US Foreign Policy: Cold War to 9/11

1. US Foreign Policy: Cold War to 9/11 READINGS: COX AND STOKES CH 4 and 5 Fukuyama, huntington

2. Guiding Questions What is the Cold War? How do we classify US foreign policy in the Cold War era? What is containment? How did it evolve? Was containment successful?

3. US Foreign Policy: The Cold War • Cold War: • State of competition between the US and the USSR and their respective allies from the mid 1940’s to the early 1990’s. • Associated with • 1) Absence of active conflict between the two actors • 2) Presence of conflict “by proxy” in developing regions.

4. US/USSR: Suspicious Minds • Despite cooperation against Nazi Germany, tensions had existed before the Cold War. • Fear of communism taking hold in Europe created suspicion in Washington • US economic strength coupled with a willingness to provide aid to Europe (particularly Germany) after the war created suspicion in Moscow. • Ideological differences (communism vs. capitalism) magnified these tensions.

5. Choosing Containment • UN formatted with the recognition that both sides had zones of influence. • Disagreements over how to deal with Germany. • Without unanimity, UN could not create collective security. • Confusion over Potsdam agreements resulted in the “Long Telegram”

6. The Basis of Containment • “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points.” • George Kennan • Based on five key centers of the world: US, UK, Germany, Japan and the USSR. • Maintaining four key industrial centers in the West was the focus.

7. The Ambiguous Nature of Containment • Unclear objective • Defeating the USSR? Coexistence? • Opinions varied by administration. • Once the USSR obtained nuclear weapons, calculations shifted. • Calculations of “acceptable loss” shaped whether or not nuclear force should be used to compel or deter behavior.

8. The Ambiguous Nature of Containment US threats of retaliation or nuclear deterrence seems antithetical to US ideals. Agreement over spheres of influence in Europe shifted major power conflict to the periphery. Created “strange bedfellows” between the US and autocrats in the periphery.

9. Containment in Action: Truman • Political realities forced a re-evaluation of containment. • NSC-68: • 1) Reiterated the US role in confronting the USSR. • 2) Increased scale of containment. • Required a conventional buildup in addition to a nuclear one. • 3) Couched the Cold War in much starker terms. • 4) Created a zero-sum mentality between the US/USSR • Security the top priority in US budgeting • 5) Positioned the US as the international “police force”

10. Eisenhower Administration: The New Look • Agreed with the thrust of NSC-68. • Secretary of State Dulles created the vision that the world wanted to be like the US; The US has an obligation to assist. • BUT, security spending could not reach 20% of the budget. • Resulted in limiting US influence in certain conflicts (e.g. Korea) and expanding it in others (encirclement). • Additional focus on nuclear deterrents (massive retaliation), burden sharing amongst allies, and psychological/economic warfare.

11. Kennedy and Johnson: Flexible Response • Sputnik launch pushed Kennedy to maintain US nuclear superiority. • Dealing with the root causes of poverty would prevent the expansion of Communism. • Built on the back of a massive buildup in nuclear weaponry. • Superpower competition kept the US in Vietnam.

12. Détente: Nixon, Ford and Carter • Economic weakness nd decline in bipartisanship required a new response. • Détente: create relationships between the US/USSR that allow for cooperation rather than conflict. • Nixon Doctrine: provide nuclear deterrent for the West • Honor commitments to allies, but not necessarily the manpower. • Distinguished between geopolitical and ideological threats; • Prevent overstretch. • Carter Doctrine: Attempts to gain power in the Middle East considered an attack on US interests

13. Evaluating Détente Détente was unpopular amongst lawmakers in the aftermath of Vietnam. Unclear how the Soviets would respond to this shift in policy, especially given US attempts to divide the Eastern bloc. Push for human rights under Carter often sacrificed for security politics.

14. Reagan: Reviving the Cold War • Reagan Doctrine: restore faith in the US, increase strength, and restore free market mechanisms. • Vowed to maintain US dominance in nuclear technology. • Cut foreign aid and increased spending on defense. • Public stance of USSR as the “Evil Empire” at odds with private diplomacy. • Reagan and Gorbachev summits changed the tenor of the Cold War.

15. Bush: Ending the Cold War • Perestroika and glasnost dealt Bush a different hand then predecessors. • The Cold War ended without warning; created debates over integrating vs. containing Russia. • Status Quo Plus: • 1) Maintain the territorial integrity of the USSR . • 2) Ensure Russian control over weaponry. • Supported unification of Germany and democratization in Eastern Europe.

16. Evaluating Containment • Early administrations wanted to achieve victory over the USSR, while others sought to contain Soviet strength (or weakness). • Needed support from allies which was not always forthcoming. • Often required US resource commitments that were not viable. • Containment based on covert operations often undercut US public moralism. • Disintegration of the USSR showed an inability of the US to plan for a post Cold War world. • Dumbrell 2008 • Containment provided a focus for US foreign policy; post Cold War era lacked a focus to ground US foreign policy • The world “had changed”

17. The End of History? 11/9-9/11 • Fukuyama 1989 • “End of History” refers to the idea that there are no systematic alternatives to western liberalism • Fascism defeated in World War II; Marxism decimated at the fall of the Soviet Union. • Economic liberalization in China and Russia suggest that they are on the path to liberalism • Does not mean that all states are liberal democracies • Just that there no systematic alternatives to liberalism • Neither religion nor nationalism fills the void. • Predicts: the “Common Marketization” of international politics and reduced likelihood of conflict between states which are “post historical” • States still facing “history” will still compete. • Terrorism still an issue

18. Clash of Civilizations? • Huntington 1993 • Roots of conflict changed in Post Cold War era. • Western ideals are not as widely accepted as many believe • Certain civilizations/religions incompatible with democracy. • Tensions between “civilizations” rather than ideas basis of conflict today. • Differences hardwired • Identity/culture does not change much

19. Responding to the Clash of Civilizations • Huntington 1993 • Identifies a series of foreign policy proposals that should be adopted to respond to current challenges. • Short-term • 1) Boost internal cooperation within the West. • 2) Limit Islamic and Confucian expansion. • 3) Boost international institutional legitimacy. • Long-term • 1) Maintain military strength. • 2) Attempt to understand each other.

20. Conclusions • Dumbrell 2008 • Bush I and Clinton administrations re-evaluated threat in the post Cold War era • 1990s appeared to be an era with little in terms of threat • Both administrations would seek to remain engaged within the international system • Bush “New World Order”: commit US to democracy but recognize limitations of US power • Clinton: “Democratic Enlargement”: use markets and diplomacy to provide for the spread of democracy • Involvement in Yugoslav conflict ushered in a “re-evaluation” of sorts • And both would seek to maintain US hegemony

21. Next Lecture • Actors/Factors in US Foreign Policy-Institutions • Cox and Stokes CH 6 and 7 • Carter CH 2