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2. Nuclear Power Plant Kr?ko, PWR type, 2 loop:- 1994 MWt, 730 MWe- from 1983 in commercial operation- app. 40 % of Slovenian electric productionResearch reactor TRIGA:- 250 kW General Atomic pool reactor- licensed in 1965Central interim storage of radioactive waste Brinje
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1. 1 Modernization Projects of NPP Instrumentation and Control Systems Related to Power Uprates and Licence Renewals Project
Licensing of I&C Modifications
Matjaž Podjavoršek
Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration
2. 2
3. 3 Five Divisions, 47 employees
Division of Nuclear Safety, Inspection, Division of Radiation Safety and Materials, Division of Analysis and Consulting, Office of International Cooperation
Functions
inspection and licensing processes in the area of radiation and nuclear safety,
development of regulatory infrastructure,
review and assessment,
analyses of operational events and experience,
preparation of reports on nuclear safety…
First priority
supervision over nuclear safety at the Krško NPP SLOVENIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
4. 4 REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT Review of design modifications
Review and assessment of new plants documents
Environmental Qualification Programme (cover also I&C)
Ageing Management Programme
Maintenance Rule Programme etc.
Findings discussed with plant managers, most of findings taken into account by plant's specialists
New Slovenian regulations will include additional requirements on I&C, environmental qualification, maintenance, testing…
5. 5 SNSA staff does not perform safety analysis
lack of manpower and tools
for issues that might have impact on safety SNSA issues project bidding
results of project are included into SNSA approach to plant modification as equivalent document to plant modification package,
results are forward to plant upon request.
Utility is responsible for safety
it decides who will perform the safety analysis
it decides who will review the safety analysis
it finances those experts
SLOVENIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
6. 6 REGULATORY (I&C) CONSIDERATIONS Design requirements/Specifications
Inspectability
Testability
Documentation requirements
Change process requirements
Separation of diagnostic and core functions
7. 7 GOALS OF I&C INSPECTION Identify unauthorized or unintentional modifications (maintenance personnel, un-qualified personnel)
Identify configuration management issues (inadequate evaluations for modifications..)
Identify the addition of new programmable digital equipment
Identify new IT security issues (new external connections to site computer systems or system interconnections)
Identify Test performance non-conformances (verify procedure compliance)
Identify that test procedures address the current configuration
Identify the adequacy of test procedures (specialist & inspector)
Evaluate corrective actions for test failures
Maintain awareness of plant trends, Identify system errors through the review of system logs/local indicators
Verify equipment environmental conditions remain as designed (temp, humidity, EMF)
8. 8 WHAT TO INSPECT? Surveillance tests
Inspection of maintenance work orders
Inspection of engineering design change packages
Inspection of procurement documents/receipt process/component qualification process
General plant awareness – general walkdowns (identification of new equipment, environmental changes, changes in IT systems…)
Interactions with plant staff (system engineers, operations, maintenance)
Inspect plant process for general network control (security) and modifications
Review system logs, reports, indicator light status
Review problem identification reports and corrective actions
9. 9 INSPECTION SKILLS Basic knowledge of design and operation
Knowledge of software lifecycle
Basic knowledge of digital system operations and sensitivities
Ability to understand maintenance and vendor site activities
Understanding of QA documentation
Identification of I&C equipment (field programmable)
Knowledge of Indicators of unintended or unauthorized modifications
Site work order process
Site purchasing process
Security devices (intrusion detection systems)
Laptops (awareness of possible changes to configurations)
Physical changes in plant
Configuration identification document
Ability to validate electronic document integrity (digital signatures…)
Knowledge of system performance indicators
Logs
History reports
Indicating lights
Site problem identification systems
Knowledge of Inspection Tools
Specialized software tools used by the utility
Basic circuit test equipment
10. 10 Act on Protecting against Ionizing Radiation and Nuclear Safety, 2002
Modifications which affect or could indirectly affect the content of safety report:
1. cat.: modifications that shall be only notified to the regulatory body
submission of information at latest six months after the work done
2. cat.: modifications that intention of their implementation must be reported to the regulatory body
the plant may commence the implementation after the regulatory body confirm that shall not be necessary to obtain permit for modification
3. cat.: modifications of significance for radiation or nuclear safety of which a permit from the regulatory body must be obtained SLOVENIAN LEGISLATION - MODIFICATIONS
11. 11 Act requires preparation of new regulation for modifications which shall include:
methodology of modification evaluation,
detailed criteria for classification of modifications into categories
requirements for application and reporting
Old regulation on the condition for sitting, construction … (E1):
positive experts opinion about project modification shall be submitted to the application for modification,
expert shall not be engaged to neither supervising the production process and not proposing this modification
Old regulation on the compilation and contents of the safety report … (E2):
application shall contain analyse of the influences of proposed modification on:
ingoing data
all other parts of the safety report SLOVENIAN LEGISLATION - MODIFICATIONS
12. 12 SLOVENIAN LEGISLATION - MODIFICATIONS Draft issue of new regulation for modifications includes:
detailed criteria for classification of modifications into categories
based on US 10 CFR 50.59
requirements for application:
application for 3. category of modification shall contain:
cause,
description, influence on operation and conformance with design basis, legislation and standards,
list of equipment effected,
safety evaluation screening and safety evaluation,
possible critical states, effected by safety function,
deterministic safety analysis,
supplementary documentation that support modification,
experts opinion.
