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QoS Risks vs. Rewards: A Dual Market Approach

QoS Risks vs. Rewards: A Dual Market Approach. Errin Fulp Douglas S. Reeves Networking 2000 May 18, 2000. Why Should We Price Resources or Services?. Allocate "scarce" resources fairly Encourage "responsible" user behavior Generate revenue

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QoS Risks vs. Rewards: A Dual Market Approach

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  1. QoS Risks vs. Rewards: A Dual Market Approach Errin Fulp Douglas S. Reeves Networking 2000 May 18, 2000

  2. Why Should We Price Resources or Services? • Allocate "scarce" resources fairly • Encourage "responsible" user behavior • Generate revenue • Prevent or diminish thefts of service or denial of service attacks • Over what time- and resource-scales?

  3. Point of This Talk • Some users want lowest price / best available quality • Some users want predictability (guaranteed reservations) • Goal: support both

  4. Network Model User User User Broker Broker Broker User Router Broker Router Broker User Router Broker Broker User User

  5. Lowest Price: The Spot Market • Initially • routers have resources, and target utilization • users have resource preferences, and budgets • 1. Users make demands for resources • 2. Routers measures this demand • 3. Router computes prices, broadcast to users • 4. Users adjust demands in response to new prices

  6. Spot Market Timing • User demands and resource prices change dynamically, asynchronously Changes in Demand Time Price Adjustments

  7. Spot Market Example • 160 users, MPEG video traffic, ATM Forum benchmark network

  8. Spot Market Properties • Distributed • Asynchronous, dynamic • Low overhead • Provably fair: max-min, weighted-max-min, proportional, equitable • Provably optimal: pareto, maximum aggregate utility • But… unpredictable prices

  9. Predictability: The Reservation Market Changes in Demand Time Price Adjustments Auction Periods

  10. Reservation Market Properties • Distributed • Synchronous, semi-static, more overhead • Provably fair and optimal • Predictable prices

  11. Combining the Two Markets • Split each resource into "available" and "reservable" portions • Allow users to specify their preferences for price vs. predictability • Compute prices separately for available and reservable parts, allocate according to preferences

  12. User Preferences (Indifference Curves)

  13. Combined Market Properties • (as above for each market) • Spot market prices will be lower than reserved market prices, but less predictable • User choice • Can maximize utility by optimizing the split

  14. Combined Market Example

  15. Example (cont.)

  16. Prospects for Pricing • Distributing prices • Authorization and accounting • At what time-scale? • For what purposes?

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