Simon Bekker, Ilse Eigelaar-Meets, and Gary Eva Stellenbosch University October 2009

1. Simon Bekker, Ilse Eigelaar-Meets, and Gary Eva Stellenbosch University October 2009 Xenophobic violence in South Africa: reflections on the events of May and June 2008.

2. ‘The underlying reasons for the violence included high unemployment, inequality, a lax border control policy, and a non existent immigration policy.’ (SAIRR 2008) ‘…the emergence of xenophobic violence is typically rooted in the micro-politics of township life.’ (Misago et al.: 54) ‘Anti-foreigner sentiment expressed uncritically in the media or from official channels can …contribute to … (such) sentiment in the popular discourse.’ (Hadland: 15) ‘…it was stupid of the police…People have been moved by the police so (shops were) targeted by the youth’ (focus group participant, reported in Cooper: 11)

3. ‘The underlying reasons for the violence included high unemployment, inequality, a lax border control policy, and a non existent immigration policy.’ ‘…the emergence of xenophobic violence is typically rooted in the micro-politics of township life.’ ‘Anti-foreigner sentiment expressed uncritically in the media or from official channels can …contribute to … (such) sentiment in the popular discourse.’ ‘…it was stupid of the police…People have been moved by the police so (shops were) targeted by the youth’ Explanations focused on external structural causes, Explanations focused on factors directly related to specific outbursts, Explanations for the diffusion of outburst events, and Explanations for perceptions concerning local policing.

4. Structure of Presentation • Introduction • A description of outburst events identified in the print media • A summary of explanations given for these events identified in the print media • An analysis of explanations given in the South African research community • An outline of the proposed general framework of understanding.

5. During the second half of May 2008, a series of short violent outbursts took place in neighbourhoods of numerous South African cities and towns. The violence during these outbursts was perpetrated by civilians, and was inflicted on the property and the person of civilians. The perpetrators were largely young poor black South African men; the targets largely the property and businesses of foreign African nationals as well as these civilians themselves; and the locations predominantly urban informal settlements, townships and hostels. The series of outbursts began in Gauteng and spread about a week later to other urban areas of the country. Initial state reaction was evasive, essentially denying the scope and seriousness of these events. Subsequently, the state sought explanations in criminal and mob behaviour. This geographic spread of outbursts was accompanied by widespread coverage in the mass media of these events and their possible causes. Since the reaction of many of the victims was flight from their residential areas, a number of temporary refugee camps were established. More than 20 000 refugees were accommodated in this way, numerous African foreign nationals were reported to have left the country, and government urged refugees in camps to return to the residential areas from which they had fled since these were said to have calmed down.

6. A description of outburst events identified in the print media • Daily and weekly national and provincial newspapers were consulted by employing key word scans within two separate electronic search engines and a comprehensive set of (some 4 000) news articles relating to reports on xenophobic sentiment and to events of xenophobic behaviour were assembled. • (Focus exclusively on perpetrators and their actions, not victims and refugees)

7. The validity of information on event data gathered through the print media ? selection bias (the nature of the sampling made). We selected the print rather than the electronic media, national and regional rather than local or country papers, two search engines, and specific keywords. description bias (the veracity with which selected events are reported in the press). Recent research on the use of newspaper data in the study of collective behaviour: “Although newspaper data may ignore key dimensions of a protest (e.g., its purpose), when event characteristics are included, especially hard news items (i.e., the who, what, when, where, and why of the event), the reports are, in general, accurate, indicating that missing data may be the most serious form of description bias.” (emphasis added) This research concludes that “researchers can effectively use such data and … newspaper data does not deviate markedly from accepted standards of quality.”

