Mass Participation and Political Behavior in Post-Soviet Russia

PoliticalChanges in Post-SovietRussia Vladimir Gel’man (EUSP/University of Helsinki) Sciences Po Bordeaux, lecture 5, 1 April 2019 Mass Participation and Political Behavior in Russia: Voting, Protests, and Repressions

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Russia – a passive society?; • Low level of mass politicization at the level of public attitudes and behavior even vis-à-vis other post-Communist states; • Decline of voter turnout during recent parliamentary elections (48%) and the rise of state-driven mass mobilization; • Why politicization in Russia is low and why there are some exceptions (such as political mobilization in 1989-1991 and in 2011-2012)? • How we can explain what Russians think about politics and how they actually behave (or not behave?) • Do we have reliable instruments for analysis?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Problems of use of survey data – “preference falsification” (Kuran, 1991) and low response rate (roughly, 1/3 of Russians refused to answer questionnaires); • Problems of use of electoral statistics – widespread electoral fraud; various estimations with the use of highly sophisticated techniques of forensics and sometimes of field experiments; • Problems of public perceptions – many Russians are quite OK with selling of their votes on elections, often insensitive to electoral fraud, and often very intolerant toward others (especially ethnic, religious, and other minorities); • Should we consider Russia as an outlier or as a laggard at the global landscape?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • How this set of values affected political attitudes? • Russians are not against electoral democracy – they agreed to elect their rulers (presidents, governors, city mayors) on competitive basis and also not approve politically-driven media censorship; • … yet Russians do not value separation of power, often prefer strong rulers over checks and balances, not are big supporters of multi-party system, and place “law and order” above civil freedoms against the background of low tolerance; • “Illiberal democracy” (Zakaria, 1997) or illiberal authoritarianism?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Low interest to politics in Russia – because of the attitudes or because of quality of politics? • Low trust to political institutions (except for three: president, army, and church); • Low level of participation in any forms – petitioning, contacts with politicians and state officials, grass-root activism (intentional de-politicization), membership in parties and NGOs, strikes, other forms of protests… • Participation in Russia is largely driven top-down than bottom-up due to weakness of organizations and movements vis-à-vis state machinery

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Still, Russians tend to vote (even though less active over time); • Why people vote in one way or another? • Economic theories of voting – self-interested voters reward economically successful rulers and punish unsuccessful rulers (but how we can explain the paradox of Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996)? And why rational voters attend polling stations at all? • Expressive theories of voting – voters express their solidarity with certain parties and politicians because of their identities, ideas, and preferences (models of political identifications and social cleavages)? But to what extent these considerations are relevant in Russia?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • To what extent mass politics in Russia (and elsewhere) is driven by elites or counter-elites? • A typical model of emergence of mass politics and the rise of political organizations in the past in a number of modern democracies; • Formation of political parties (nineteen-century US), trade unions (United Kingdom), etc. was driven by top-down rather than by bottom-up; • The formation of Russian party system after collapse of the Communism – from competition to hierarchy?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • The rise of United Russia – “party of power”; • Intra-elite conflict over elections (1999 – struggle for Yeltsin’s leadership succession): Unity vs. Fatherland – All Russia; • Electoral system: since 1993 – encouragement of party development (tool of political struggle); • Building of disciplined pro-Kremlin majority, since 2003 – turn to super-majority (except for 2011-2016); • Other loyal parties (Communists, LDPR, Just Russia) – why they are needed to the regime?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • While most observers focused on mass apathy and non-participation…

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Challenge to authoritarian regimes – alternative sources of mobilization and mass protests; • In most instances – protests were driven by counter-elites: recent wave of anti-regime mass mobilizations in post-Communist areas, especially Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004, 2014), Kyrgyzstan (2005, 2010), Moldova (2009), etc.; • About 70% of autocracies after the World War II failed due to intra-elite conflicts (Svolik, 2012), the role of the mass protests was less important; • Competing explanations of failure of authoritarian regimes – ”weak autocrats” (Way, 2015) or ”strong opposition” (Bunce, Wolchik, 2011)

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Russia – a ”crucial case” for understanding of ”regime vs. opposition” conflicts under electoral authoritarianism? • Until 2011 – tremendous regime’s investments into authoritarian institution-building (reforming of electoral and party systems, strengthening of the ”power vertical”, isolation and marginalization of oppositions of various sorts), high level of mass support because of economic growth; • 2011-2012: bump on the road - relatively weak regime’s performance during parliamentary elections (49% of votes for the major party), relative decline of mass support, the re-emergence of the opposition amid generational changes; • Regime did survive but perceive major threats…

