Contact Information

1. Contact Information Albert “Tripp” Selke Lieutenant   Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office (813) 247-0726 aselke@hcso.tampa.fl.us

2. Practical Application Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office Tampa, Florida Intelligence-Led Policing

3. Agenda • Etiology of ILP at the HCSO • Organizational Impact • Application

4. Goal for the Presentation

5. Covered Topics • Knowledge Management • Reorganization and Dismantling Silos • Crime Analysis • Exploitation of Criminal Cultures • Establishing Priorities • Benign Neglect • Practical ILP workflows and processes • Critical Success Factor

6. Building Blocks

7. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office • The 8th Largest Metropolitan County Law Enforcement Agency in the United States • Total Population of Hillsborough County 1,202,011 (2010 Census) • Total Population of Unincorporated County 801,981 (2010 Census) • HCSO Deputies 2,245 (HCSO February 2011 BOCC Report) • 1,245 Law Enforcement • 1,000 Detention

8. The Reality: Resource constraints dictate that police forces cannot deliver every item on thepublic’s policing wish list and must instead decide service delivery priorities. Why did the HCSO Adopt the ILP Model? ILP offers the best capacity for the HCSO to meet our commitment to provide for the greatest degree of safety and security of Hillsborough County’s citizens in the most effective manner possible.

9. Tampa Tribune August 09, 2009 • “Unlike the county government, which will soon lay off more than 500 workers, the Sheriff is containing costs by freezing his work force. Chief Docobo said 150 law enforcement deputy and 100 detention deputy positions remain vacant. The Sheriff has not asked for new deputy positions for four budget years, department documents show.” • “The Sheriff cannot reduce his work force further without losing ground in the war against crime, Chief Docobo said. The department has 1.67 deputies per 1,000 residents; the national average for Sheriff's Departments is 2.67 deputies per 1,000 residents. Tampa Police have 2.86 officers per 1,000 residents.”

10. Tribune Article Continued • "Right now, we are probably at a critical point in terms of our staffing," Chief Docobo said. • “Despite the vacant positions, the county's crime rate has decreased three years in a row, HCSO's figures show. Chief Docobo said the office has been effective in analyzing the time and days when crime is most prevalent and deploying deputies accordingly. The agency also focuses on habitual criminals who commit the majority of crimes.”

11. Ratios • Current HCSO Staffing 1.55Deputies per 1000 residents • National Average for Sheriff’s Offices 2.67 Deputies per 1000 residents; 2.3 Police Officers per 1000 residents • Tampa Police Department has 2.86 Officers per 1000 residents

12. Reality • (Population based) 2179 – (Current) 1245 = 934 understaffed from the National Average for Sheriff’s Offices • Conservative cost estimate to train a new recruit first year all encumbered $125,000 • 934 * 125,000 = $116,750,000 personnel first year only expenditures not counting benefits • Capital costs not estimated

13. The ILP Solution Instead of tackling crime one laborious investigation at a time. Place threats and risks into a holistic perspective that assesses the social harm of criminality.

14. The ILP Solution Stated otherwise: FROM: “Whack a mole policing” in which the majority of police resources are directed as a reaction to crimes that have already occurred; TO: Preventing and Reducing crime and victimization at the top of the crime continuum by strategic identification and focus on intervening against the prolific 6% of criminals who commit 60% of the crime. (The Big Picture)

15. District III ILP Results

16. Another District

17. County-wide Application • Special Investigation Division (SID) established the Law Enforcement Intelligence Nexus Center (LINC) in May of 2009. • The LINC was designed to be the central repository for all criminal intelligence and its function was to align agency resources to proactively target High Priority Offenders / Organizations (HPOs).