8. 4 Way Classification of Violent Outbursts

9. First Phase10 – 20 May

10. First Phase: Gauteng Events Without specific Dates 20 18 14 16 11 17 19 10 May Siyahlala Inf Alexandra Kew Klipfontein View Mashimong Beirut inf Mayabuye Bophelong Berea Mohlakeng Ivory Park Kopanong Vusimusi Etwatwainf Diepsloot Germiston extension 5 Benoni Zandspruit Siyahlala Germiston extension 9 Mandleni Olifantsfontein Marathon Diepsloot Makausi Tembisa Actonville Ivory Park Mashimong Choba Choba Kopanong Vusimusi Vosloosrus Mayabuye Mpilisweni Zandspruit Alexandra Central JHB Kya Sands Beirut Klipfontein View Dukathole Mohlakeng Zenzele Kew Malvern Etwatwa Cleaveland Central JHB Dikathole Joe Slovo Jeppe Tshiavelo Jeppe Daveyton Jabulani Makausi Benoni Ramaphosa Phiri Jerusalem Actonville Berea Gugulethu Everest Community Tembisa Zamimpilo Hilbrow Ramaphosa Mpilisweni Dukathole Reigerpark Mandleni Jerusalem Amakhauwusi Tedstoneville Marathon Lusaka Vosloosrus Extension 9 Extension 5 Tedstoneville Katlehong Zenzele Cleaveland Daveyton Kya Sands Zamimpilo Joe Slovo Malvern Bophelong Phiri Reigerpark Jabulani Township Amakhauwusi Dikathole Hilbrow Katlehong Lusaka Tshiavelo Olifantsfontein

11. First Phase: Excluding Gauteng 16 17 20 18 19 May Events without specific dates Lebohang Walmer Township (Port Elizabeth) Mafikeng Lebohang (Leslie) Kanana (Klerksdorp) Kanana Cato Crest (Durban) Dalton (Umbilo) Dalton Malmesbury CatoCrest Warwick Warwick Embalenhle Embalenhle (Durban) Gugulethu (Cape Town) Motherwell (Port Elizabeth) Mafikeng Malmesbury Motherwell WalmerTownship Gugulethu

12. First Phase

13. Middle Phase21 – 29 May

14. MIddle Phase: Western Cape Events Without specific dates 21 22 23 24 26 27 May Bloekombos Wallacedene inf Franschoek Vrygrondinf Maccassar Khayelitsha Masiphumelele Nyanga Oudtshoorn Witlokasie Kraaifontein Hanover Park Crossroads Du Noon Thembalethu Du Noon SamoraMachel ImizamoYethu Joe Slovo Mbekweni Oudtshoorn Delft Fairyland Nomzamo Hanover Park Kraaifontein Pacaltsdorp Kayamandi Franschoek Conville Pacaltsdorp Nyanga Sizamile Smutsville Witlokasie Philippi Bloekombos Crossroads Thembalethu Tamboerskloof Philippi Zwelihle Khayelitsha Samora Machel Wallace Dene Imizamo Yethu Kwanonqaba Vrygrond inf Nomzamo Kwanonqaba KwaNokuthula Maccassar Tamboerskloof Masiphumelele Zwelihle Sizamile Smutsville Conville Delft Fairyland Joe Slovo Mbekweni Kayamandi KwaNokuthula

15. Middle Phase: Excluding Western Cape Events Without specific dates 22 24 29 27 21 28 23 25 may Bottlebrush (Durban) Cator Manor (Durban) Sebokeng (Vanderbijl Park) Oukasie Fase 2 Moboloka Soshanguve Kenville (KwaMashu) Oukasie Fase 3 GaRankuwa Old Coronation Malukazi (Isipingo) Spring Valley Honeydew Madelakufa OukasieFase 2 (Brits) Delmore Extension 16 Kokosi OukasieFase 3 (Brits) Sebokeng Pietermaritzburg Moboloka (Brits) Batlharos Namahadi 1102 Informal (Chatsworth) Old Coronation (Witbank) Amaoti (KwaMashu) Welkom Phoenix Greenwood Park (Durban) Thabong Amaoti Phoenix (Inanda) Pietermaritzburg Quarry Hights Cato Manor Durban Quarry Hights (Durban) KwaNdegezi Groutville Bottlebrush Kenville Greenwood Park Madelakufa (Tembisa) Malukazi Batlharos (Kuruman) 1102 Informal New Brighton (Port Elizabeth) Welkom KwaNdengezi (Durban) Kokosi (Fochville) Soshanguve Delmore (Boksburg) Groutville (Durban) GaRankuwa (Pretoria) Honeydew Spring Valley (Witbank) Durban Namahadi (Frankfort) Thabong (Welkom) New Brighton Extension 16 (Embalenhle)

16. Middle Phase

17. Final Phase03 – 30 June

18. Final Phase: National Events without Specific Dates 03 06 30 29 June Mohlaletse Bloemfontein Middestad Zwide (Port Elizabeth) Acacia Shelter Pretoria Bloemspruit (Bloemfontein) New Doornfontein Pretoria Central Prison Heidedal (Bloemfontein) Kopanang (Bloemfontein) Acacia Shelter (Pretoria) New Doornfontein (JHB) Hammerdale Umthata Kopanang Mohlaletse (Sekhukhune Area) Bloemspruit Bloemfontein Heidedal Hammerdale Mthata Zwide

19. Final Phase

20. Summary of all Events

21. A summary of explanations given for these events, identified in the print media During the first phase, government reactions denied both the extent and the serious nature of the outbursts - the perpetrators were “criminals” and or there was a ‘third force’ at work. A national minister stated that the violence would be over within a week. Numerous structural causes for the violence were suggested by journalists: • failure of government policies; • the high unemployment rate particularly among young urban black men; and • the incompetence of the police. • widespread sentiments of xenophobia among poor urban residents.

