International Politics: Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation

1. International Politics: Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation Objectives of the class, Two goals: First: give students an overview of basic concepts and themes that are used in the political analysis of International relations and of their recent theoretical developments. Among those concepts: actor, sub-actor and system in International relations, decision-making bargaining, escalation and crisis, deterrence and stability. The course also intends to cover issues in International cooperation such as alliances and coalitions, collective goods, and international institutions.

2. International Systems Second, the course wants to provide epistemological and methodological foundations for the use of these concepts in a rigorous way. In order to that the course will insist on the closeness of economic and political approaches in the use of rational choice analysis and game theory particularly in their dynamic and evolutionary aspects. The importance of productive processes and of basic demographic and resource bases for the understanding of international politics will also be emphasized.

3. Fundamental questions • The political analysis of international relations can be subsumed in two basic questions: • Why the present international power structure • How will it evolve? • The course will try to answer by emphasizing • Fundamentals: Resources, Demographics, Ecological Conditions, Technology, Health Factors: The "Diamond" perspective • Strategic aspects of political systems and behavior of political agents, Institutions

4. Example: The Mongol Empire

5. World Configuration

6. Epistemology and Methodology • Epistemological and Methodological Considerations • Fundamental question: What is politics? • Different epistemological and methodological approaches will give different answers. • I will use here a scientific (Popperian) epistemology characterized by what is called methodological individualism and the rational choice perspective • This perspective gives a unique answer here: namely Politics is the solution to collective action problems (Taylor) • This approach has two advantages:

7. Dynamics of conflict and cooperation • It gives rigorous and unambiguous definitions of concepts whereas a lot of concepts used by social scientists are fuzzy • It clearly links politics with economics and other scientific disciplines such as biology, anthropology, archeology, and evolutionary psychology. Politics under different evolutionary settings which links up with a tradition started in the 19th century: e.g. the Marx –Engels theory of the state

8. Dynamics of conflict and cooperation What is the scientific method? It is according to Popper: A Hypothetic-Deductive Method which includes at least 4 steps • Definition of a paradigm (units of analysis) • Definition of basic assumptions and hypotheses • Logical conclusions from these assumptions • Empirical testing of these conclusions through rigorous methods independent from the assumptions

9. Dynamics of conflict and cooperation Basic explanatory mechanisms in the social sciences • Purelycausal approaches • Normative approaches: Assume the existence of norms • Approaches based on the motivations of actors or agents: they imply actors act strategically or instrumentally and not for other reasons!! • Rational choice approaches: do not exclude norms! < Cognitive approaches

10. Rational choice approaches: Decomposition of preferences and decisions: present, future, uncertainty Rationality means transitivity if A>B and B>C then A>C. Rationality is also represented by the standard expected utility model: Suppose a transitive preference or utility order, this order can be represented by a function U(x,y,z,...). This function can then be associated with a gamble. Here U(x) takes only the values W (win), ST (Status quo) and L (lose). We have the order here of W>ST>L. The gamble or risk aspect is associated with a probability scheme for different events. gamble sure - thing act probability lose L ST p win W ST 1 - p Gamble preferred to sure thing if EU (gble)> U(ST),EU (gble) = U(W)(1-p) + U (L) p

11. Dynamic Aspects and Risk Preference U(C’(x))=[U(B(x)p(x)+U(A(x)(1-p(x))] is always preferred to the sure thing value C The sure thing realization U(C(x)) is always preferred to the (chancy) prospect U(C’(x))=[U(B(x)p(x)+U(A(x)(1-p(x))] The interval T – C(x) is the amount of gain in terms of x an individual is prepared to forgo for not taking the risk linked to the chancy prospect Dynamic aspects can be included via a discount rate: pure time preference

12. Dynamic aspects

13. EVENT SEARCH FOR SIMILAR EVENT IN PAST Use matches to past to decide course of actions TAKE ACTION Did action yield desired outcome NO YES PAST EVENTS Modify event base to avoid future match Reinforce matched event Cognitive approaches: Example of a scheme Nowsuch approaches have evolved into agent based modeling or morphed with rational choiceapproaches

14. Agent Based Modeling Symmetric indirectly ruled state with a hierarchy depth of n Symmetric directly ruled state with no depth