18. Initial LINC Focus • Centrally manage the flow in intelligence • Develop standards for ILP processes at districts • Centralize all Crime Tips/Confidential Informants • Coordinate with IT to facilitate RMS changes • Decrease reliance on stand alone databases • Identify opportunities to automate Intel flow • Provide Training (Insite, CIs, Intelligence work) • Establish daily information sharing conferencecalls

19. I have heard it said,“ILP is good ole fashion police work, mixed with technology.”

20. Knowledge Management • Leveraged existing Records Management System(RMS) • General Offense (GO) report type “ILP-Investigative Lead” (Non-case specific field tips) • Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) • Career Criminal and other High Priority Offender • Citizen Informant designation • Analysis – Crime Street Check • Civilian/Detention Internet Link

21. Knowledge Management • LeveragedestablishedIntelligence Database • InSite (Florida Department of Law Enforcement) • Premonitory Information Repository • 28 CFR Part 23 compliant • Allows for selective sharing and/or dissemination of intelligence • Maintained by FDLE free of charge

22. Knowledge Management • Human Intelligence (HUMINT) • Centralization and automation of Confidential Informants • Centralization of Tips and Leads • Crime Stoppers • WeTips • Internet Tips • Random telephone calls

23. Knowledge Types Tacit • (as opposed to formal or explicit knowledge) is knowledge that cannot be easily transferred to another person as a result of it being written down or verbalized. Explicit • is knowledge that has been or can be articulated, codified, and stored in certain media. It can be readily transmitted to others.

24. LINC Accomplishments • The creation of an effective Knowledge Management System • Developed a comprehensive ILP plan to include structures, processes and policies to support both tactical and strategic ILP initiatives • Facilitated the availability of covert resources for offender targeting (U/C cars, GPS, Telephones) • Solidified the proactive resources carved from the reactive • Provided proactive components with job descriptions and offender focus • Dedicated 2 SAO Liaison Detectives to monitor and influence the processing of HPOs • Established a daily conference call including all relevant agency components for purposes of deconfliction and ensuring the proper focus on offender targets.

25. Problems • No consistent resource devoted to mass gathering of humanintelligence (HUMINT) which is essential to identifying HPOs and their activities • Analysts lose the ability to fill important intelligence gaps when making targeting decisions as a result • Not central to the decision-making process, thus not effective in driving resources • Districts defaulted more toward the reactive service-oriented mission, yet had the most manpower and resources to effectively gather information to identify and target HPOs • Became support for the reactive components, forcing it to be reactiveas well

26. The Next Level

27. Key Changes • The reactive separated from the proactive • SID (proactive) will operate independent of the Districts and Criminal Investigations Division (reactive) to eliminate the constant pull of manpower • SID’s focus will be on intelligence gathering to target HPOs (Part I Crimes) • Intelligence will be shared to assist reactive components to respond more efficiently

28. Intelligence Team(s) • The amalgamation of specialty silos • 1 Sergeant • 2 Corporals • 4 Vice Detectives • 4 Gang Detectives • 4 Narcotics Detectives • Responsibility: To identify and target HPOs that affect their geographic area of assignment (District aligned) and collect intelligence on their activities and that of their associates

29. Intelligence Teams • Methodology: To exploit the nexus of narcotics, gangs, and vice for the purposes of gathering intelligence to identify HPOs and their activities • Focus on the reduction of Part I Crimes

30. Intelligence Coordination Unit • 2 LINC Detectives • 1 Intelligence Analyst • Responsibility: To facilitate the flow of information from the Intelligence Team through the analysis cycle and to ensure the Intelligence Team is briefed on all intelligence collected from other sources that may affect their area

31. Operations • 3 Intelligence Support Personnel (LINC) • STAR A • STAR B • Major Violators • Responsibility: To target the HPOs selected by the leadership of the LINC utilizing quality tactical intelligence analysis

32. Covert Sources Collection Intake/Analysis Operational LINC Intel Coordinators Jail Culture CRU/Portal Re-entry Detention/Jail Intel Detective STAR Responsible for targeting all high priority offenders; career criminals, prison releases, and prolific or otherwise priority offenders that meet the guidelines for targeting FDLE/Career Criminal DOC CIs GPS Surveillance HUMINT Sources TIN Teams MVU TIPS TIP COORDINATORS Responsible for targeting all high priority criminal organizations that are identified by TIN or STAR OVERT SOURCES

