PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence

1. PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence Week 19: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding

2. Lecture outline • Introduction: Can we speak of “post-conflict”? • Definitions: Post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding • Track record of war recurrence • Track record of negotiated civil war settlements • Failed conflict settlements in our case studies • “Post-conflict”? • The liberal international peacebuilding paradigm • Common items on the PCR/peacebuilding agenda • Peacebuilding standards • The liberal international peacebuilding paradigm

3. Lecture outline (2) • The blind spots of post-conflict reconstruction: gender and informal political institutions • The first blind spot: gender • The second blind spot: informal political institutions • Problems of violence in peace processes and PCR • 3 problems violence poses for peace implementation • 3 priorities in sustaining peace • Spoilers • Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) • Summary

4. Part I: Introduction: Can we speak of “post-conflict”?

5. Definitions: Post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding • Term “post-conflict reconstruction” could mean both the restoration of economic, political and social structures that existed prior to the outbreak of violent conflict (Pankhurst 2003), or the redesign of these structures to prevent the recurrence of large-scale violence. • Latter use is more common, though post-conflict reconstruction always involves elements of restoration. • Post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding are typically seen as very closely interlinked, if not interchangeable concepts:

6. Definitions: Post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding (2) • Last week’s definition: Peacebuilding involves “sustained and multidimensional efforts to address the structural causes of conflict … and to reconcile relationships affected by conflict” (Barnes 2009:14); • “post-conflict reconstruction is aimed at establishing institutions that are superior to those that existed before the violent escalation of the conflict and do not contain the same failures that led to the conflict in the first place” (Wolff 2006:156). • Furthermore, “[f]illing the bold, and often vague, pronouncements of peace settlements with substance is the unique contribution that post-conflict reconstruction makes to conflict settlement, and in doing so it is, indeed, a fundamental and necessary element of the conflict settlement process” (Wolff 2006).

7. Track record of war recurrence • 1946 to 1990: twice as many armed conflicts (intrastate and interstate) ended through military victory than through negotiation; • 1995 to 2004: negotiated settlements three times as likely to end war as military victory; • Between one-third and one-half of all ended conflicts revert to warfare within five years (Lomborg 2004); • 36% of civil wars that ended between 1945 and 1996 experienced renewed warfare (Walter 2004); • 30% of civil wars that ended between 1945 and 1999 reverted to warfare within two years (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). (See Call and Cousens 2007 for summary of this)

8. Track record of negotiated civil war settlements • 41 of 103 civil wars between 1945 and 1998 were concluded through negotiated settlement (13 were unresolved); • the mean survival of a civil war settlement is approximately 42 months; • approximately 37% of civil war peace agreements end in a return to violence within five years. (Hartzell et al. 2001) → Remember the discussion from last week about how such numbers can be contested based on the operationalisation of variables and the methodology used.

9. Failed conflict settlements in our case studies • Northern Ireland: 1973 Sunningdale Agreement; 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement • Rwanda: 1993 Arusha Accords → Note that failure is here being conceived of in negative peace terms. i.e. a return to warfare.

10. “Post-conflict”? • “Post-conflict” generally refers to a period when the “formal” phase of fighting has stopped and the threat of violence – apart from isolated incidents – is apparently over (Handrahan 2004). [Negative peace.]

11. “Post-conflict”? (2) Yet “post-conflict” might be misleading: • Because “after” the violence might be before the [new] violence (cp. previous slides); • because there might not be a “true” end point to violent ethnic conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1996); • because peace agreements need not [and maybe cannot?] resolve the conflicting goals of the contending parties, cp. Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina: “peace agreements do not resolve conflicts – at best they provide a framework in which conflicting goals can be accommodated and pursued by means other than political violence” (Wolff 2006); • because peace agreements may hold, yet witness changing forms of violence rather than a total end to violence; • because conflict can take on both violent and nonviolent forms and as such exists in all societies at all times (Conflict Resolution theory).

12. Part II: The liberal international peacebuilding paradigm

13. Common items on the PCR/peacebuilding agenda • demobilisation; • demining; • disarmament; • establishment of international and local civilian police forces; • rebuilding infrastructure; • establishment of the rule of law and a working judiciary; • institution-building; • socio-economic rehabilitation [and reorganisation]; • organising and supervising electoral processes; • education and promotion of human rights; • democratisation; • capacity-building; • psycho-social healing (Llamazares 2005).