22. During the later phases, terminology now included terms such as ‘madness’. ‘pogrom’, ‘mob’, ‘barbarism’, ‘gang’ ‘a culture of violence’ and ‘hate’. Government politicians admitted this form of ‘mob’ behaviour needed an effective and immediate response (which took the form of the mobilization of the SANDF late in May). The Minister for Intelligence Services was quoted as stating that “we cannot ignore … that there were reportedly meetings held in hostels, that this prairie fire of hate seemed to move fast as if planned, and that there were printed pamphlets’. In early June, President Mbeki stated that the recent attacks were not driven by xenophobia but by criminals. Similar structural causes were regularly raised. Three more appeared: a ‘lack of leadership’, the perpetrators put up ‘a rugged disdainful resistance’ to the government and to the police and the role of the mass media in the diffusion of violence.

23. An analysis of explanations given in the South African research community The South African research community appears to have been caught as unaware and bewildered about the events of 2008 as the political, state and economic elites. 5 sources published in 2008: • HSRC report and roundtable – with recommendations to government • An anthropologists’ reaction to the recommendations • A book based on a Wits Univ symposium immediately after the outbursts – with photos • An ISS paper entitled ‘South Africa’s Xenophobic Eruption’ • An International Organization for Migration publication on violence against foreign nationals in South Africa

24. The two HSRC publications use relative deprivation. • Poor black urban residents are experiencing competition, inadequate provision of housing, poor service delivery, little effective government communication and corruption. • The relative deprivation comprises the frustrations they develop as a result of their expectations in these regards not being realized. • These sentiments are converted into violent aggression against those they perceive as competitors and as the immediate cause of their frustrations. • Their targets accordingly are the ‘foreigner’ and the ‘stranger’ in their neighbourhoods. • BUT • While it was generally known that xenophobic violence was taking place, what is new is the ‘wildfire character’ of diffusion; • An important characteristic is ‘its violent and/or destructive character; • Young black poor urban men feel besieged. ‘In this context, the ‘foreigner’ is the nearest ‘other’, against which this sentiment can be expressed “. • None of these three issues are subsequently addressed in the explanatory framework used.

25. A South African anthropologist criticized the HSRC reports for recommendations that South Africa should become an ‘impenetrable fortress’ in which migrants will remain ‘at the bottom of the internal hierarchy’, recommendations that take refuge in the notion of a bounded all-or-nothing citizenship based essentially on territory. The labeling of the violence as ‘xenophobic’ hides as much as it reveals What is required is to “study up”. Also, South Africans’ sentiments toward foreign African nationals are more complicated than simply xenophobic – some are positive and some negative depending on local conditions. ‘The fact that some poor South Africans looted the possessions of people they saw as outsiders, chased them out of the townships, and burned at least one person alive was, without doubt, deeply shocking. But to understand just how shocking it was one needs to look at the broad sweep of South African xenophobia, consider the full extent of its causes, and reflect on the disturbing ways influential South Africans respond to it’ The article sheds no further light on how such understanding could be achieved.

26. Wits University colloquium on violence and xenophobia. Outbursts a ‘national shock’, partially generated by international moral outrage Constitutional claim that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it’ has been reversed The naming of the violence as xenophobic conceals as much as it reveals. This term ‘an alibi for a much more profound malaise’, ‘a secondary symptom rather than a primary cause of violence’. Perpetrators targeted those they perceived as not belonging to South African nation-state. A culture of entitlement – for those who live in shacks without prospect of a job – led them to commit violence against non-citizens. The targets of this violence were black rather than white foreigners, that is in effect, pointing to racialised degrees of belonging. ‘That the poor have made scapegoats of foreign blacks is a reflection of the political impasse on the long walk to freedom’. Precisely how this political impasse led to violence is not addressed. One chapter in the volume however makes a significantly different case: (There is) a disconnect between popular and elite ‘common sense’ on the matter of ‘foreigners’. This xenophobia … is coming from below – it is profoundly democratic, albeit in the majoritarian-popular sense rather than the liberal-constitutional one… ‘They’ – the urban poor – occupy a different universe of meaning to ‘us… the author points to the absence in the formal political discourse of either mobilization aimed against foreigners or of an instrumental manipulation of xenophobic sentiments. Rather, within their militaristic subcultures that tolerate crime and violence and that experience corrupt and incompetent policing as normal, members of this underclass ‘have made a rational diagnosis of their problem’ Why such xenophobic violence is claimed to be ‘profoundly democratic’ is not clear.