requirements for reporting:
safety report shall be at least 6 months after outage or every 2 years updated
13. 13 SLOVENIAN LEGISLATION - MODIFICATIONS Draft issue of new regulation for modifications includes (cont.):
reporting for 2. and 3. category of modification, when they are supported by PSA:
summary of calculated contributions to risk, including intermediate results and their justifications,
accidental consequences of events with special emphasis to new prevailing risk factors,
analyse of PSA sensitivity and uncertainty,
survey of PSA model changes.
risk increase due to modification is not allowable except in special case ? 3. category of modification:
risk increase < 5·10-7 for CDF,
risk increase < 1·10-8 for LERF.
All WENRA requirements regarding modifications will be included in the new regulation
14. 14 New Regulation on Authorized expert on Ionizing Radiation and Nuclear Safety, 2006:
old authorization for experts became out of force in December 2006
new authorization shall be renewed at least every 5 years
SNSA is in position to dispossess authorization in compliance with the conditions of the Act
include:
setting up the commission for checking up experts (individual or legal person) applications compliance with the legal requirements,
methodology for acquisition of authorization,
experts annual reporting to the SNSA SLOVENIAN LEGISLATION - MODIFICATIONS
15. 15 SLOVENIAN (I&C) LEGISLATION Some WENRA requirements on I&C systems are already included in current Slovenian nuclear legislation
New regulation will be consistent with all WENRA requirements on I&C systems
Most of the WENRA requirements are already implemented in the Krško NPP
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17. 17 Major NPP Krško I&C systems modifications implemented since 1983 ATWS Mitigation Safeguard Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC)
Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS)
Process Information System (PIS)
Annunciator System
Off-line data acquisition of chemical analysis data (prim & sec. sampling) - Chemnet
RCP and TU Vibration monitoring
Core Monitoring and Operations Support System, BEACON-TSM System
Meteorological Monitoring System
Seismic Instrumentation
18. 18 SG Blowdown Control (digital discrete controllers and digital indicators)
Heater Drain Control, PLC
Condensate Polishing, PLC
Water Treatment, PLC
Switchyard Control & Monitoring (ABB Micro SCADA - although it has remote control capabilities in the MCR it is used for switchyard monitoring only)
Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)
FP- Fire protection (Detection) system Major NPP Krško I&C systems modifications implemented since 1983, cont
19. 19 PROCESS INFORMATION SYSTEM (PIS) The Process Information System (PIS) was installed in NEK in 1992 as part of the post TMI requirements
The main purpose of the PIS was to monitor critical functions (Critical Function Monitoring System - CFMS)
CFMS was designed to meet SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System) requirements of NUREG-0696 (Functional Criteria For Emergency Response Facilities), NUREG-0737 (Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements) Item I.D.2, and NUREG-0737 Supplement 1
Major features of the CFMS include:
A Critical Safety Function Monitor which defines conditions to assess the status of six critical safety functions (criticality, core cooling, heat sink, RCS integrity, containment and RCS inventory),
Engineering Safety Features equipment monitoring
Plant process and area radiation monitoring, and
Meteorological conditions monitoring
20. 20 PROCESS INFORMATION SYSTEM (PIS) Other functions of the PIS are:
Insufficient Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS)
Post-trip review data acquisition
Nuclear process calculations
Primary to secondary leakage calculations
Calorimetric calculations
QPTR evaluations
PIS is a non-safety related system used to provide supplementary information to the operator and to inform him of off-normal conditions
Data is collected by the redundant data acquisition equipment and transmitted to a fully redundant distributed computer system
PIS data is also obtained from other process computers through separate serial or fast Ethernet communication links
21. 21 PROCESS INFORMATION SYSTEM (PIS) Last upgrade of PIS system (May 2006) included:
Wax replaced with Alpha technology
The newest ABB PMS platform
New data connections (MicroScada, Beacon, VibMon, CK-CPS)
Upgraded application software – inclusion of ARP procedures
GPS time synchronization
The effects of the upgrade were:
Improvement of overall PIS performance and availability during transients