14. Peacebuilding standards • Barnes (2009: 18): positive peace has been achieved “where democratic governance is established, where human rights are protected, and where sustained progress can be made towards development”. • “The Security Council recognizes that peacebuilding … requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence” (UN 2001 cited in Call and Cousens 2007: 4-5).

15. The liberal international peacebuilding paradigm • Since the end of the Cold War, the international organisations [and to a lesser extent also the international NGOs] that have been most prominent in peacebuilding efforts have been strongly committed to the liberal international peacebuilding paradigm (Paris 1997). • “The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy” (ibid.: 56).

16. The liberal international peacebuilding paradigm (2) Arguments in favour • Democracy empowers the people, increases legitimacy, responsiveness and accountability of the political system (e.g. Rueschemeyer et al. 1992); • [consolidated] democracies are less likely to experience ethnic violence (Gurr 2000); • economic and political freedoms reinforce each other (Lipset 1959; Moore 1966); • free market economies – if accompanied by the “right” social policies – can increase the wealth of a country and reduce socioeconomic inequalities (Williamson 2002); • according to modernisation theory, all countries will become free market democracies anyway (Huntington 2000; Rustow 1970).

17. The liberal international peacebuilding paradigm (3) Shortcomings • Political and economic transitions are tumultuous, conflict-ridden and lengthy processes (Huntington 2000); • the liberal international peacebuilding paradigm increases the risk of violent conflict by recommending multiple transitions at the same time; • war-shattered states are ill-equipped to manage the societal competition induced by political and economic liberalisation (Paris 1997); • the institutional and political incoherence of countries undergoing regime change open up opportunities for political leaders to manipulate ethnic identities for their own benefit (Snyder 2000); • neoliberal reforms lead to [temporary??] economic deterioration and tend to increase socioeconomic inequalities (Huber and Solt 2004; Przeworski 1991).

18. Part III: The blind spots of post-conflict reconstruction: gender and informal political institutions

19. The first blind spot: gender • Although there has been increasing awareness of the gendered oversight in ethnic conflict studies, women’s concerns are still typically excluded from peace processes (Handrahan 2004; Pankhurst 2003), despite UN Resolution 1325, and peace processes are usually highly masculinised. • This failure to consider women’s concerns reflects implicit or explicit attempt to restore pre-conflict gender roles, and the patriarchal constraints and norms of the international development community (ibid.). • The neglect of women’s particular concerns reinforces their symbolic role as mere objects/vessels in ethnic wars; the neglect of gender relations and gendered structures of society more widely constrains expectations of men and masculinity as well as women and femininity.

20. The first blind spot: gender (2) The post-conflict period may pose as much, if not more security threats to women (Handrahan 2004): • because trafficking in women, female slavery and gang rapes become more likely; • because women might be forced into prostitution out of economic necessity; • because domestic violence increases; • because “honour” killings and suicides are more likely to occur. →Think about what has been happening in the north and east of Sri Lanka since the end of the war in May 2009.

21. The first blind spot: gender (3) Implications of this gendered oversight for the peacebuilding project: • Failing to include former female combatants in the reintegration process may pose a serious security threat (MacKenzie 2009). • Women’s potential to contribute to economic, political and social development is underestimated (Pankhurst 2003). • Peacebuilding efforts that do not meet social realities are perceived as artificial and likely to cause tensions (Handrahan 2004).

22. The second blind spot: informal political institutions • Week 14: Informal political institutions are enduring structures that shape political interactions, but – unlike formal political institutions - are safeguarded through entrenched social mechanisms, not formally codified nor guaranteed by the state (Lauth 2000). Examples include networks of corruption and structures of civic life. • Despite an increasing awareness about the relevance of informal political institutions (Varshney 2001; Wimmer 2002), peace research, ethnic conflict studies and peacebuilding efforts have paid far more attention to questions of formal institutional design.