27. A number of the book’s photographs are of perpetrators. Their emotions appear devoid of guilt, of remorse and of fear of retribution. The young men shown carrying weapons or loot emerge as disinhibited and often as deriving pleasure from their collective actions. Insofar as this interpretation is valid, nowhere in the book is this extraordinary conduct addressed.

28. Steinberg’s ISS Paper - the series of events ‘the first sustained, nationwide eruption of social unrest since the beginning of South Africa’s democratic era in 1994’ poor young South African urban residents define the national economy as comprising a fixed number of jobs what these young men have learnt is that it is local party-political influence that counts when competing for jobs - provided by a bureaucracy rather than created by entrepreneurs they believe that South Africans alone are entitled to these opportunities, entrepreneurially successful foreigners become targets of resentment and assault.

29. The International Organisation for Migration study outlines the political economy of violence against outsiders…The theoretical approach -- resource mobilization where collective action is seen to be used to extract benefits from those who control or own resources Evidence is obtained from secondary sources and seven selected sites in Gauteng and the Western Cape, in five of which outbursts occurred and in two of which violence did not occur. Evidence of overlapping formal and informal leadership structures in these areas is provided. The report suggests informal leadership played a critical role in launching the outbursts in the 5 sites selected whereas formal leaders played a reconciliatory role in the others. The report concludes that ‘‘in almost all cases where violence occurred, it was organised and led by local groups and individuals in an effort to claim or consolidate the authority and power needed to further their political and economic interests.’ In how far this generalization to the at least 135 outbursts identified above can reliably be made on the basis of the empirical studies provided is unclear.

30. A general framework of understanding of the three week episode. • external structural causes, • (ii) factors directly related to specific outbursts, • (iii) factors relating to diffusion of outbursts, and • (iv) perceptions concerning policing.

31. Four processes framing the run-up to these outbursts An increase in both the scope and depth of xenophobic sentiments among South Africans Large sustained migration streams of foreign African nationals entering South Africa after 1994 Incoherence over the establishment of a national immigration policy, and Recent price increases in the costs of basic foods and of transport.

32. But • These structural explanations • cannot explain why violence occurred in some places and not others, • why it was as intense during this period, • why diffusion took place as it did, • and so on. • A number of researchers have suggested strongly that local circumstances and meanings local residents give to wider events are critical to understanding the nature of these outbursts. • Also • dominant theoretical approaches used by researchers – relative deprivation and resource mobilization – both emphasize the rational dimension of collective behaviour to the detriment of the emotional

33. Donald Horowitz, in a study of riots, argues that both external contextual causes as well as immediate locality-bound causes need to be considered. Since these immediate causes point to local and short-term issues, they imply a measure of spontaneity as well as deep emotion associated with the outburst – they imply both passion and calculation. I will now list six of the conclusions Horowitz draws from his empirical study of a large number of outbursts in numerous developing countries

34. Hostility toward the other: The targets are imagined to be very dangerous. It is a short step from apprehension to the imputation of hostile intentions to the target. A belief in such intentions of the target group is an important facilitator of riot activity. Anger: Emotion plays a critical part in the riot. Anger may be generalised or aimed at superiors but is often converted into aggression against unranked groups. Selective targeting (risk aversion). Rioters select as targets those who are perceived to be neither aggressive nor protected. Fear of retribution tends to inhibit violence. The perception of immunity from punishment or incrimination is critical Justification. Rumours justify the violence that is about to occur; they usually contain concealed threats and outrages committed in secret; they are satisfying and useful to rioters and their leaders and they tend to be evolutionist (found in widely different settings) rather than creationist (in one particular place). Disinhibition Once the violence begins, it takes on an impersonal and brutal form. Members of one group search out members or property of another. The “Other” is in this way devalued and perpetrators become disinhibited in their actions. Reversal of humiliation and dishonour The violence is suffused with emotion born from humiliation. Much of the pleasure that violence brings springs from the mastery that reverses dishonour.

