An enduring logic of conflict in world politics?

An enduring logic of conflict in world politics? Paul Bacon SILS IR201

Continuity? • Realist conflict cycle. • Perpetual anarchy. • Alliances/balances of power/war • Gilpin – do we know more than Thucydides?

Change? • The world is shrinking – flight times and costs, and missile delivery times have all decreased significantly. • Global Internet communication is almost real-time, and extremely cheap. • Threat of ‘double death’. • 9/11 – threat from remote, poor countries. • HIV/AIDS • Global warming.

Three basic forms • A world imperial system • One government controls most of the world with which it has contact. • Rome, Sumer, Persia, China, Britain, the US. • A feudal system • Human loyalties and political obligations not fixed primarily by territorial boundaries. • Europe after the collapse of Rome. • An anarchic ‘Westphalian’ system of states • Cohesive, territorial, sovereign states, with no higher government above them. • Ancient Greece, 15thC Italy, Europe and the world post-1648.

Differing views on anarchic politics • Realism • Liberalism • Dependency theory • Neo-realism/neo-liberalism • Constructivism • Feminism

Building blocks • Actors • Goals • Instruments

Actors • Realists believe that states are the only significant actors. • Realists also believe that only the big states really matter. • The number of states in the world has increased by a factor of 4 since 1945. • However, the rise in the number of non-state actors has also been highly significant. • Many large MNCs straddle international borders, and command more economic resources than many states (see textbook, p. 10).

Actors • At least 177 MNCs have annual sales that are larger than the GDP of more than half the 200 states in the world. • States, especially the powerful ones, are usually still the main actors. • New, complex coalitions between state and non-state actors have important implications. • States remain the major actors in the world, but they do not have the whole stage to themselves.

Actors • Important actors in the Middle East: • Of course, the warring states in the region, and the outside powers, such as the US and Russia. • MNCs such as Shell and BP. • Intergovernmental institutions such as the UN, OPEC, and the Arab League. • Human rights NGOs such as the Red Cross and Amnesty International • Transnational ethnic groups such as the Kurds. • Terrorist groups, drug cartels and mafia organizations. • International religious movements and political ideologies (Wahaabi Islam and liberal democracy).

Goals • According to realists, the dominant goal of states in an anarchic system is military security. • However, today states care as much or more about their economic wealth. • Human rights and human security have become very important goals for some states in the international system. • Although military security has not been replaced as the dominant goal, the agenda of international politics has become more complex as states pursue a wider range of goals.

Instruments • The traditional realist view is that military force is the only instrument that really matters. • AJP Taylor – ‘A great power is one which is able to prevail in war’. • However, it is costlier to use force than it was in earlier times. • The link between military strength and positive achievement has been loosened.

Instruments • Nuclear weapons are too ‘muscle-bound’ – too costly and damaging to have a practical use in war. • Foreign rule is very costly and difficult in an age of nationalism and global mass communications. • In democracies, there are increasingly norms of anti-militarism, and democracies are reluctant to suffer too many casualties. Unjust uses of force can be costly to soft power, both internally and externally. • A number of contemporary issues, such as trade disputes between democracies, do not lend themselves to forceful solutions.

The Peloponnesian War • Athens • Corcyra • Sparta • Corinth • Epidamnus • Potidea • Megara • Persia

The Prisoner’s Dilemma • The realist ‘security dilemma’ is a particular type of Prisoner’s Dilemma • There are a number of different possible outcomes. In our example, these are as follows: Prisoner One Prisoner Two • 0 (Squeal) 25 (No squeal) • 1 (No squeal) 1 (No squeal) • 10 (Squeal) 10 (Squeal) • 25 (No Squeal) 0 (Squeal)

The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Pelopponesian War • Should Athens have co-operated with Sparta and Corinth by turning down Corcyra? • But, what would have happened if Sparta and Corinth had captured Corcyra’s ships, and the naval balance become 2-1 against Athens? • Athens could have trusted S and C to keep their promises. • However, Athens decided to ally with Corcyra. This is the equivalent of ‘squealing’ on the other prisoner.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Pelopponesian War • The problem is that Athens came to believe that war was inevitable. • If there was to be a war, then better to have 2-1 superiority than 2-1 inferiority. • From a game theory perspective, it is always difficult to show trust when the game is only played once. • The big decision is whether to take the risk and co-operate.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Pelopponesian War • Game theory suggests that if a game will be played many times, then the best, most rational strategy is to co-operate on your first move, and then copy what your opponent/partner does. • However, crucially, it is always rational to defect if you think that you are playing last. • This is why it is so dangerous if you come to believe that war is inevitable. It means that you are close to the last move, and it is rational to worry whether you can trust your opponent/partner. • For Thucydides, states will also always be caught in this Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Limits on ethics in IR • 1. There is only a weak international consensus on values. • 2. States are not like individuals. (Should a president be a Kantian?) • 3. Causation is more complex in international politics than in domestic politics. • 4. International institutions are particularly weak, and the disjunction between order and justice is greater in international than in domestic politics.

An enduring logic of conflict in world politics?