15. Rational Choice Shows The Problematic Aspect of Solving Collective Action Problems and Social Choice and thus of the Linkage Domestic Foreign Policy • Two theoretical approaches especially in view of information problems • Condorcet-Arrow paradox and theorem • The Theory of collective goods • International dynamics are linked to such questions

16. Social Choice: Condorcet Arrow • Social Choice and Arrow’s Theorem: • 3 Voters: x y z • 3 Issues: A BC

17. The Condorcet Arrow Paradox • Preferences: • x: A > B > C • y: C > A > B • z: B > C > A • Majority Vote: A > B, B > C, but C >A

18. A B C A C B P r e f e r e n c e A B C A B C A B C Arrow Paradox continued: Single peakedness

19. Collective Good Theory • Collective goods as opposed to private goods are problematic with respect to exclusion and rivalry • They are nevertheless essential for the working of society • They originate with productive processes and population concentrations that are higher: Production security dilemma

20. Collective good theory continued Tax solution Property rights solution

21. Collective good theory leads to a theory of interest groups • Free Rider Problem and Selective incentives • Asymmetry of interest is important • Collective goods are usually supplied by small groups • Collective goods lead to the principal agent problem

22. Politics, Conflict and Cooperation • What is politics? • If politics consist in solving collective action problems, (for a collective good) then they consist in organizing for cooperation but also for conflict • Politics start to emerge when traditional methods of conflict resolution fail: avoidance, skirmishes, raids • They require a tax base which can only be realized through a surplus

23. Theories • Classical: Hume, Kant, Cobden • Whereas classical approaches are focusing on the origins and nature of structures the newer theories take structure for granted even constructivism (Wendt) : This is not so see the works of Peter Sahlins and , Graham Robb • More recent: Neo-realism, Neo-liberal institutionalism, Information based conceptions such as epistemic communities. • Constructivism

24. Theories of international relations • The evolution of theories is closely linked to the structural aspect of state systems • Historically we notice a succession of decentralized state systems followed by the creation of empires • This evolution was broken in Western Europe around the year 1000 and despite attempts an empire could not be recreated • Elsewhere the standard evolution continued (China, the Ottoman Empire,..) • By the 18th Century the European specificity became clear to analysts • By the 19th Century European states became consolidated

25. Politics and internal structures • What can be said historically? • Given types of political systems appear: Chiefs organizers of redistribution-providers of higher goods, lords, kings, emperors, self-government • From taxation to property rights: Egypt, Incas • These have international connotations: The Konrad Skaperdas perspective: size of coalition to create collective good • Evolutionary aspects: from Chiefs to self-government • Fundamental question: what conditions these evolutions

26. Size of Polities (Johnson + Earle) • Camp or Hamlet: 25 – 30 • Local group: 150 – 500 some warfare over resources and people (Yanomamo: women) • Big man collectivity: 350 – 1800 more warfare • Chiefdom: 1000- max 100 000 more regular warfare • State: several 100 000 to several millions systematic organized warfare: Inka state 14 M • Importance of warfare for state organization

27. The Konrad-Skaperdas Model • The Konrad-Skaperdas Theory: Based on Hirshleifer individual based utility functions of different groups in society: peasants, bandits, soldiers, lords. • Basic Assumptions: Diminishing Returns in Production, Trade-offs between private and collective defense and between defense and productive activities. • 4 Nash equilibria from Konrad Skaperdas: Anarchy, Self governance, Leviathan, Competing Lords

28. All these considerations lead to different ways of considering theories • What is primary are relations among individuals or households and how they solve subsistence and security questions and the resulting collective action problems • These will lead to big or small coalitions and centralized or decentralized political systems • What will determine those are cost, technology and taxation possibilities • This suggests a different look at theories

29. The International Actor and its Bargaining Power • Even though we know that the international actor is not unitary, it is convenient to represent it like that sometimes • Sometimes the unitary actor is even justified • There is however no relation between unitary actor and rationality: More complex representations are possible • It is in particular desirable to represent the actor like this in terms of bargaining and bargaining power • What is bargaining power: A heightened ability to impose a solution on the other side, this greater “probability” results from being able to walk away from negotiations

30. Possible conflict dynamics

31. The Basic Bargaining Model Type I Type II q 1-q q Accepts ST Givesup Insists Or prefer or not a bargain to conflict u(x) ≥ (1-p)W - c(conflict) where x is an offer by the challenger

