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MIPA. MASS / DKIM BOF. IETF – Paris 4 Août 2005 dkim.org mipassoc.org/mass. Agenda. NOTE WELL AD Greeting Russ 5 min Agenda bashing Jim & Dave 5 min DKIM Review Eric 20 min IPR comments Miles 5 min Charter Jim & Dave Review 15 min Open mic 15 min Bashing 45 min
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MIPA MASS / DKIM BOF IETF – Paris4 Août 2005 dkim.org mipassoc.org/mass
Agenda • NOTE WELL • AD Greeting Russ5 min • Agenda bashing Jim & Dave 5 min • DKIM Review Eric 20 min • IPR comments Miles 5 min • Charter Jim & Dave • Review 15 min • Open mic 15 min • Bashing 45 min • DKIM Working Group interest hum 5 min MASS/DKIM BOF
N O T E W E L L Any submission to the IETF intended by the Contributor for publication as all or part of an IETF Internet-Draft or RFC and any statement made within the context of an IETF activity is considered an "IETF Contribution". Such statements include oral statements in IETF sessions, as well as written and electronic communications made at any time or place, which are addressed to: • the IETF plenary session, • any IETF working group or portion thereof, • the IESG, or any member thereof on behalf of the IESG, • the IAB or any member thereof on behalf of the IAB, • any IETF mailing list, including the IETF list itself, any working group or design team list, or any other list functioning under IETF auspices, • the RFC Editor or the Internet-Drafts function All IETF Contributions are subject to the rules of RFC 3978 and RFC 3979.Statements made outside of an IETF session, mailing list or other function, that are clearly not intended to be input to an IETF activity, group or function, are not IETF Contributions in the context of this notice. Please consult RFC 3978 for details. MASS/DKIM BOF
Charter Description – Par 1 • Forgery of headers that indicate message origin is a problem for users of Internet mail. The MASS working group will produce standards-track specifications that permit authentication of message headers during transit, using public-key signatures and based on domain name identifiers. Keys will be stored in the responsible identity's DNS hierarchy. The specification will be based on the draft-allman-dkim-*.txt Internet-Drafts. The working group will make only the minimal changes deemed useful to improve the viability of services that are based on these specifications. The specifications will contain summaries of the threats, requirements and limitations that are associated with the specified mechanism. The MASS working group will also address mechanisms for advertising "signing policy" so that a recipient can determine whether a valid message signature should be present. MASS/DKIM BOF
Charter Description – Pars 2 & 3 • The working group will NOT consider related topics, such as reputation and accreditation systems, and message encryption. It will also NOT consider signatures which are intended to make long-term assertions (beyond the expected transit time of a message) nor signatures which attempt to make strong assertions of the identity of the message author. • The working group may also study whether to adopt a work item for specifying a common mechanism to communicate the results of message verification to the message recipient. MASS/DKIM BOF
Goals and Milestones 7/05Issue initial Internet-Draft[s] of signature specification 10/05Submit to IESG - MASS threats and requirements 2/06 Submit to IESG - MASS signature specification 2/06Submit to IESG - MASS public key Resource Record 5/06Submit to IESG - MASS policy specification MASS/DKIM BOF
Open Issues – 1 MASS/DKIM BOF
Open Issues – 2 MASS/DKIM BOF
Open Issues – 3 MASS/DKIM BOF