35. In the Western Cape during the second phase of the episode, in some cases, television and print media coverage of the first phase, together with the dissemination of credible rumours, led to an exodus of foreign Africans from their homes and neighbourhoods in anticipation of attacks, and enabled opportunistic looting and vandalisation of these properties Horowitz argues that there are two types of ‘contagion’: imitation and common responses to a single precipitant. A single precipitating event at one place can produce violent reactions at many locations almost simultaneously. Violence does not occur in isolation; it derives intellectual impetus from events regarded as comparable elsewhere. Actors judge the plausibility of their conduct by the fact that others have carried out similar plans. Diffusion to localities close by often takes place by word-of-mouth communication whereas diffusion to distant places typically takes place by way of mass media (radio, newspaper and TV) and cell-phone communication. In both cases, perceived official ratification of earlier violence is an important facilitating factor.

36. South Africa’s state police have been widely criticized by scholars and in the media for their response to the three week 2008 episode but these criticisms are insufficient to explain the widely reported perceptions of immunity from punishment and incrimination of perpetrators across urban South Africa The issue of the insufficient penetrationof state police presence into the informal settlements and townships of urban South Africa is at issue here. In the Western Cape, police reported that refugees chose to seek refuge at police stations away from their neighbourhoods and that ‘role players’ in the community who normally assisted us (the police) with crime investigations appeared to side with the perpetrators by refusing assistance in this case. In effect, non state policing (such as vigilante groups, ‘civics’, traditional authorities, informal security groups and so on) play critical security roles in such urban settlements. If policing is defined as ‘any organized activity, whether by the state or civil groups, that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security and peace’ and if security is considered from the point of view of the resident ‘rather than from the governance perspective of the political authorities’, then the resident may be thought of as having a choice of policing, besides that of the state police. The difficulty arises when the state no longer has the capacity to bring non-state policing under effective accountability and ‘community organizations’ endorse intolerance of outsiders and associated violence. This appears to have taken place during a number of outbursts In short, the issue is not solely that of perceptions regarding state police but probably more importantly perceptions regarding the role and legitimacy in the eyes of local residents of non state police organizations.

37. Conclusions During 2009 and 2010 , urban residents of townships and informal settlements in South Africa have experienced wide-ranging disruption and violence once again. The ostensible reasons this time round have been given as dissatisfaction with municipal service delivery and rejection by locally employed public sector workers of proposed state salary adjustments. Outbursts appear to share the same mix of passion and calculation as those of 2008. Little evidence of xenophobic violent intention however has appeared. two questions The first is the extent to which the anger is generalized and not directed at strangers and foreigners in the first place, anger that is a mix of direct and displaced aggression. Consider the following focus group quote held right after the 2008 three-week episode: ‘(G)overnment is fighting against us, employers are fighting against us and foreigners are fighting against us, that is why we fight against them because they are nearer; they don’t support us in our struggle…’ The second question refers to the emotions in participants’ behaviour during these outbursts. Many media images of perpetrators portray body language that appears to be devoid of guilt, of remorse and of fear of retribution. The rational calculations that underpin resource mobilization and relative deprivation theories fail to explain these images of young men as disinhibited and as reveling in, as deriving pleasure from, their collective actions.In the survey of explanations offered for outbursts during the 2008 three-week episode, none address directly the emotional dimension of this extraordinary conduct.

38. THANK YOU

39. What of the period under scrutiny - mid May to early June 2008 delimiting a particular episode of violent collective behaviour that requires explanation? Such an episode has been constructed in the media and popular imagination but may well become analytically confusing. 1998 -2008 → Events preceding May & June 2008

40. Classification of Reported Events Preceding 10 May 2008 Places where violent Xenophobic events recurred during May & June 2008 Places where violent Xenophobic events did not recur during May & June 2008

