Dr. Taras Kuzio, Senior Fellow, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto.

1. The 2010 Ukrainian Presidential ElectionsInstitute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University, 22 January 2010 Dr. Taras Kuzio, Senior Fellow, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto.

2. Political Crisis and Elite In-Fighting: 2007-2009 2008-09: in-fighting undermined Yushchenko; Spread disillusionment in Ukrainian democracy; Global financial crisis: Ukraine one of the worst affected in Europe: GDP collapsed by 30%; IMF Stand-By Agreement $16.4 billion; Parliament blocked by Party of Regions populist demands and president continued undermining government; Tymoshenko seeking election as sitting prime minister.

3. Election Results • Yanukovych: 35%; • Tymoshenko: 25%; • Tihipko (best result): 13%; • Yatseniuk (worst campaign): 7%; • Yushchenko: 5%; • No knock-out; • Tymoshenko has a chance; • 20% middle class vote: spread nationally ; • Yushchenko result far worse than Kravchuk in 1994. • Balance of forces going to second round: 50-55% (potentially Tymoshenko) versus 40-45% (potentially Yanukovych). Yanukovych: • additional voting resources for round 2 are weak, except Symonenko; • Tymoshenko: • Orange vote (Yatseniuk, Yushchenko, Grytsenko): either stay at home or vote negatively; • Tihipko vote: former Yanukovych and Yushchenko voters. Who will they support in round 2? Round 1 Round 2

4. Yushchenko Result Dashes Hopes of Prime Minister Position

5. Election Results: State of Ukrainian Democracy • Widespread cynicism and disenchantment; • Democracy equated with chaos; • Voters selling votes on internet; • Reflected in low public trust in institutions and all candidates receiving high negative rates of distrust; • Fed up of elite in-fighting; • Turnout still respectable (68%); • Pro-European, reform forces won 5th election since 2002;

6. Serhiy Tihipko Tymoshenko’s technical candidate? Defeated Yatseniuk for 3rd place; Prime Minister under President Tymoshenko; Biography Dnipropetrovsk clan, Labour Party; Viktor Pinchuk; Head of Yanukovych’s 2004 election campaign; Head of National Bank; Minister of Economics (Yushchenko government).

7. Tihipko and Yatseniuk: Choices • Yatseniuk voters all ex-orange: gives him less flexibility; • Tihipko voters are two thirds ex-Yanukovych and one third ex-orange: greater flexibility; • Tihipko : What to do? • Accept Prime Minister position in Tymoshenko presidency; • Wait for pre-term elections if Yanukovych wins elections; • Potential pre-term elections in 2010 only if Yanukovych is elected; • Threat to both: if they do not enter politics and government and wait until 2012 elections Ukrainian voters will forget about them.

8. Two-candidate election, as in every presidential election; Tymoshenko and Yanukovych enter 2nd round; “Beauty and the Beast”

9. Regional Factor and Presidential Elections • Central Ukraine swing region: Kuchma (1994), Yushchenko (2004); • Nation-building: national democratic vote moves West to Centre; • Capital city central to success of Orange Revolution; • West Ukraine is key battleground; • Will ‘orange’ candidates back Tymoshenko in round 2 or not vote; • Election fraud: Trans-Carpathia; • Central Ukraine: will voter turnout be low? 1994 and 2004 2010

10. Tymoshenko’s Strengths Charisma rare in Ukrainian political elites; Strong self confidence in her own abilities; Image of strong leadership absent in most other presidential candidates. Accusations of ‘autocratic tendencies’; Stewardess of Ukraine during global financial crisis; Tymoshenko is Ukraine’s best election campaigner; Greater numbers vote for BYuT than polls record;

11. Yanukovych’s Strengths • Seeks revenge for 2004; • Opposition base is easier to win presidency; • Fighting for political life; • Large financial resources: most oligarchs support him (Akhmetov, Firtash, Kolomoysky, Yaroslavsky, Grigoryshyn); • Disciplined voters: high turn out; • Round 1 candidates (Symonenko, Bohuslovska): 5% to Yanukovych in round 2; • Disillusionment among orange voters could lead to voter turnout in West and Centre; • Election fraud: Trans-Carpathia;

13. Attitudes to 2004 Elections • Orange Revolution key supporter & mobiliser; • Support for opposition candidate Yushchenko; • Support for criminal punishment for election fraud; • Argue aims of the Maidan were not implemented. • Orange Revolution was “political technology” (i.e. US conspiracy); • Yanukovych was legally elected; • No election fraud (as proven by no prosecutions); • Supreme Court ruling was illegal; • Attempted prosecutions were political persecution; • 2010 election will be proof (revenge) for above views. Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