23. The second blind spot: informal political institutions (2) The relevance of corruption • Corruption can be broadly defined as acts in which public officials violate the formal rules and duties of their position in exchange for wealth or status gains either for themselves, their family or a private clique (Nye 1967). • Where corrupt networks form around ethnic solidarities – and there is ample evidence to suggest that they often do (Mauro 1995; Wimmer 2002) – this not only harms economic growth (Mauro 1995) but also fosters socioeconomic inequalities between ethnic groups and leads to political exclusion (Ndikumana 1998).

24. The second blind spot: informal political institutions (3) The relevance of corruption • Corruption thereby decreases both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state, fosters grievances, intensifies competition over resources and contributes to inter-ethnic tensions (Wimmer 2002). • By implicitly or explicitly accepting corruption, peacebuilding efforts can restore old or create new sources of resentment (Call and Cousens 2007).

25. The second blind spot: informal political institutions (4) The relevance of structures of civic life • According to Varshney (2001), structures of civic life that are interethnic and associational have a significant impact on the prospects of ethnopolitical stability, as they can countervail events that would otherwise lead to the polarisation of ethnic groups. • But although the empowerment of civil society features prominently on the peacebuilding agenda of international organisations such as the EU and UN, their civil society programmes for instance in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been ambiguous at best and detrimental at worst (Belloni 2001).

26. Part IV: Problems of violence in peace processes and PCR

27. 3 problems violence poses for peace implementation • Strategic and tactical use of violence to undermine peace. • Potential rise in criminal violence that can undermine the value of peace. • Psychological and physical effects of past violence. (Stedman 2002)

28. 3 priorities in sustaining peace • To overcome or minimize the threat of spoilers. • To demobilize soldiers & reintegrate them into civilian life. • To lay foundations for future long-term peacebuilding: reform of police & judiciaries; wider disarmament in society; building local capacity for human rights & reconciliation. (Stedman 2002)

29. Spoilers • Spoilers are “leaders and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their interests and who are willing to use violence to undermine it” (Stedman 2002:103). • Spoilers can be positioned inside or outside of a peace agreement (cp. President Habyarimana as inside spoiler, and the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution as outside spoiler in Rwanda).

30. Spoilers (2) • Spoiler problems also differ according to the number of spoilers, the type of spoiler (limited, greedy or total) and the locus of the spoiler problem (Stedman 1997). • Which management strategy is most appropriate depends largely on the spoiler type. Broadly speaking, “total spoilers … must be defeated or so marginalized that they can do little damage” (ibid.: 14), greedy spoilers “require a long-term strategy of socialization” (ibid.: 15) and limited spoilers can be appeased through inducements.

31. Spoilers (3) The problem with the spoiler framework (acknowledged by Stedman): • Stedman’s framework calls for caution regarding spoilers, but has little predictive or prescriptive value. Ultimately, it is neither possible to know the motivations of spoilers nor which strategy of spoiler management is likely to backfire.

32. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) “War may end, but if former combatants lack jobs and skills and if weapons are easily available, then violent crime may increase and rob citizens of their security and their hopes for a robust peace dividend” (Stedman 2002).

33. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) (2) “Although the tasks of disarmament and demobilization are often bundled, demobilization plays a far greater role in ensuring successful peace implementation” (Spear 2002).

34. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) (3) • Demobilization “is only possible when there is some measure of disarmament. Similarly, the success of demobilization efforts is contingent upon effective rehabilitation of the former combatants and their integration into civilian life or a restructured army”. • DDR has “a symbolic and political importance beyond the sum of its parts”. (United Nations Development Programme 2002)

35. Part V: Summary

36. Summary • There are [arguably] four crucial reasons why PCR/peacebuilding efforts fail: due to the inherent contradictions of the liberal international peacebuilding paradigm, peacebuilders’ blind spots regarding gender issues and informal political institutions, and the fact that it is impossible to anticipate the type or extent of the spoiler problem in peace processes. • From this follows that the success rate of peacebuilding projects may be improved by adopting a more moderate liberalisation agenda in post-conflict societies; taking the diverse experiences of women during conflict situations seriously in the peace process; addressing the risks of corruption and fostering interethnic structures of civic life; and appreciate that peacebuilding efforts will always be vulnerable to spoilers.