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Balance of sticks and carrots – crucial for survival of electoral authoritarian regimes; • “Authoritarian equilibrium rests on lies, fear, and economic prosperity” (Przeworski, 1991: 58); • In the 2000s, Russia’s regime mostly used carrots due to effects of economic growth (buying of loyalty), and rarely applied sticks (“fear”); • In the 2010s, potential for further buying of loyalty seemed exhausted, and the role of lies and fear increased; • Threat perceptions (Davenport, 1995) as the major factor of repressions

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • 2012 – repressive turn of Russia’s regime, “tightening of the screws” after Putin’s return to the presidency; • Regime’s attacks towards: • Opposition activists (the case of Bolotnaya square); • independent media outlets (lenta.ru, gazeta.ru, forbes.ru, rbc.ru, etc.); • NGOs (“foreign agents” law); • “cultural wars” (Pussy Riot case, etc.) • Some of regime’s rivals were discredited and further marginalized; • 2014 – overthrow of Yanukovych in Ukraine (added insult to injury)

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • What are the functions of repressions in authoritarian regimes? • Not only coercion and punishment of regime’s rivals but also signaling to the public (and to elites) about boundaries of permitted forms of their discontent (one might object certain policies but not the regime as such); • The use of mass repressions is risky game (empowering of coercive apparatus, the rise of internal tensions, elite purges as side effects, etc.); • Turn toward selective use of repressions as an alternative solution (fine-tuning of repressive policies)

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Late-Soviet repressive policy as a role model for present-day Russia? • A “success story” in combating organized dissent in late-Soviet Russia (but not in other Soviet republics): winning combination of preemptive monitoring and preemptive coercion; • Few examples of political protests, the overall low number of political prisoners despite rising discontent, use of various methods of control, ranging from ban of certain jobs to forced emigration; • Organized dissent nearly exhausted by the time of Gorbachev’s reforms and played a limited role in protests of 1989-91 in Russia; • Regime’s problems were not eliminated but postponed and put onto the shoulders of next generation of leaders

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Present-day Belarus: yet another success story of selective repressive policy? • Effective mechanism of monitoring due to the state control over economy and temporary job contracts in the public sector; • Effective use of: • coercion (disappearance of some opposition figures in the early 2000s), • divide-and-rule tactics (provoking internal schisms among regime’s rivals), • Incentives to “exit” rather than “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) – effects of emigration; • No serious threats to Lukashenko’s regime ever?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Putin’s triumph after 2014? • Skyrocketing of popularity (approval rate up to 88%, but then decline to 64%); • No major discontent after annexation of Crimea; • Further weakening of the opposition (internal schisms, failure during 2016 State Duma elections)

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • … but the new challenges lies ahead? • The rise of Internet/social media + generational changes – effective counter-mobilization (spontaneous youth rallies in Moscow and other cities in March and June 2017); • Gradual overcoming of internal schisms among the opposition (the slow rise of a “negative consensus”); • The rising (yet silent) discontent among elites due to shrinking pool of rents and lack of positive prospects;

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Demonstrative killing of Boris Nemtsov (February 2015) – a new phase of “repressive turn”; • Outsourcing of the use of violence (still under control); • Further legal “tightening of the screws” (the law on “undesired” foreign organizations, strengthening of control over Internet/social media); • More intensive negative campaigning in the mainstream media against the opposition, mobilization of lower layers of the “power vertical” • Rising tides in anticipation of 2021 parliamentary elections?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • New tendency - increasing regime’s repressions against elites (including regime’s loyalists); • Since 2014 – criminal charges against five regional chief executives, some deputy ministers, head of federal custom service, top officials in the Ministry of Interior, and the minister of economic development…; • Side effects of fierce struggle over rents (the case of Sechin vs. Ulyukaev conflict); • Reformatting of the “winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) as a mechanism of maintenance of elite loyalty

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Alexey Navalny (b.1976) – a new opposition leader from the younger generation; • In 2013, he got more than 27% of votes in Moscow mayoral elections; • Gathered more than 500000 signatures of voters for his nomination during pre-campaign online mobilization in 2017; • In 2013 accused in economic crime (probation), legally ineligible for balloting, the court verdict is overturned by ECHR, but… • The Kremlin was able not to let him run in any elections

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Putin easily won in 2018 presidential elections: 76% of votes, more than 50% of all voters, but… • The rise of public discontent amid barely competitive elections: • either predictability of results with low turnout (demobilization strategy) or high turnout at any costs with risks of post-election protests (risks of counter-mobilization); • Fake candidates as false targets? (cases of regional elections, September 2018) • Still, no major immediate challenges but high threat perceptions in the Kremlin – previous success of repressive turn paved the way for further repressions (Davenport, 1995)

Mass Participation and Political Behavior • Q1: why civil and political participation of the mass public in Russia is very limited? • Q2: why and how Russia’s political regime so successfully used repressions vis-à-vis its opponents?

Mass Participation and Political Behavior in Post-Soviet Russia