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International Laws and Disputes in the Nile River Basin. Ashok Swain Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, SWEDEN. Sharing the International Rivers. 263 international river systems (covers 45% + earth’s land surface and supports 40% + world population)
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International Laws and Disputes in the Nile River Basin Ashok Swain Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, SWEDEN
Sharing the International Rivers • 263 international river systems (covers 45% + earth’s land surface and supports 40% + world population) • 145 countries have some share in international river system (92 of them have 50%+ of their territories in these basins) • 21 countries receive 50% + of their surface freshwater supply from upstream countries (Egypt 97%, Sudan 77%). • No magic formula in governing International Rivers • Each international or regional agency has its own agenda • Basins in the news: Jordan, Nile, Euphrates-Tigris, Rhine, Colorado, Parana, Danube, Ganges-Brahmaputra, Indus, Mekong
Nile River: Facts and Figures • Longest international rivers in the world: From its remotest headstream, the Ruvyironza river in Burundi, the river is 6,671 km long. • The main stream of the Nile is formed at Khartoum, Sudan, 2,988 km from the sea, by the junction of the Blue Nile (1,610 km) and the White Nile (3,700 km long). Other tributaries: Atabara and Sobat. • Blue Nile originates from Lake Tana and White Nile from Lake Victoria. • Rivers originating from Ethiopian highlands contributes 86% of water supply to Egypt, while White Nile’s share is small but steady 14 %. • Egypt is the primary beneficiary of Nile (island between the Blue Nile and White Nile close to Khartoum irrigated with Nile water). • Ten riparians: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo,Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. • 300 million live in 10 countries, and 160 million within the the basin.
Nile River and its Control • The 1902 Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia (prohibited Ethiopia to divert Nile water) • The 1929 Treaty between Egypt and Sudan (Great Britain): 48 bcm/year to Egypt, 4 bcm/year to Sudan (this amount was to be drawn from Jan 20 to July 15). Colonial power committed no use of water for irrigation and power by its other colonies in White Nile basin. • The 1959 Treaty between Egypt and Sudan after Sudan’s independence (1956) and Aswan Dam planning (1952): 55.5 bcm/yr for Egypt, 18 bcm/yr for Sudan, 10 bcm/yr for seepage and evaporation. Joint front established versus Ethiopia. • 1991: Sudan and Ethiopia agreed to explore cooperation over Blue Nile and Atbara rivers and it alarmed Egypt. • 1993: Framework of general cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia: both agreed not to do anything with Nile to cause ‘appreciable harm’ to other. • The Nile Basin Initiative since 1999.
Nile Basin Initiative • Established by the governments of ten riparian countries with its secretariat at Entebee, Uganda, thanks to World Bank. • Water Minister’s club, fails to bring CEO of the riparian countries on the board. • Focus on economy, ignores environment. • Public participation is superficial. • Total dependence on funding agency.
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses • International Law Association’s several attempts since 1956 to establish 'principle of equitability’ • In 1966 at Helsinki, the ILA decided on the Helsinki Rules (an existing use of river would have to give way to a new use in order to reach an equitable apportionment of shared water resources, though the new user would have to pay compensation). • In 1970, Finland unsuccessfully introduced a resolution in the UN General Assembly to consider Helsinki Rules as a model for sharing international rivers.
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Contd.) • Being directed by the UNGA in 1970, the International Law Commission worked to define the scope of the term ‘international watercourse’ • In 1976, the ILC agreed to use the term ‘international watercourse’ instead of contentious terms as ‘international drainage basin’ or ‘international watercourse system’. • After 25 years of deliberations, the ILC submitted its draft on ‘Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ in 1996 to the UN General Assembly, which adopted it on 21 May 1997. • The Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 103 in favour to 3 against (Turkey, China and Burundi) with 27 abstentions. • Convention stresses that states should use watercourses in an equitable and reasonable manner, and defines a procedure to follow when planned schemes may have adverse impacts on other riparian states.
Limitations of UN Convention • Slow Ratification process • Only Sovereign Nations are under its purview • General but contradictory language: international watercourse versus surrounding eco-system, Existing agreements and the new framework; equitable utilization (art 5) versus not causing significant harm to present user (art 7) • Lack of serious enforcement agency
UN Convention and Nile River • None of the riparian countries have ratified the Convention. • The convention at UNGA: Sudan was in favor; Burundi opposed; Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania abstained; Eritrea, Uganda and DRC (Zaire) were absent. • Egypt does not like the term “international watercourse”. • Egypt likes art. 7 while Ethiopia likes art 5. • Article 3: 1929 agreement between Egypt and Great Britain on behalf of Sudan and 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan
Statement of some Nile Riparian countries on the Convention at UNGA • Ethiopia: Abstained in the voting because the text of the Convention was not balanced, particularly with respect to safeguarding the interests of upper riparian States. Article 7 and Part III of the Convention (planned measures) were of particular concern. Part III put an onerous burden on upper riparian States. • Egypt: Abstained in the voting. Expressed the hope that its adoption of the Convention would enhance the Assembly's role in codifying and developing international law, with the aim of promoting international peace and security and upholding the rule of law. While the Convention contained some new regulations, they did not modify customary international law. • Rwanda: Abstained in the voting. The Convention lacked any reference to the sacrosanct principle of State sovereignty. His Government also had problems with Article 33, on the settlement of disputes, as well as with provisions in Article 2, on the management of underground waters. • Tanzania: The draft convention could have been better; it was, to some extent, the product of a deadline. He noted that it was to enter into force following the deposit of 35 instruments of ratification or accession. He said that represented a mere 18 per cent of the Organization's current membership of 185 States -- a figure that was even lower if regional economic integration organizations were taken into account. Abstained.
Sharing of the Nile and its Future • Ratified convention cannot provide answers to Nile sharing questions: there is no Golden Principle. • Colonial treaties are major obstacles: 1902, 1929 • 1959 treaty and Ethiopia • Egypt’s increasing demand: New Lands in Sinai, transfer projects • NBI should focus at the sub-basin level rather than taking a basin based approach: too many cooks for too little broth. • Focus should be Blue Nile, not White Nile: Jonglei Canal is a big Q. • Comprehensive strategy for mutual benefit sharing: Storage in Ethiopian highlands and hydropower for the use of underground water. • Scientific progress to make desalination process economically viable can alter the whole scenario: Egypt as upstream. • Nile Basin countries need to establish a self-sustainable and lasting cooperative mechanism: NBI in the present form is not the answer.