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Historical Study Of Distributed Operations

Historical Study Of Distributed Operations. Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq. 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004. Overview of Distributed Operations. Taking Dispersion to another level Present a less defined target to the enemy Operations in smaller units More autonomous small units

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Historical Study Of Distributed Operations

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  1. Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant ResolveFallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

  2. Overview of Distributed Operations • Taking Dispersion to another level • Present a less defined target to the enemy • Operations in smaller units • More autonomous small units • Leadership and decision making at lower levels

  3. Why study Fallujah? Operation Vigilant Resolve is one of the closest real life examples of U.S. Marines conducting distributed-like operations.

  4. Why study Fallujah? • Patrols conducted by squad sized units • Units dispersed all around Fallujah • Squad Leaders taking more control of situations • Varying patrol routes and times, trying to present ambiguous targets to the enemy • Relying on fire support

  5. Overview of Combat Model Operation Vigilant ResolveFallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

  6. Designing the Fallujah Model

  7. Designing the Combat Model

  8. Designing the Combat Model

  9. Designing the Combat Model

  10. Designing the Combat Model

  11. Designing the Combat Model • Each blue agent represents a fire team with an M16,M203, and an M249 • Blue agents typically operated in squad-sized units (3 agents)

  12. Designing the Combat Model • Red agents were designed to blend in with the local population, giving them a first shot advantage. • Move in teams of 3-4 • Carry AK47s and RPGs Before and After Engaging

  13. Fallujah TimelineDay One (Step 0-720) • Marines push into city with Tanks and Helos

  14. Fallujah TimelineDay One (Step 0-720) • Marines attack a mosque in NW corner.

  15. Fallujah TimelineThroughout (Step 0-3600) • Insurgents fire from towers of Central Mosque as Marine snipers patrol SE perimeter

  16. Fallujah TimelineDay Two (Step 720-1440) • Heavy fighting in NW neighborhood • AC130 called in for support

  17. Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160) • Gunfight at train station

  18. Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160) • Fighting in the South

  19. Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160) • Small skirmishes along Marine Defensive positions on the Northern Perimeter

  20. Fallujah TimelineDay Four (Step 2160-2880) • Gun battle between 200 Marines and 800 insurgents in NW. • Fire support called in.

  21. Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600) • Building to building raids with fire support

  22. Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600) • Insurgents try to run road blocks

  23. Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600) • More skirmishes on Northern perimeter

  24. Stealth and Red Kills Blue Stealth doesn’t effect Red Kills Red Stealth greatly reduces Red Kills Huge decrease in number of Red Kills at 90 Red Stealth

  25. Stealth and Blue Killed Blue Stealth significantly reduces blue kills Red Stealth significantly increases blue kills

  26. Red Force Size Increasing size of red force leads to much greater rate of increase in Red Casualties than in Blue Casualties

  27. Communications Accuracy Communications Accuracy has little effect

  28. Communications Latency • Comms Latency has even less effect

  29. Lessons Learned • Impact of Red Stealth emphasizes the value of having first-shot advantage. It is possible that we could use DO to attain a similar advantage or to take that advantage away from our enemies.

  30. Lessons Learned • In a very distributed force (the red force) throwing more numbers at the enemy doesn’t result in a significant advantage. This is an argument for DO at the squad level (smaller units).

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