistic point of view in action…” (143) In that sense, objective hedonism is indirect. Sophisticated hedonism=The agent “aims to lead an objectively hedonistic life” and doesn’t commit to subjective hedonism. E.g., he really becomes a loyal friend rather than just trying to appear as a loyal friend.

10. Indirection Example of tennis: A pro tells a competitive tennis player to forget about wining and instead enjoy the game for its own sake. Thinking about winning is self-defeating so he chooses to forget about winning while he’s playing but “he need not hide from himself his goal of winning…” Sophisticated hedonist and friendship: His choice meets a counterfactual condition: “he would not act as he does if it were not compatible with leading an objectively hedonistic life…” (145)

11. The Place of Non-Alienation Among Human Values Alienation may not always be bad. (1) ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and we ought to do things out of love or sympathy sometimes but we can’t in every case. So we need duties and obligations in friendships and family relationships. (2) People need distance from their sentiments. E.g., if a parent favors one child over siblings. (3) There will always be conflicts between goals and avoiding alienation. E.g., Williams’ ground projects should be up for scrutiny. To be autonomous, we have to detach and thinka bout our commitments.

12. Benefits of alienation Another benefit of alienation is that “alienation of some individuals or groups from their milieu may at times be necessary for fundamental social criticism or cultural innovation. And without some degree of inauthenticity, it is doubtful whether civil relations among people could be maintained.” (148) Does this speak to moral schizophrenia—the lack of harmony between one’s reasons and one’s motives?

13. Reducing alienation in morality Because of experience machine cases, utilitarianism is a non-starter. A wonderful subjective mental state is not what makes a life good. We should also not treat all goals instrumentally in the way of the hedonistic utilitarian—some things may be good for their own sake.

14. A better approach: Pluralism about value Rather than subjective mental states, “several goods are viewed as intrinsically, non-morally valuable—such as happiness, knowledge, purposeful activity, autonomy, solidarity, respect, and beauty.” (149)

15. Juan v. John Juan says when asked about all the good he could do instead of spending so much time caring for his wife “it’s a better world when people can have a relationship like ours and nobody could if everyone were always asking themselves who’s go the most need…You’d make things worse in a worry if you broke up those close relationships for the sake of some higher goal…” (He doesn’t trust moral saints, by the way.) So why is Juan’s the better answer?

16. The contrast Juan does “subject his life to moral scrutiny.” He doesn’t just say what Williams says he should say which is “it’s my wife.” So he is not being purely partial. What Railtonsyas is that his “motivational structure” “meets a counterfactual condition.” He “would seek to lead a different sort of life if he did not think his was morally defensible.” (151) Do does Juan avoid alienation? (Note this doesn’t really tell us what makes a life morally defensible yet—but it is realizing something from the list of abstract goods.)

17. Meaning We want to see ourselves “as part of a more general, lasting and worthwhile scheme of things.” (152)

18. Two Kinds of Consequentialism (1) Subjective consequentialism: For each action, do the thing that would promote the most good. (2) Objective consequentialism: “the criterion of rightness of an act or course of action is whether it in fact would promote the good of those acts available to the agent.” Objective consequentialist act/life: Brings about the most good. Sophisticated consequentialist: “Someone who has a standing commitment to leading an objectively consequentialist life” but not committed to each decision as based on good consequences. The person “will belief he should act forthe best” but does not use the consequentialist calculus…

19. Does this face the usual problems with indirection? Some usual problems (1) How do you get it right? Is it some kind of accident? (2) Are you hiding a truth from yourself about why you do things? [That would raise Stocker’s criticism.]

20. Some benefits of SC (1) We often need to act quickly. (2) Many actions are too trivial to deliberate about their long term consequences. (Avoids paralyzing regresses like how long should you think about the consequences for, etc.) (3) Indirection helps us ina lot of cases—like tightrope walker who shouldn’t be thinking about keeping his concentration.

21. What if we wholly exclude maximizing the good? Would that kill consequentialism? Railton: No—it is a virtue. The truth conditions of SC are separate from the acceptance conditions. There’s a definite criteria of right action and some ways of making decisions will be better than others—but they don’t have to be subjective consequentialist methods. (156)

22. Negative Responsibility: How demanding is consquentialism? Objective consquentialismis potentially demanding. But Railton says that it really demands that we change our society in the long run—the demands don’t have to be a personal demand. Sometimes change disrupts people’s projects: But what if people have more satisfying lives as a result? Changes to laws and social customs enforcing sexism and racism disrupted the projects of white men, but it may have given women and people of color more satisfying lives. So project disruption is not necessarily defeating.

23. Alienation from morality We have an “almost universal urge to rationalize our acts and our lives” and this shows that we want to look at things from the general (moral) point of view. How might we answer the question ‘why should I be moral?’ It could be from thinking of morality as “selfless, impartial, impersonal….” It could be as a good strategy for the self as Hobbes said.

24. These 2 perspectives are psychologically misleading They assume that a person is a “presocial, rational, abstract individual…” Rather a person is “situated in society, complete with identities, commitments and social relations…” (167) Meaning and respect are both social, not necessarily private. So we are already “non-alienated.” There is an assumption that we have to explain concern for the self and one’s goals but not concern for others and the world: “denying the significance of anything beyond the self may undercut the basis of significant for the self.” (169) [But Railton does not consider at length here whether the significance given these things can be justified by the impartial, general. Objective perspective.]