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Beyond Traditional IEEE 802.11 Security Marie Waldrick May 5, 2003

Beyond Traditional IEEE 802.11 Security Marie Waldrick May 5, 2003. Outline. Characterizing Wireless Networks Wireless technology, 802.11 currently 802.1X EAP Architecture 802.1X/EAP Future Trends-802.1X/EAP/TKIP Conclusion-802.11i. Characterizing Wireless Networks.

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Beyond Traditional IEEE 802.11 Security Marie Waldrick May 5, 2003

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  1. Beyond Traditional IEEE 802.11 Security Marie Waldrick May 5, 2003

  2. Outline • Characterizing Wireless Networks • Wireless technology, 802.11 currently • 802.1X • EAP Architecture • 802.1X/EAP • Future Trends-802.1X/EAP/TKIP • Conclusion-802.11i

  3. Characterizing Wireless Networks • Adhoc only requires wireless devices on each computer. • Infrastructure requires wireless devices on each computer AND a base station (with built in DHCP server and firewall)

  4. Peer-to-Peer (Adhoc) • Wireless devices have no access point connection and each device communicates with each other directly

  5. Client/Server (infrastructure networking) • Extends an existing wired LAN to wireless devices by adding an access point (bridge and central controller)

  6. Advantages to Infrastructure Mode • Automatic use of Network Address Translation (NAT) firewall –blocks all outside port requests • Local reserved IP addresses only used by clients. Those IP addresses will not show up on the internet. • The DCHP server (gateway) that is built into this NAT firewall does not require that any one computer be on (and functioning) in order to use the connection.

  7. Wireless Networks • By nature, wireless networks need to advertise their beacons to show their existence

  8. The IEEE 802.11 standard • Service set identifier (SSID) • Beacons frames broadcast network parameters are sent unencrypted • Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering • 802.11 uses 48 bit station identifiers in the frame headers • -check mac address to insure station has access • not part of 802.11 standard but used anyway to identify • Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) • Was supposed to provide authentication and privacy • Secret 40 bit keys, but unsafe at any length • Static-manually-configured keys • Weakness due to long life of keys and they are shared among many users

  9. 802.1X Standard -Solves user authentication problem -Standard for passing EAP over a wired or wireless LAN -EAP messages are packaged in Ethernet frames and don’t use PPP. -It is only authentication -Provides a security framework for port-based access control -Resides in the upper layers to enable new authentication and key management methods without changing current network devices. -The latest security technology should still work with your existing infrastructure

  10. 802.1X architecture overview AP Client Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server Concrete Authentication Protocol EAP carries concrete authentication protocol between Supplicant and Authentication Server RADIUS/UDP/IP: carries EAP between Authenticator and Authentication Server 802.1: carries EAP over 802 LAN between Supplicant and Authenticator

  11. 802.1x connection • A client device connects to a port on an 802.1x switch and AP • The switch port can determine the authenticity of the devices • The services offered by the switch can be made available on that port • Only EAPOL frames can be sent and received on that port until authentication is complete. • When the device is properly authenticated, the port switches traffic as through it were a regular port.

  12. EAP Transport “Authentication” Protocol Access point 3 5 4 2 Authentication Server 1 Laptop • 1 -Client Associates with Blocked Access Point • 2 -User Provides Login Authentication Credentials • 3 a)-Server<->user authentication • b)-Server delivers Unicast WEP key to Access Point • -Access point delivers broadcast WEP key Encrypted with • Unicast WEP key to client • 5 -Client and Access Point activate WEP and Use Unicast and Broadcast WEP keys for transmission

  13. Unicast-communication single host single receiver packets sent to a unicast address are delivered to the interface identified by that address

  14. Multicast is communication between a single host and multiple receivers Multicast Sends Packets to a Subnet, and defined devices listen for Multicast Packets

  15. What is EAP • Beyond simple user names and passwords • Easily encapsulated within any data link protocol • Provides a generalized framework for all sorts of authentication methods. • Simpler interoperability and compatibility across authentication methods • For example, when you dial a remote access server(RAS) and use EAP as part of your PPP connection, the RAS doesn’t need to know any of the details about your authentication system. Only you and the authentication server have to be coordinated. • The RAS server gets out of the business and just re-packages EAP packets to hand off to a RADIUS server to make the actual authentication decision.

  16. EAPoL packet structure EAP messages are packaged in ethernet frames and don’t use PPP

  17. A typical EAPOL protocol run SupplicantAuthenticator EAPOL start EAP request/identity EAP response/identity EAP request/MD5-challenge EAP response/MD5-challenge EAP success

  18. TKIP SEQ # Temporal key P1 P2 RC4 MAC addr IV/SEQ ciphertext S | D | body | | | MIC Integrity key hash WEP IV RC4 Shared secret key S | D | body IV | ciphertext | ICV CRC-32 | |

  19. TKIP(Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) • Addresses weak IVs, IV collisions • Firmware upgrade deployable to existing 802.11 hardware • Components -Cryptographic message integrity code -Packet sequencing -Per-packet key generation -Re-keying mechanism

