"When does new science become a threat?".

1. "When does new science become a threat?". 

2. The scientific process problem - experimentation - discovery

3. The scientific process problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination

4. The scientific process problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC

5. Controversial biological publications • Jackson et al. 2001: Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus suppresses cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox • • Cello et al. 2002: Chemical synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious Virus in the Absence of a natural Template • • Tumpey et al. 2005: Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish Flu influenza Pandemic Virus • • Wein et al. 2005: Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinim Toxin in Milk • • Herfst et al. 2012: Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus between Ferrets • • Imai et al, 2012: Experimental Adaptation of an Influenza H5 HA confers respiratory Droplet Transmission to a Reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 Virus in Ferrets • • Xiong et al. 2013: Receptor binding by a ferret-transmissible H5 avian Influenza Virus • • Bieringer et al. 2013: Experimental Adaptation of Wild-Type Canine Distemper Virus (CDV) to the Human Entry Receptor CD150 • • Zhang et al 2013: H5N1 Hybrid Viruses Bearing 2009/H1N1 Virus Genes transmit in Guinea Pigs by Respiratory Droplet

6. The scientific process problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination Vanity publishing Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC

7. The scientific process problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC

8. The scientific process Scientists Funding Open innovation problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination - repetition - adoption Science is a moving target – good science identifies new ground

9. The pace of change Introduce new traits into an organism at the genetic level Use an existing pathway to make something new. Engineer an organism to modify to an existing pathway Engineer an organism to do something completely new Engineer a new functional organism from scratch 2 3 4 5 1

10. The politics of 20/20 hindsight

11. The pace of change Can we prevent access to new sciences: e.g. oligonucleotide synthesis Interferon gamma 17kDa, 166aa, 498 bp Code of conduct – what is you want scientists to do differently? Security culture – responsible conduct

12. The scientific process problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC

13. Self policing • Constant vigilance!! • Provide education – at all levels • Engender a community responsibility • Provide a reporting framework • Provide confidential contacts • Provide a knowledge base

14. A problem Categories of Experiments that might be DURC 1. Enhance the harmful consequences of a biological agent or toxin. 2. Disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of immunization without clinical and/or agricultural justification. 3. Confer to a biological agent or toxin, resistance to clinically and/or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies. 4. Increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate a biological agent or toxin. 5. Alter the host range or tropism of biological agent or toxin. 6. Enhance the susceptibility of a host population. 7. Generate a novel pathogenic agent or toxin, or reconstitute an eradicated or extinct biological agent. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), USA, 2012; http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity_documents.html Emerging Science Makes Security a Moving Threat Beyond the 15 Key Pathogens/7 Core Experiments of Concern – moving target

16. A problem • No common framework in which to conduct sound risk/benefits analyses of science: • In different countries • In different cultures • In different communities (e.g. science vs. security) • Therefore probability that too risky experiments yielding too little benefit will be conducted. • However, can we apply universal rules? • Should the restrictions/expectations placed on a 3rd world be the same as a developed nation? • Rather do we really need common ethical guidance?

17. Who provides the solution Quid est veritas: What is truth • Convergence of science • Divergence of scientists • - in interest/expertise • - who is doing the science - including “the public” Safety Security Risk Threat

18. The language Advise on risk/benefit assessment and risk mitigation • don´t do it • do it in another way Dissemination • don’t publish it • publish it with balancing/redacted information • Advise on supporting structures, e.g. local/regional ethical review committees

20. What is the cost of security? “The biological world is displacing the machine as a general world of design.” DARPA – Living Foundries: Large U.S. investment in next-generation bio-based manufacturing • Unknown unknowns – horizon scoping and the pace of scientific development • Most science develops iteratively and easy to map. • Some scientists work in a different way and think about where they want to be and describe the route to get there, real scientific breakthrough • Step change is often serendipitous, or is unrecognized at the point of discovery. • Nature as a threat – biggest bioterroist.

21. Identifying a clear and present danger How good at this are we? Scientists are good at identifying where science is going in the near future Horizon scoping 10 years and beyond less reliable – pace of change Dealing with potential issues in advance …. Discussion between science, policy and security …. Coreponsibility …..