Dr. Taras Kuzio Slavic Research Centre , Hokkaido University, Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced I

1. Ukraine, Trans-Atlantic Relations and Black Sea Security.“The Black Sea area in a Changing World – Old Issues in a New Bottle,” University of Shizuoka, 29-30October 2011 Dr. Taras Kuzio Slavic Research Centre , Hokkaido University, Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC

2. Myths 1 • “Pro-Western” ” versus “pro-Russian” Leaders and Political Parties: • Aggressive Russian pressure changes “pro-Russian” leaders L.Kuchma, V.Yanukovych; • Naivety of eastern Ukrainian elites towards Russia (1994, 2010); • V.Yushchenko/Our Ukraine: NATO membership never included in election programmes; • Ukraine fatigue in West under Yushchenko (2008-2009); • Yushchenko supports sentence against Tymoshenkoyet it undermines Ukraine’s EU integration; • A.Yatseniuk: was pro-NATO (2008) but became pro-Slavic union (2010); • Personal Interests More Important Than National Interests: • Revenge, personal enrichment; • Poor quality advisers;

3. Myths 2 • Russian Factor: • Russian MFA condemned sentence of Y.Tymoshenko; • Pro-Russian lobby inside Yanukovych administration: 7 Cabinet positions successfully lobbied by Moscow; • Tougher policies: President Vladimir Putin elected 2012; • Sevastopol: • “Kharkiv accords” gives Russia geopolitical interest who is in power in Kyiv; • If opposition returns to power: Moscow may again promote separatism (as in 2008-2009); • This could lead to Crimea becoming the next “South Ossetia”?: Reaction of EU and Turkey?

4. Who is Viktor Yanukovch? • Party of Regions Strongholds: Donetsk and Crimea: • Soviet and working class political culture; • Unrefined responses and language; • Intellectually insecure; • New Rich elites from1990s “Wild West” capitalism; • Economic nationalism (protectionism); • Vyanukovych: aUkrainian “Hugo Chavez”?;

5. Yanukovych the Outsider • First of four Ukrainian presidents to not support NATO membership; • “Euro-pragmatists” (Yanukovych) versus “Euro-romantics” (Yushchenko); • A la carte European integration: combines “Putinism” at home with European integration abroad; • Elite View of Ukrainian votersand Western Leaders: • Cynicism: EU (not US) accepts money from Ukraine (homes, businesses [RosUkrEnergo]), Cyprus); • Buy them: bribe or populist election promises; • Can hoodwink them; • Turn a blind eye: exaggerated view of Ukraine’s geopolitical importance to West;

6. Determinants of Foreign Policy Foreign policy is an outcome of domestic factors: • Personal factors: revenge against, and fear of, Tymoshenko; • Short-term factors (“momentocracy”) dominate medium-long-term horizons; • National identity: Russophile-Sovietophile; • Energy: “gas lobby” are in power; • Oligarchs and Business groups: declining pluralism compared to Kuchma era; • Corruption: Ukrainian and Western disbelief in anti-corruption policies; • Think tanks and experts: anti-intellectual and non-listening administration; • Media: censorship of TV;

7. Paralysis of Foreign Policy 1 • “Civil war” since Kuchmagate crisis (November 2000); • Kuchmagate protests and Orange Revolution: ignored and opposed by eastern Ukrainians; • Regional and political divisions growing under Yushchenko and Yanukovych: negative impact upon national integration; • Party of Regions: • Strongest and wealthiest Ukrainian party; • Resembles a reincarnated CPSU? • Cooperation with Unified Russia, Chinese Communist Party and European Parliaments Socialist political group;

8. Paralysis of Foreign Policy 2 • 2012 Parliamentary Elections : • Not recognised as “democratic” by OSCE: • Venice commission criticized new election law; • Opposition leaders in prison; • Tymoshenko sentence (7+3): bans her from 4 elections until 2020; • 2013: US/EU “black list” of Ukrainian officials? • 2015 Presidential Elections: • Yanukovych regime fears removal from office; • Election fraud greater than in 2004; • Orange Revolution 2?: Will it be non-violent as in 2004? • Severdonetsk 2?: How will Kyiv react to Donetsk separatism?

9. Impact on Foreign Policy • High temptation of corruption because elites are unaccountable; • Institutional weakness leads to failure to implement Western “signals:” • 2006: Yushchenko failed to act upon “signal” of NATO MAP (Membership Action Plan); • 2011: Yanukovych failed to act upon “signal” of EU Association Agreement;

10. Yanukovych “Multi-Vectorism” • Deception and distrust in foreign policy; • Party of Regions “Multi-vectorism”: • In opposition: support Russian-backed separatism in Georgia and arms embargo against Georgia. Opposed to Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO; • In power: support territorial integrity of states and NATO cooperation; • Psychological “multi-vectorism”: • Inferiority complex vis-à-vis West; • Demand respect from the West (and Russia) while undermining own image in the West;

11. Ukraine and GUAM • Origins: • Miezdymorze(Between the Seas): anti-Russian buffer based on Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and J.Pilsudski’s ideas. Promoted by L.Kravchuk(1991-1994); • GUAM established in 1997 by Kuchma-Shevardnadze; • 3 of 4 GUAM members threatened by Russian-backed separatism; • Pro-NATO and pro-US: GUAM becomes GUUAM (Uzbekistan) at 1999 NATO anniversary summit; • Diversification of energy supplies; • Opposition to Russian integration of CIS (Single Economic Space, Collective Security Treaty); • High Expectations and Stagnation: • 2004-2006: promotion by Yushchenko-Saakashvili; • 2008: Russian invasion of Georgia : only Ukraine supports Georgia; • Ukrainian leadership of GUAM stagnated under Yushchenko (2008-2009); • Yanukovych: upholds Russian position on Georgia and GUAM (2008-);

12. NATO and US • Disinterest in NATO: Yanukovych does not support NATO MAP or deep levels of NATO cooperation, including in Black Sea region; • Distrust in US: • Bush administration support for democracy promotion agenda; • Soviet conspiracy mindset: 2001 Bulldozer, 2003 Rose and 2004 Orange Revolutions (and Arab Spring) viewed as foreign-backed conspiracies;

13. European Union • EU’s Diverted Attention: • Internal crisis: Euro, Greece, etc; • “Arab spring” countries look more democratic than Eastern Partnership countries; • Ukraine and Eastern Partnership: • Leading country in Eastern Partnership; • Break-down of negotiations on Association Agreement an EU policy failure? • Moldova and Georgia take lead on new Association Agreements?

14. Conclusions • Ukrainian Foreign Policy Objectives are Undermined by Domestic Factors: • Personal issues, such as revenge; • Corruption (especially in energy); • Short-term time framesof elites; • Political-regional divisions: “civil war” since 2000 is deepening and dangerous in 2015; • Impact on Black Sea Region: • Stagnation of leadership in GUAM; • Disinterest in NATO and US-led cooperation; • Crisis in relations with EU; • Big business see Russia as threat to their economic interests;