  20. TKIP-MIC • Sender and receiver share 64-bit secret integrity key • MIC = H(src MAC|dst MAC|frame body)K • If receivers computation matches the MIC sent, then message presumed authentic • If 2 forgeries in a second, then assume under attack -Delete keys, disassociate, and reassociate

  21. TKIP-Packet Sequencing • Reuse 16-bits of WEP IV packet field for sequence number • Initialize sequence # to 0 for new encryption key • Increment sequences # by 1 on each packet • Discard any packet out of sequence

  22. TKIP-Per-packet Key • Phase 1: • Key_mix(128-bit temporal key, 48-bit MAC)=128-bit result • Ensures unique key if clients share same temporal key • Phase 2: Key_mix(phase 1 result, seq #) = 128-bit per-packet key Incrementing seq# ensures unique key for each packet • Keystream=RC4(128-bit per-packet key)

  23. TKIP-Rekeying • Key hierarchy • Master key • Established via 802.1x or manually • Used to securely communicate key encryption keys - Key encryption keys (2) • Secure messages containing keying material for deriving temporal keys • Key 1: encryption Key 2: integrity • Temporal keys(2) • Key 1: encrypting data Key 2: data integrity

  24. TKIP • If master key compromised, then TKIP is voided • The lack of PKI represents a huge issue on the AP side.

  25. Standard EAP with TKIP WLAN DesignAttack Mitigation Roles for Standard EAP WLAN Design

  26. 802.1X/EAP with TKIPThreats mitigated • Wireless packet sniffers -per packet keying -key rotation • Unauthenticated access -only authenticated users are able to access the wireless and wired network -optional access control on the Layer 3 switch limits wired network access • MITM -the mutual authentication nature of several EAP authentication types combined with the MIC can prevent hackers from inserting themselves in the path of wireless communications.

  27. 802.1X/EAP with TKIPAdditional Threats mitigated • IP spoofing -have to first authenticate to WLAN -layer 3 switch restricts any spoofing to the local subnet range • ARP spoofing -have to first authenticate to WLAN • Network topology discovery -have to first authenticator to WLAN -know network exist by SSID, but cannot access the network.

  28. 802.1X/EAP with TKIPThreats not mitigated Password attack -passive monitoring 802.1X/EAP exchanges between client and the access point -Protected EAP mitigates this by establishing a TLS tunnel from the client to the server before asking for user authentication credentials.

  29. Determines authentication encryption and MAC algorithms. Select by Server Default Cipher Suite TLS_DHE_CSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA IETF-802.11i CipherSuite CipherSuite Back End (EAP) Server Network Access Server (NAS) Trust Client Laptop EAP Conversation (over PPP, 802.11, etc.) Keys for Link Layer CipherSuites EAP method EAP Method

  30. IEEE 802.11i Embraces 802.1x and TKIP Replaces RC4 with AES for encryption and integrity 48-bit sequence counter, 128-bit key Requires coprocessor, therefore new hardware deployment

  31. Summary • Mobile communication technology will continue to grow encouraged by switching to packet-switched 3G cellular phones • Results in natural progression to accessing the internet without wires • Results in requiring more privacy/security protection mechanisms • Standards/vendor products eventually evolve to meet customers’ needs

  32. The Alliance announced the first certified products with WPAApril 29, 2003 • The Wi-Fi Alliance created Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) in October of 2002 as a stepping stone between the sullied Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) encryption that has long been part of the 802.11 specifications, and the upcoming 802.11i standard that will bring IEEE endorsed security to WLANs. http://www.80211planet.com/news/

  33. References: • P. Nikander, Authorization and charging in public WLANs using FreeBSD and 802.1x, Ericsson Research NomadicLab, pekka.nikander@ericsson.com • IEEE Draft P802.1X/D11: Standard for Portbased Network Access Control, LAN MAN StandardsCommittee of the IEEE Computer Society,March 27, 2001. • L. Blunk and J. Vollbrecht, RFC2284, PPP ExtensibleAuthentication Protocol (EAP), IETF,March 1998. • C. Rigney, S. Willens, A. Rubens, W. Simpson, RFC2865, Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS), IETF, June 2000. • http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/so/cuso/epso/sqfr/safwl_wp.htmns? • Cisco Networking Academy Program: Second-Year Companion Guide, Cisco Systems, Inc., Cisco Press 2001. • Glen Fleishman, “Key to Wi-Fi security”, http://www.infoworld.com/article/ /03/01/10/030113newifisec_1.html • H.Anderson,“Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP), http://www.globecom.net/ietf/draft/draft-josefsson-pppex-eap-tls-eap-02.html • Rob Flickenger, “Using SSH Tunneling”, http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/wireless/2001/02/23/wep.html • http://www.ietf.org/ietf/lid-abstracts.txt • www.inetdevgrp.org/20020618/WLANSecurity.pdf • http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~gt0369c/802_11%20Security%20Survey_slides.pdf

  34. Thank You

  35. Notes: • If access is approved, the authenticator hands over a unique per-supplicant master key from which the supplicant's network adapter derives the TKIP key, the packet integrity key, and other cryptographic necessities. The user can then be authenticated • EAP is used to frequently refresh the master key, reducing the window of opportunity for intercepting packets for cracking.

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