S&T foresight and government decision-making in the European Research Area

1. S&T foresight and government decision-making in the European Research Area Brussels, 21 November 2001 Introduction Rémi Barré OST Associate Professor, CNAM

2. S&T foresight activities are instruments for public decision making in the area of S&T policy : • addressing questions related to the science – society relationships • are developing at an unprecedented pace in most EU member states and elsewhere • have a high potential as open-co-ordination instruments Hence the importance to understand, clarify and assess their role in public decision-making processes.

3. The objective is to propose an interpretative framework of such foresight activities : • 1. what is meant by foresight • 2. the major drivers considered foresight exercise • 3. a typology of foresights • 4. acknowledged risks and limitations • 5. open questions • 6. challenges for foresight as goverrnment decision-making processes in the ERA

4. 1. What is meant by foresight Foresight is here definied as a potential new policy instrument, relevant to relate : • - the S&T change and innovation problematique, • - its economic, social, environmental, territorial and geo-political dimensions, • - the deepening of democracy in the context of a knowledge society.

5. Linkage with government decision-making • Such processes contribute to co-ordinating the anticipations of the institutions thus enhancing their strategic capabilities. • The aim of such processes is to ‘distribute’ strategic intelligence of the S&T dynamics in relation to society to the actors themselves. • S&T foresight as collective learning process to support strategic decision-making

6. 2. the major drivers considered • S&T change and the new forms of knowledge production and circulation • social and economic change (‘societal foresights’) • changes in professional, cultural and ethical norms • news forms of organisation (‘learning organis.’), • regional innovation systems and clusters, • geopolitical change, the governance of the global systems and international relations

7. 3. A typology of foresights • Axis 1 : the extensiveness of the foresight activity the number and variety of persons or the experts involved.

8. Axis 2 : the intensiveness of the foresight activity quality (completeness) of the learning cycles involved in each of the four phases • substance of the activities taking place, • what is produced, how, by which methods, • what impacts on the participants.

9. the typology : the groups of foresights Intensiveness strategic analytic scenario building industrial technology oriented focussed societal societal macro-societal extensiveness

10. macro societal foresights grouphigh extensiveness ; low intensiveness • Macro-Societal foresight is rooted in the tradition of public participation • The central focus is on who participates and the objectives are the creation of new networks and circulation of information • such widely spread exercises may end up in rather loose exchange of opinions among participants

11. focussed-societal groupmedium position on both axes • Like macro-societal foresight exercises, they involve a wide constituency of stakeholders. • But they are more focused at sectoral level, which may give them the advantages of a broad approach, but without the difficulties of size • They are becoming the standard procedure for policy making in some countries

12. strategic scenario building grouplow on extensiveness , high on intensiveness • important knowledge production activity, leading to a data and modelling challenge. • involve few people directly, having interactions only with a limited number of experts and, at best, some representatives of selected social groups. • Each stage involves some sort of qualitative or quantitative modelling. • The central focus is the internal coherence and plausibility quality of the scenarios

13. industrial technology oriented grouprather low on extensiveness, medium to medium high on intensivemess • more classical view of foresight : S&T aspects are seen quite independently from societal aspects. • they are quite analytic and focused, which can bring very valuable information for technology programme setting, • they are typical of industrially oriented technology promotion foresights

14. Acknowledged risks and limitations • too great a role for users, thus shifting objectives to short term, • when all opinions are legitimate, the risks of inconsistency and factual errors are high, • If foresight is just for anyone to present the pieces ‘on the table’ for whoever wants to use them, what is the real value added ? • Don’t societal foresight put at risk the normal channels of the political decision-making, de-legitimising the political arena ?

15. 5. Open questions • the nature and form of the deliverables and outputs of the project as a whole, • the nomination and exact role of the steering committee, as well as its ‘distance’ from political authorities, • the nomination procedure for the panel members, given the socio-political nature of the whole process, • the method and status of the integration of the divergent views within panels, and the different pieces brought by the different panels.

16. 6. Challenges for foresight as government decision-making processes in the ERA • the handling of the political dimensions of societally oriented foresights ; questions of diversity, legitimacy, openness, • the sensitiveness to different cultures in the respective disciplinary fields and/or countries, to different rationales among the key actors • the design and implementation of really interactive processes • the evaluation of foresights ; validity, credibility, quality assurance, criteria, ethical norms,

17. the infrastructures needed for access to background studies and previous results • infrastructures and mechanims for capitalisation of results, methodologies and experiences, • networking and coordination mechanisms allowing for decentralised, yet coherent and self-reinforcing foresight activities in the member states.