33. SID Organizational Framework Special Investigations Division Major Law Enforcement Intelligence Nexus Center (50) Lieutenant Crime Analysis Unit Manager Intelligence Operations Bureau (69) Lieutenant Deputy Division Commander Captain Intelligence Coordination Unit Sergeant/Corporal STAR A Sergeant/Corporal District 1 Team Corporal/6 Detectives STAR B Sergeant/Corporal Tactical Intel Team West Sergeant District 3 Team Corporal/6 Detectives Major Violators Unit Sergeant/Corporal District 2 Team Corporal/6 Detectives Tactical Intel Team East Sergeant Warrants Section Sergeant/Corporal District 4 Team Corporal/6 Detectives Selective Ops Sergeant/Corporal Tip Coord Unit Deputy/Researcher

34. Anticipated Benefits • More effective and efficient deployment of limited personnel and budget resources • Greater impact on crime/public safety within district • Reduction in agency Part 1 crime levels • Increased coordination among multi-specialty investigative resources • More effective intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination • Better success at incapacitating HPOs, dismantling criminal organizations, and abating high priority crimes

35. Problems

36. Problems • Team Concept broke down almost immediately • Human source development and collection became a secondary (if any) focus of the Intelligence Teams • Lost the ability to fill important intelligence gaps • Resources were primarily aligned around the snowball effect

37. The Limitations Of Arrest Strategies Even though many police officers profess to wanting to catch the criminal elite, they are constrained by an organizational system that rewards them for the volume of arrests rather than the quality of their captures As a result of observations of over 300 crack dealers, and interviews with over 120, Johnson and Natarajan estimate that experienced and higher-level dealers can minimize the risk of arrest to one for every thousand drug transactions or more (See Johnson and Natarajan 1995: 54) Conviction rates in the UK from suspicious transaction reports during the early 1990s were as low asone for every thousand suspicious reports(See Levi, 2002)

38. Leadership… Is the Critical Success Factor!!!

39. District ILP Processes

40. District II • 250 sq. miles • Population 190,000 • 226 Sworn Deputies • 2 Analysts

41. District Business Priorities • Efficient and effective response to calls for service • Crime suppression, i.e. Part I Crimes: Robbery, Burglary Auto Theft, Larceny • Eliminate opened drug and prostitution markets

42. Necessary Commitments • The Reactivecomponents must be separated from but complementary to the Proactive components • Cannot pull resources from Proactive component to react to the problem of the day. • Need to make provision for each element of the intelligence process • Collection • Evaluation • Analysis • Dissemination

43. Implementation Initiatives • Return to the original strategic focus, i.e. Reduction in Part I Crimes • Exploit the nexus of gangs, vice, narcotics and jail to Part I crimes • Create an analytical assessment/Territory Report • Inventory data sources and plan for adequate analytical products/coverage

44. Implementation Continued… • Develop standardized District ILP Goals and Objectives • Develop standardized Intelligence Products • Implement the “Top 20 Adult and Juvenile Offenders” program • Information gaps/intelligence requirements established for all D2 components

45. Implementation Continued… • Require participation of all components (including Patrol) in the Intelligence Cycle • Establish Criteria for Evaluating Field Tip and Intelligence Entries

46. District Intelligence Coordinationwithin the DIU • Responsibility: To facilitate the flow of information from the community, patrol, GO detectives, and other agency components into the district analysis cycleand to ensure deputies, detectives and analysts are briefed on all intelligence collected from other sources that may affect their area (Regular and Routine Feedback)

47. Overt Sources Collection Evaluation Collation Covert Sources Feedback and Evaluation Dissemination Reporting Analysis Intelligence Cycle (Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement)

49. Social Harm • Social Harm is the negation, endangering, or destruction of an individual, group or state interest which was deemed socially valuable • Primary filter to determine priorities.

50. District PrioritiesResidential Burglaries and A/C Thefts