Expanding the PIS capability to receive and send process parameters to different process computers
Easier and less expensive maintenance
PIS can now also be used for issuing commands to other non-safety digital control systems
Issues during licensing:
Effects on safety systems (control room ventilation)
Expansion of PIS functions – to control other systems
22. 22 ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM REPLACEMENT Former Annunciator System (Betalarm1000)
gathered a switching contact and controlled the operation of a lampbox to turn on and off a dedicated lamp window
was installed 25 years ago and it was becoming increasingly more difficult to provide technical support and replacement parts
New Annunciator System (SER4100 & BL1500)
use of flagship sequential event recorder to record switching contact which are time stamped and processed to a number of outputs (annunciators, visual display units, printers and computer for data archiving and post analysis)
the BL1500 has been designed to have the identical form factors as the lampboxes supplied 25 years ago with the BL1000.
therefore the operators were presented with an identical control room as before the installation
23. 23 ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM REPLACEMENT Advantages of the new system:
Event recording
Post event analysis
Redundancy
Expandability
Re-configuration flexibility
Advanced Alarm Filtering capabilities
Availability of spares
24. 24 ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM REPLACEMENT proven design (verified in NPP and large industrial applications
full redundancy concept,
on-line diagnostics, functional testing and status reporting
quality equipment and cable
applicable standards, design methods, measures and materials for assuring reliable and safe operation of the system in designed conditions
mechanical protection of exposed signal & PWR cables
seismic qualification (alarm system racks, ALB boxes & frames)
(per original system specification for seismic load of 3g horizontal/ 2g vertical)
cable insulation: fire retardant; LO smoke; No Chlorine
((PWR, Control & Signal cables)
paint of alarm system racks: fire retardant
25. 25 ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM REPLACEMENT ITS impacts (Important To Safety) -1/2
Possible Direct ITS- effect: no direct influence to any SR equipment!
Possible Indirect ITS-effects or influences:
ITS 1- Electrical
SR AC PWR Supply Overload / Shorted from NSR source: Highly improbable
redundant PWR Supplies for new Alarm System (as NSR system) will be properly electrically separated from Safety Related AC PWR Sources
additional load is within acceptable capability of the source.
ITS 2 – Fire Hazard:
Possibility for fire (induced by new equipment): Highly improbable
LO energy (electronic) alarm system consumers,
fire retardant, LO smoke, No Chlorine cables used
electrical cable overload protection (fuses)
fire protection measures:
fire detectors (for early warning),
fire retardant paint for system racks
26. 26 ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM REPLACEMENT ITS 3 – Mechanical:
Possible mechanical damage of SR equipment around
(following a seismic event): highly improbable
seismic design & fabrication of alarm system racks and standalone boxes
ITS 4 – Environmental:
Possible system unavailability due to:
surrounding process, environmental and fire effects: highly improbable
equipment is located in non-hazard area ( MCB and Cable Spread Room)
no high energy equipment ( no potential sources of: fire hazard, missiles, pipe failure)
cables are limited to control and I&C functions (and their PWR supply)
LO energy PWR cables used - installed in enclosed raceways
administrative control of activities in these areas
IP54 protection class of the racks
27. 27 ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM REPLACEMENT Open issue during licensing:
approval of software
SNSA has taken into consideration:
system standards list
NPP reference list
Post-performance problem
inoperability of power supplier
new configuration without power supply redundancy
28. 28 Conclusions During the 20 years of commercial operation more than 500 modifications (and a lot of this modifications are related with I&C system) have been implemented in the NPP Krško
The next important modifications will be the DEH (Digital Electro Hydraulic) system for the control and supervision of the TG (Turbine-Generator) set (scheduled for outage 2009)
All of these modifications are performed on the non-safety related I&C system
New regulations will be in compliance with the WENRA requirements
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THANK YOU!