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The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Science and Technology Fellow Council on Foreign Relations September 29, 2004 Georgetown University Financial support: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and Nuclear Threat Initiative.
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The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Science and Technology Fellow Council on Foreign Relations September 29, 2004 Georgetown University Financial support: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and Nuclear Threat Initiative
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism • Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon • Crude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) • Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear power plant or other nuclear facility • Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb”
Holmes to Watson: It’s Elementary • Motive • Means • Opportunity
Assessing Risk Risk = Probability X Consequence • Large uncertainties • Lack of data Alternatively: Risk = Motivation X Intention X Capability X Consequence
Terrorist Motivations • Why haven’t there been any RDD or crude nuclear weapon terrorist attacks? • Those who study terrorist motivations are “underwhelmed by the probability of such an event for most – but not all – terrorist groups.” – Jerrold Post (IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001) • Psychological and political constraints are great for most groups
Terrorist Motivations (continued) • Traditional thinking: “Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” -- Brian Jenkins, RAND • New Breed of Terrorist Group: • Al Qaeda – politico-religious • Aum Shinrikyo – Apocalyptic Want to kill many and have even more watching in dread
But Can They Get the Means? • Nuclear weapons and fissile material are difficult to obtain • Radioactive materials are much more accessible • Variety of nuclear facilities to target: Security also varies
Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Weapon • Theft • Purchase • Gift (a little help from their friends)? • Coup
Greatest Risks of Terrorist Acquisition • Russia – • Large numbers of portable, forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons • Pakistan – • Presence of al Qaeda • Unstable political system • Parts of government (ISI) sympathetic to terrorist causes • Nascent nuclear command & control system
Highest Priority Efforts: Intact Nuclear Weapons U.S. should: • press Russia to fully implement 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiative pledges. • revamp policy prohibiting security assistance to operational Russian nuclear weapons. • declare its intention to remove its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. • provide security assistance to Pakistan contingent on constraints of NPT
Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb? • Gun-type: • Simplest design • Cannot use plutonium; must use HEU
Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb? (continued) • Implosion-type: • More sophisticated, but still first generation weapon • Can use either plutonium or HEU
Highest Priority: Put HEU at the Head of the Queue • Accelerate down-blending of Russian HEU • Speed up repatriation of Soviet/Russian- and U.S.-origin HEU and accelerate conversion of research reactors • Use Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility to secure HEU • Subordinate Plutonium Disposition Program to HEU First Strategy
Attacks on Nuclear Facilities • Commercial nuclear power plants • Research reactors • Spent fuel storage pools • Reprocessing facilities
Nuclear Facilities: Highest Priority Efforts • Design basis threat should reflect 9/11 magnitude of attack • Rapidly identify and implement urgent upgrades to vulnerable plant systems • Need performance-based (not-compliance based) security system • Need formal government assessment of potential vulnerabilities at research reactors
Dirty Bombs – Myth versus Reality • RDDs (Dirty Bombs) are NOT Weapons of Mass Destruction • Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD • RDDs can be Weapons of Mass Disruption Major effects: • Panic (psychological and social effects) • Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)
High-Risk Radioactive Sources • Finding: Only asmall fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks • But still large number • High-risk sources are: • Portable • Dispersible • More radioactive
Dirty Bombs: Highest Priority Tasks • Improve security of high-risk radioactive sources Preparation and Response: • Develop and stockpile effective decontamination technologies • Involve public in development of decon standards • Provide better training of emergency first responders • Educate public about real versus perceived risks of radiation: psychological immunization