READING: Finish the textbook.

1. Money & Politics on the International Stage: The Political Economy of the UN Security CouncilJames Raymond VreelandAssociate ProfessorSchool of Foreign ServiceDepartment of Government Georgetown University READING: Finish the textbook.

2. Cooperation & Change

3. Collaboration

4. UNSC IMF/WB project in Ghana IMF World Bank

5. The question: • Do temporary members of the UNSC receive financial perks?

6. Yes. Why? • The United States and other powerful countries seek additional influence over the UNSC.

7. The goal of the donor countries: • Get countries under a program – in case important issues come up. • Godfather-esque: “Some day, and that day may never come, I'll call upon you to do a service for me. But uh, until that day, accept this justice as a gift on my daughter’s wedding day.” • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Bz9iXernY4&feature=fvw

8. Plan • What is the UN Security Council? • Why are they used to influence the UNSC & how? • Evidence • Statistical • Anecdotes • So what?

9. What is the UNSC(United Nations Security Council)?

10. What is the UNSC? • 5 permanent members with veto power • 10 elected members (2 year term - limited) • Nominated by regional caucus, elected by GA • Africa (3), Asia (2), Latin America (2), Eastern Europe (1), Western Europe+ (2) • Decisions (open ballot) require 9 votes • UNSC votes on • UN military action against aggressors • Economic sanctions & arms embargoes • Elected members of the UNSC potentially will vote on matters of extreme international importance.

11. Why bribe/reward votes? • Voting power? • Legitimacy • There is a premium for getting (near) unanimous votes to win domestic public support.

12. US President public support before and after military action – with and without UNSC authorization

16. Evidence: Direct foreign aid

17. (non-UNSC: n=5719) (UNSC: n=339)

18. Enter: • The IMF • The World Bank • Regional Development Banks: • Asian Development Bank • African Development Bank

19. What are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank?

20. Two Key points about the IMF & World Bank • Involved with developing countries through “programs”: loans + conditions. • Influence over decisions pegged to economic size.

21. Why use the IMF and the World Bank to influence the UNSC? • Political benefits (for both actors) • “DIRTY WORK” • Leverage benefits • Conditionality & loan disbursements • Cost benefits • Shared:

22. Gulf War Examples • Zimbabwe – UNSC member 1991-92 • 1992 – 1st IMF arrangement in a decade • Votes for 2 resolutions against Iraq • Then abstains… • And Zimbabwe was threatened with new IMF conditions • Subsequently votes for 11 resolutions condemning Iraq.

23. Gulf War Examples • Zaire in early 1991: PRESIDENT of UNSC • Request emergency UNSC meeting • Inconvenient for: • “Zaire was offered undisclosed ‘debt forgiveness’ and military equipment in return for silencing the Security Council when the attack was under way.”

24. Counter examples?

25. Gulf War Examples • Cuba – UNSC member 1990-1 • Consistently opposed Iraq resolutions • IMF arrangement? • Left the IMF in 1964 – not an IMF member • (Why? Claimed the IMF was a tool of the US)

27. Gulf War Examples • Yemen – UNSC member 1990-1 • Voted against Desert Storm • U.S. representative was overheard declaring to the Yemeni ambassador that it was “the most expensive vote you have ever cast.” • The US cut hundreds of millions of dollars in aid • (No IMF arrangement)

28. A more historical example? • Tanzania • 1961-1974 no IMF, no UNSC • 1975 • UNSC member • First IMF arrangement – exceedingly weak conditionality

29. What does it mean“to explain”?

30. Nomothetic (law-like)vs. Idiographic (descriptive) approaches • Law-like statement: • Whenever & wherever X occurs, X is in a certain relation to Y. • Descriptive statement: • Specifies spatio-temporal locations and makes all subsequent propositions relative to these parameters.

31. Description (idiographic): • Julius Nyerere was the first President of Tanzania from the country’s founding in 1961 until 1985 (his retirement ) • 1975 • UNSC member • First IMF arrangement – exceedingly weak conditionality

32. Law-like (nomothetic): • UNSC members are more likely to receive IMF loans with light conditionality • Other examples: • A particle to which no force is applied will move with constant velocity in a straight line. • Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force that is directly proportional to the product of the masses of the particles and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. • E=mc2

33. We can easily apply law-like statements to particular cases… • A particle to which no force was applied in Brazil during the 1960s moved in a straight line with constant velocity. • Particles of matter in Argentina during the 1990s attracted other particles in Mercosur and the rest of the world with forces directly proportional to the product of the masses of the particles and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. • In France, E equaled mc2after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. True - but redundant - statements.

34. But some would judge the following “improper” because people don’t behave in a universal fashion the way “particles” do. • Import substitution industrialization retards economic development in the long-run. • Fixed exchange rates may fail as credible commitments leading to economic catastrophe. • The Trilemma.

35. We have taken a “nomothetic” approach to IPE • Risky! • We may have made false generalizations • Alternative: • History of international political economy • Descriptive • Less risky • Can lead to the view that every outcome is UNIQUE

36. According to the approach of this class, What is it to explain? • To state the conditions under which a phenomenon always or usually takes place (perhaps probabilistically) • The BRIDGE • The BRIDGE between historical observations and general theory is the substitution of variables for proper names and dates

37. Instead of: • Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanzania, saw his country elected to serve on the UNSC in 1975 and entered into an IMF arrangement with light conditions that year. • We have: • UNSC members are more likely to receive IMF loans with light conditionality

38. IMF reply in the Washington Post (November 1, 2006): • An IMF spokesman said “the [Tanzania] evidence is anecdotal and circumstantial.” • To convince people, we need • many more anecdotes • statistical evidence (it’s not just luck)

40. Conditionality?

42. World Bank evidence “It is true that during the Cold War years aid was politically motivated.” “Now however, aid is being delivered to countries most in need and to those who show they are determined to use it well.” (World Bank, FAQ, www.worldbank.org)

43. avg=1.29 avg=2.13 avg=1.29 avg=2.06 avg=2.19 avg=1.28 avg=2.15 avg=1.30 avg=2.10 std=1.95 std=2.93 std=1.95 std=2.75 std=3.11 std=1.96 std=2.96 std=1.93 std=2.92 n=5333 n=357 n=5333 n=176 n=181 n=2638 n=183 n=2695 n=174 Non- Member Non- 1st.year 2nd year Non- Member Non- Member member member member member member member Total sample Over time During the cold war After the cold war Average # of World Bank projects by UNSC membership If politics mattered during the Cold War, but not after, this bar should be above the line, and this one should be at/below the line… UNSC members continue to get more World Bank programs 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0

44. Asian Development Bank Daniel Yew Mao Lim, Class of 2011

45. African Development Bank

46. Observation by Russian Student • Bribes – no surprise • Trade money for votes • But the US bribes… • with a loan • must be repaid! • Impressive!

47. Who is surprised?

48. So what? • Q # 1: Is this a bad thing? • Q # 2: Is it in the US interest to change things? • Perhaps not – Short-run political gains. • Long-run economic development? • Elected to the UNSC 6 times • 15 IMF arrangements since 1958 • 32 out of 48 years (66% of the time)

50. So what? • ACCOUNTABILITY • Do away with term limits • Let regions elect