14. Social Populism Ukrainian Elections: • Populist programmes; • High claims of socio-economic successes; • Extravagant promises; Tymoshenko: • Interventionist & populist? • Social market economy (New Labour); • Anti-oligarch and anti-corruption rhetoric; • Former Communists are Influential wing of Regions: populist policies; • Rada and presidential election programmes populist: greatest number of promises on 2010 election billboards; • 2009 law on increase in social payments: negative influence on IMF Stand-By Agreement. Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

15. Nation-Building, History and Language • Continue moderate nation-building policies in 1991-04; • Nation-building & history less personalised; • 1933 Famine recognized as genocide; • Legislation on Soviet persecution and nationalist partisans; • Continue moderate policies in place from 1991: • Ukraininisation of education; • Ukrainian only state language; • Ukrainianisation in TV and films. • D.Tabachnyk: Sovietophile-Russophile view of history & nationalism; • Neo-Soviet, anti-nationalist rhetoric in 2002 & 2004 elections; • Not support law on famine; • Benign historical view of Russia; • 2004, 2006, 2010 Elections: Russian as a second state language; Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

16. Separatism and the Crimea • Anti-separatist; • 2008 war: supported Georgian territorial integrity; • Never aligned with Russian nationalists in the Crimea. • 2006 elections: For Yanukovych bloc allied Regions & 2 Russian nationalist parties in Crimea; • 2008: supported independence of South Ossetia & Abkhazia; • Support for regional separatists in Trans-Carpathia. Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

17. Relationship to Europe • Batkivschina is the most active Ukrainian party in European parliament; • European Peoples Party supports Tymoshenko in 2010 elections; • Tymoshenko-Nemyria are active lobbyists in Brussels-Strasbourg; • EU membership at centre of 2010 election programme; • WTO membership: stepping stone to EU-Ukraine Free Trade Zone. • Regions cooperation agreement with Unified Russia, not with European parliament; • Few visits to Brussels-Strasbourg; • EU rhetoric reminiscent of Kuchma era; • Oligarchs interested in implementing Free Trade Zone policies? • Will Yanukovych’s election re-set relations with the EU? Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

18. Energy and Gas • No gas consortium with Russia; • Gas pipeline modernisation only with the EU; • No gas intermediaries (RosUkrEnergo); • Support for energy sovereignty; • Mobilised Rada for law blocking transfer of pipelines (February 2007); • Vanco and Black Sea shelf. • Yes to gas consortium with Russia; • Gas pipeline modernisation with the EU and Russia; • Gas intermediaries: yes please! • Vanco: Regions were 2 of 4 Ukrainian joint owners; • Renegotiate 2010 gas contract to receive gas subsidies. Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

19. NATO Backburner: • Popularity not increased; • Political instability; • Ukraine fatigue; • German opposition; • Bush and Obama; Tymoshenko: • Pro-NATO wing; • January 2008: joint letter to NATO; • PfP cooperation return to high levels. • No NATO membership; • PfP cooperation lower than in Kuchma era; • No pro-NATO wing of Regions; • September 2006: Yanukovych told NATO no MAP. Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

20. Relationship to Russia • EU seeks good Ukraine-Russia relations and stable gas transit; • Pragmatic economic-energy relationship. Does not impinge on Ukraine’s European integration; • Russia is a potential threat; • Criticised Medvedev letter to Yushchenko. • Endorsed by Russian media in 2010 elections; • Support for Single Economic Space Customs Union; • Support for separatism in Georgia; • Regions-Unified Russia cooperation (since 2005); • Dismiss Russia as a threat; • Support criticism in Medvedev letter; • Support Russia on new European Security Treaty; • For Ukraine’s neutrality, but back Sevastopol as long-term BSF base. Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

21. Post-Election Political Stability • No pre-term elections giving 2 years of stability; • President would have support of larger coalition and control government; • Party of Regions could disintegrate and businessmen orientate to Tymoshenko. • Seek pre-term elections leading to conflict with coalition and Tymoshenko; • Seek to bribe Tymoshenko businessmen and Lytvyn bloc to shift allegiances; • Tymoshenko could try and launch constitutional reforms towards full parlianmentarism to strip Yanukovych of power. Yulia Tymoshenko Viktor Yanukovych

22. 2 Big Questions and 7 Policy Areas for Next President and Prime Minister Who will be best in providing political will? Will EU come forward with membership offer? Elites remain above the law, rule of law degraded and increased corruption in judiciary; Oligarchs, separation of business and politics: neither Bandits to Prison or Amnesty; Constitutional reform; State of democracy, political fragmentation on left and right;

23. 2 Big Questions and 7 Policy Areas for Next President and Prime Minister Corruption (Transparency International): Ukraine improved its ranking in 2005-06 but deteriorating since 2007. Georgia: political will and better ranking. Business and foreign investment climate; Foreign policy: NATO on backburner, re-set of relations with EU; Russia.