21 st CENTURY’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT SYMPOSIUM

1. 21st CENTURY’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT SYMPOSIUM 14 January 2003 -- Re-thinking Intervention -- Professor David Carment, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

2. Three Positive Trends • The number and magnitude of armed conflicts within and among states has significantly decreased since the early 1990s and the world is a less riskier place to live than it was five or even ten years ago. Three positive trends have been identified: • 1) ethnic groups are gaining even greater autonomy and power sharing; and • 2) democratic governments now outnumber autocratic governments two to one; • 3) and continue to be more successful in resolving violent societal conflicts

3. Current Environment • Fundamental system-wide problem of state failure as a structural and global problem that is unlikely to go away in the short run • Many states in the developing world have failed, are failing or will fail in the next 20-30 years • Most are in sub-Sahara Africa

4. Track Record • The failure to prevent the slow collapse of states in Central and West Africa – despite clear understanding of when and where such events would occur and the availability of forecasts for predicting and explaining their causes and manifestations (Congo, Guinea, Sierra Leone); • The failure to anticipate the moral hazards that are generated by efforts to address refugee flows, ethnic cleansing and clan warfare (Rwanda, Somalia); • The failure to understand how biased interventions can accelerate conflict between combatants (Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia); • The failure to produce credible responses to warring factions thereby generating even greater violence (Rwanda, Bosnia);

5. State of Peacekeeping • Post-Cold War peace operations differ from their predecessor missions in a number of important ways: • the central characteristics of traditional peacekeeping missions - the use of force for self defense only, the interposition of troops after a ceasefire and the maintenance of tactical and strategic impartiality - no longer provide the boundaries for presumed mission success. • intrastate conflicts are more complex and more deadly for both peacekeepers and ordinary citizens caught in the fray. • In order to perform functions such as guaranteeing the safe passage of humanitarian aid and assisting and protecting displaced persons, peacekeepers have had to resort to more forceful actions.

6. Policy Insights Several initiatives have been undertaken to advance the debate on collective security and peacekeeping. These include: the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) which builds on the Secretary General’s Millennium Report and the recently launched International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

7. Key Recommendations • UN as a secondary actor • Importance of regional context • Identification of thresholds • Prior Risk Assessment • Emphasis on Preventive action

8. Strategic Insights • The assumption that interveners must be perceived and act as impartial is now seriously questioned. • Faced with extreme instances of political violence, a coalition of states or an organization should not be discredited in seeing a conflict reach a specific outcome. • The use of force must be tightly linked to the mediation process. • Force and the threat to use force are the coercive side of negotiating a peace plan in which the fear of even greater costs, motivates combatants to make concessions at the bargaining table.

9. Strategic Insights • Credibility and resolve relate directly to developing effective and dynamic strategies as well as to generating an effective reputation for credible response over time. • Security institutions and organizations are not just things that evolve structurally. Their reputations and credibility also change over time. • Any strategy that is weak in capability will not be taken seriously as a credible deterrent and is more likely to fail under extreme and hostile conditions. • Peacekeeping forces must be prepared to implement robust mandates when necessary; acquiesce and possibly withdraw in the face of stronger counter-forces in other instances and; if incapable of mustering the necessary resolve, be prepared to not get involved in the first place.

10. Implications for UN Peacekeeping • Lost credibility over the last 10 years • Secondary actor in support of regional missions • Circumvention of the UN • Avoid situations in which it is unlikely to succeed

11. Implications for Intervention • Large-scale robust missions not an automatic guarantee of success. • A variety of operations - both large and small that match the extensive array of belligerent strategies are more appropriate. • We should not eliminate less intense forms of involvement such as fact finding, observer missions and information gathering through early warning networks. • Information gathering is particularly crucial in determining belligerent intentions and strategies. • Astute leaders aware that overt tensions may lead to escalation will prefer a low intensity war, effective enough to accomplish specific objectives, without attracting outside involvement.

12. Strategic Issues • Moral hazard –actions taken to forestall violence may encourage it • Security provided by peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies can be understood as a public good available to belligerents and civilians alike. • The impact of bias – forceful interventions may encourage more violence by favouring the ascendant side

13. Summary • Preference should be given to preventive action • Local analysis (risk assessment and early warning) are crucial • Costs of early intervention are less than late intervention