41. Events Preceding 10 May 2008 Lindela Refugee Centre (3 Events) Yeoville (1 Event) Zandspruit (6 Events) Letsopa (1 Event) Ernest Wolffe (2 Events) Tswelelang (1 Event) Polokwane (1 Event) Nooitgedacht (1 Event) Witpoort (1 Event) Kwanobuhle (1 Event) Denneboom (1 Event) KwaZakhele (1 Event) Diepsloot (2 Events) Joe Slovo (1 Event) Eersterust (1 Event) Langa (1 Event) Itireleng (3 Events) Sehlala (1 Event) Soshanguve (3 Events) Polokwane (1 Event) Phomolong (4 Events) Olievenhoutbosch/Choba (2 Events) Khayelitsha (3 Events) Sehlala (1 Event) Freedom Park (1 Event) Olievenhoutbosch/Choba (1 Event) Soshanguve (1 Event) Soshanguve (1 Event) Thembalethu (2 Events) Valhalla Park (1 Event) Atteridgeville (8 Events) Atteridgeville (1 Event) Eersterust (1 Event) Galashebe (1 Event) Vrygrond (1 Event) Lindela Refugee Centre (1 Event) Lindela Refugee Centre (1 Event) Lindela Refugee Centre (1 Event) Zakhele (1 Event) Mooiplaats (1 Event) Diepsloot (2 Events) Ernest Wolffe (2 Events) Freedom Park (1 Event) Widela (1 Event) JHB Central (1 Event) Primrose (1 Event) Nooitgedacht (1 Event) Jeffreys Bay (1 Event) Zandspruit (4 Events) Zandspruit (1 Event) Zandspruit (1 Event) Denneboom (1 Event) Zakhele (1 Event) Witpoort (1 Event) Itireleng (3 Events) Yeoville (1 Event) Ipelegeng (2 Events) Olievenhoutbosch/Choba (3 Events) Tswelelang (1 Event) Lusaka (1 Event) Lusaka (1 Event) Tyutyu (1 Event) Letsopa (1 Event) Phomolong (4 Events) Kgakala (1 Event) Walmer Township (2 Events) Khotsong (1 Event) Ramulutsi (1 Event) Plastic view (1 Event) Duncan Village (1 Event) Bothaville (1 Event) Albert Park (1 Event) Ramulutsi (1 Event) JHB Central (1 Event) Khotsong (1 Event) Galashewe (1 Event) Soshanguve (5 Events) Delft (2 Events) Kuilsriver (1 Event) KwaNokuthula (1 Event) Albert Park (1 Event) Masiphumelele (1 Event) Paarl (1 Event) Qolweni (1 Event) Mdantsane (1 Event) Mthata (1 Event) Green Point (1 Event) Bothaville (1 Events) Atteridgeville (9 Events) Ipelegeng (2 Events) Duncan Village (1 Event) Mdantsane (1 Event) Lusaka (2 Events) Tyutyu (1 Event) Mooiplaats (1 Event) 2000 1998 2005 2007 2004 2002 2008 2001 2006 Plasticview (1 Event) Paarl (1 Event) Motherwell (3 Events) Hanover Park (1 Event) Walmer Township (1 Events) Thembalethu (1 Event) Primrose (1 Event) Valhalla Park (1 Event) Kuilsriver (1 Event) Kwanobuhle (1 Event) Widela (1 Event) Du Noon (1 Event) Thembalethu (1 Event) Joe Slovo (1 Event) Delft (2 Events) Langa (1 Event) Hanover Park (1 Event) KwaNokuthula (1 Event) Masiphumelele (1 Event) Khayelitsha (1 Event) Khayelitsha (2 Events) Vrygrond (1 Event) Walmer Township (1 Events) Jeffreys Bay (1 Event) KwaZakhele (1 Event) Motherwell (3 Events) Qolweni (1 Event) Green Point (1 Event) Mthata (1 Event) Kgakala (1 Event)

42. Reported Events & Places Pre May 2008

43. Periodisation the recurrence of events in approximately one half of all recorded places where an earlier xenophobic event took place points to continuity in the process of the perpetration of violence against strangers in underprivileged urban residential areas. A local history of violence against strangers (during which immunity from punishment could be learnt) mixed with media coverage of such recent violence elsewhere in the country appears to have been a potent combination. At the level of a location, then, the most useful period within which to investigate such violent collective behaviour could differ from that employed here.

44. ‘(P)olitical histories of anti colonial resistance (in South Africa) …are about an almost angelic dignity… It is as if the South African masses rose above their wretched circumstances and found an essential nobility which transcended time and place… Prison gangs (on the other hand) …get too close to the bone. They show us why generations of young black men lived violent lives under apartheid, and why generations more will live violently under democracy.’ Jonny Steinberg The Number

45. Xenophobia “the hatred or fear of foreigners or strangers” It is the definitions by those South Africans whose sentiments may become xenophobic with regard to ‘foreigner’ or ‘stranger’ that are pertinent (not technical definitions of intellectuals and of the state). Accordingly, a minority in a South African informal settlement may well be defined by residents as ‘strangers’ even though they (or some of them) may be South African nationals.