This Briefing is UNCLASSIFIED

1. 14th Air Force (Air Forces Strategic) This Briefing is UNCLASSIFIED Fourteenth Air Force Technology … the enabler of SSA Lt Gen Willie Shelton 14 AF (AFSTRAT)/CC 3 December 2008 Integrity – Service - Excellence This Briefing is UNCLASSIFIED

2. 14 AF (AFSTRAT) Mission CONTROL AND EXPLOIT SPACE FOR GLOBAL AND THEATER OPERATIONS • Component-NAF to USSTRATCOM & JFCC SPACE for space operations • Plan, task, direct, synchronize & execute space operations including: • C2 of assigned & attachedSpace Forces • Space Superiority • Space Situational Awareness & Missile Warning • Satellite & Network Operations • Space Launch & Range Operations • Organize, Train, & Assure Readiness of Space Forces • Support AEF Deployments 2

3. USSTRATCOM Geographic Combatant CDRs Supporting & Supported Geographic COCOM Geographic COCOM Geographic COCOM Space Coordinating Authority JFC Reachback Space Coordinating Authority* JFCC SPACE JFACC Direct Support JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC Horizontal & Vertical Integration DIRSPACEFOR JAOC Synergized Tactical Execution Assigned / Attached Forces Assigned / Attached Forces Assigned / Attached Forces Assigned / Attached Forces Assigned / Attached Forces * Assuming JFC Delegates SCA to JFACC Command/Support Relationships AFSPC (COMAFFOR) 14 AF (AFSTRAT) 14 AF (AFSTRAT) JSpOC 614 AOC 614 AOC SPACE WINGS ARSTRAT NAVNETWARCOM 3

4. Scenario # 1 • Nation X covertly rolls out mobile TEL w/ booster • US not postured due to lack of I&W • First warning: DSP satellites • What is it? Where is it going? • Further tracking: space launch • Is it a threat to US/Allied spacecraft? • Booster burnout, tracking ends • No radar coverage, so how do we proceed? • Phone conversations to verify health of assets

5. Scenario # 2 • High value US LEO spacecraft suddenly stops transmitting • Telemetry indicates quick rise in temp just prior • Further analysis: spacecraft was over Nation Y laser research facility at time of failure • Challenge: Anomaly or laser attack? Accident?

6. Scenario # 3 • US satellite in HEO is a “no-show” at scheduled tracking time • Over open ocean after last SSN track • Multiple pieces later tracked • Questions: Explosion? Attack? Debris?

7. ~2025 ~1957-61 Today The Space Environment Evolution from few, military only assets to many, multi-agency, civil assets

8. “Traffic Management” Example • Routine orbital conjunction screening revealed possible conjunction between an active US Weather Satellite and a piece of debris of unknown origin • Close conjunction predicted for 7 Aug 08 • 42 meter predicted miss distance • Approx 14,400 MPH closing velocity of the approach • Satellite did not have capability to perform collision avoidance maneuvers • Post-event analysis shows final miss distance at time of closest approach only 67 meters

9. DEPENDENCE on Space Assets OPERATIONAL & PHYSICAL VULNERABILITIES PROTECTION of Space Assets Create Demand INCREASING RISK from Environmental Hazards Need for Protection(Dependence and Risk Vulnerability) “United States national security is critically dependent on space capabilities, and this dependence will grow.” National Space Policy, 2006 • Space utilization is growing, increasing exposure to hazards within the medium, while technology drives the threat • Access to space is cheaper & more widely available • Space is more crowded than ever (18,000+ man-made objects, including debris) • Improved & smaller spacecraft technologies provide challenges • Jamming, attacks on ground sites, ASATs, High Energy Lasers, NUDETs • Protection is about Preservation—requires Recognition & Attribution • Must be able to say an event “will, is or has” & answer “who, what (threat or hazard), why, how, when & where” • Early recognition allows preservation—attribution enables response

10. SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS Intelligence Environment ISR Spc WX PNT SATCOM Space Surveillance System Status SPACE CAPABILITIES CREATE EFFECTS Space Support Space Force Enhancement TT&C C2 Launch DCS SSA OCS Space Control Enabling Space Superiority TO ACHIEVE SPACE SUPERIORITY

11. DATA becomes INFORMATION that ENABLES ACTION Diplomatic Actions Protect Assets Maneuver Assets Change Tasking Eliminate Threat Go on Alert Continue to Monitor Combatant Cmdr Reqs STRATEGIC COA TOOLS STRATEGIC UDOP Attribute Events Actor / Natural Event / Sys Failure Modeling & Decision Tools OPERATIONAL COA TOOLS COLLABORATIVE DECISION ENVIRONMENT FULL SPECTRUM RESPONSE OPERATIONAL UDOP NETCENTRIC C2 CAPABILITIES Near Real-time Fusion TACTICAL UDOP TACTICAL COA TOOLS Net-centric from the outset Vision for SSA/Space C2 BLUE SPACE RED SPACE GRAY SPACE INTEL (All Source) WEATHER REAL TIME UPDATES METRIC / SURV GRND SYS LINKS & NODES 11

12. COCOM Needs Space Ops Directive Master Space Plan • Weather • Blue Space Picture • Red/Grey Picture • Debris Tracking COA Development Joint Space Tasking Order COA Selection Execution Assessment Retasking JSpOC • Offensive Counterspace • Tactical Units (Joint) • Deny Space Advantages Space Situational Awareness Command and Control Joint Space Tasking Order • Routine Space Ops • Tactical Units (Joint) • Create Desired Effects • Dynamic Tasking • Shared Situational Awareness • Strategic, Operational, Tactical • Enable UDOP • Defensive Counterspace • Tactical Units (Joint) • NRO • Civil/Commercial • Allies JFCC SPACE Synchronization

13. Mission Partner interface • AFSPC NRO • NOAA DIA • AFWA FAA • US DOT DOS • CFE NORAD • STRAT COCOMS • ARMY NAVY • CIA NSA • NGA NASA • FOREIGN NASIC • COMMERCIAL • SPECIAL Monitor Execute JSpOC Assess Plan JFCC SPACE supports National, Strategic, Theater, and Tactical Operations

14. Conclusion • Threats are real and exist • today! • Pre-season is over – regular season has begun Robust, all-source Intel + High resolution, timely space surveillance = Enabling SSA Conjunction analysis Satellite Ops Threat Determination Launch Ops SSA

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