32. Characteristics of the Basic Bargaining Model • The basic bargaining model emphasizes the importance of: • Sequence and thus time preferences and discounting • Uncertainty and thus attitudes toward uncertainty and risk

33. (2,2) Row Column (3,3) NashEquilibrium (4,1) (2,2)Nash Equilibrium C C C C Prisoner=s Dilemma (1,4) Chicken Row C C Row Column (3,3) (4,2)Nash Equilibrium (Subgame Perfect) (1,1) C C C C Basics of Bargaining Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken

34. Bargaining Power: A General Conception • International Actors, like Domestic Ones interact by using their Bargaining Power: Probability to defect in a bargaining situation • This Power is determined by: • Domestic Constraints leading to the Metaphor and then Models of Two-Level Games • By the Symmetry or Asymmetry of Preferences or (expected) Utilities (As already noticed for Collective Goods). This characteristic was emphasized by John Nash in his theory of bargaining.

35. Bargaining Power (continued) • This Power is also Determined by International Actors' Propensity toward Risk, by the Patience or Impatience of Actors with Respect to a Bargaining Outcome and thus by their Discount Rate (Rubinstein Theory of Bargaining) • Incomplete information about the nature of an other actor or about propensity toward risk will also play a role, particularly in evaluating threats

36. 1 R L 2 2 R’ R’ L’ L’ 2 1 0 0 5 1 1 2 What role for risk preference?Example

37. Conflict Escalation • The analysis of negotiation among actors indicates an irrationality of conflict escalation • This irrationality can be explained through the notion of incomplete information or poor risk preference: Fearon model • The dollar auction game is a good metaphor for conflict escalation and the costs associated to it.

38. Deterrence and Stability • Deterrence can be explained via the analysis of compellent or deterrent threats. • If credible threats are absent deterrence or compellence may not work • If deterrent power is well spread stability is maintained.

39. The Evolution of Warfare and Combat and Arms Races • The evolution of military technology influences international relations because it modifies the costs of using armed forces. • There are often complementarities between military force and production and exchange systems. Phoenician and Athenian fleets protected trade and commerce, Roman armies were guarding the empire but also conducting raids for slaves, Viking ships could both be used for piracy and trade.

40. Some Analyst agree: The Evolution of Combat • Combat is characterized by two parameters, concentration and dispersion • These two notions were studied by the British engineer Lanchester during World War I in terms of dynamic equations, one for frontal attacks, one for blanketing an area (such as naval battles or artillery fire) • For concentration: dx1/dt=-ax2 a quadratic law obtains to explain success: x12/x22 > a / b • P For dispersion , a linear law obtains: dx1/dt=-Ax1x2 x1/x2 > A / B

41. How does technological evolution work out?

42. Combat Strategies • Good strategists like Hannibal have always been able to use a combination of concentration and dispersion. • In the battle of Cannae Hannibal was able to destroy through clever use of concentration and dispersion a numerically superior Roman army • Lets look at this example

43. The Roman Empire at 100 BC Changes effected by Second Punic War:Conquest of Syracuse, complete control of Sicily - 211 BCConquest of Carthaginian Spain - 206 BC Creation of Hispania Citerior (Nearer Spain) - 197 BCCreation of Hispania Ulterior (Further Spain) - 197 BCConquest of Macedonia - 148 BC Conquest of Greece, incorporated into Macedonia - 146 BCConquest of Carthage, creation of province of Africa - 146 BCInheritance of the kingdom of Pergamum (Province of Asia) - 133 BC (129 BC)Conquest of Illyricum (possibly incorporated into Macedonia at first) - 129 BCConquest of Balearic Islands, incorporated into Hispania Citerior - 123 BCConquest of Gallia Transalpina (Narbonensis) - 121 BCConquest of Cilicia - 102 BC

45. HannibalBattle of Cannae 216 BC

46. Roman generals: Lucius Aemilius Paullus & Gaius Terentius Varro Forces: 48 000 infantry; 6 000 cavalry

47. Carthaginian general: Hannibal Forces: 35 000 infantry; 10 000 cavalry

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49. http://www.ancientsites.com/aw/Pos238837t/

50. Historical Evolution of Combat and Military technology • Historically combat tends to disperse more and more (cf. The analysis made by T. Dupuy) • These evolutions influence military preparedness and produce arms races • The dynamics of arms races are important in themselves