100020 – Hydrogen fuelling station CEP – Berlin

1. 100020 – Hydrogen fuelling station CEP – Berlin Safety risk assessment and authority approval :experience and lessons learned

2. Hydrogen solutions for Europe Hydrogen fuelling systems from Hydro • The ECTOS-project in Reykjavik – part of the Icelandic vision to mitigate CO2 and become the world’s first hydrogen society • CUTE – Hamburg renewable hydrogen fuelling • CEP – Clean Energy Partnership BerlinHydro delivers gaseous hydrogen to 13 of 16 vehicles at public station in a green line of fuel • HyNor – NorwayHydro leads the planning of a hydrogen infrastructure

3. Hydro – an early promoter of hydrogen for transportation Hydrogen and ammonia fuelled vehicle – Rjukan 1933 Source: Et forsøk verdt. Forskning og utvikling i Norsk Hydro gjennom 90 år. Oslo 1997, s. 125

4. The Clean Energy Partnership • Unites 10 companies from France, Germany, Norway, Sweden the United Kingdom and the US • Potential European Light-House-Project • International Public-Private Partnership • Supported by the German Federal Government • Project Duration 2002 - 2007

5. A partnership between: Energy and Technology Companies: Aral - BVG - Hydro/GHW - Linde - TOTAL - Vattenfall Europe Automotive Companies: BMW - DaimlerChrysler - Ford - GM/Opel

6. Primary Objectives • Mobility based on hydrogen • Reduction of CO2 emissions and mitigation of the greenhouse-effect • Diversification of energy sources • Prove of international cutting edge technology in fuels and vehicles drives • Demonstrate technical solutions for the future

7. The hydrogen station at Messedamm in Berlin • Worldwide the largest H2 filling station with a capacity of more than 100 cars per day with CGH2 and LH2 • First fully integrated H2 filling station in Europe • In operation since November 2004 • Open 24hrs daily for hydrogen refuelling

8. O2 H2 Energy Hydrogen Hydrogen vehicle Electrolyser Renewable power H2O A green line of fuel Transforming renewable energy to clean hydrogen

9. Hydro – infrastructure partner delivering CGH2 • One of the operators of the hydrogen filling station • Emission-free production of gaseous hydrogen at the filling station via electrolysis • Automated production, remotely supervision from Hydro’s control centre in Norway • Testing of commercial hydrogen production for transportation

10. The challenge • How to incorporate a Hydrogen station into an ordinary petrol station • Central location in Berlin with public and in highly populated area • Limited space available • Acceptable risk level • Hydrogen productions at site • Storage of both CGH2 and LH2 • Approval from authorities

11. The response to the challenges Safety is CEP number one priority • Infrastructure partner agreement • Use EIHP recommendations when planning and designing the station • Use risk based safety management • Perform HAZID • Perform HazOp studies • Perform QRAs • Follow BP HSE requirements during construction and operation

12. Approvals: Roles and responsibilities • BP/Aral responsible for contact with authorities and TÜV for overall approvals • The individual partners responsible for their own properties to give sufficient information / documentation for the approval process • Hydro and Linde responsible for CE marking of all equipment

13. Background Prepare approval of production unit To address concerns raised in the MMI HAZID report for CEP Berlin Use of the CFD software FLACS Product Explosion risk analysis, general Explosion pressure contours for different risk levels Missile evaluation QRA Electrolyser container

14. Risk and acceptance criteria Risk is a combination of accidental event consequence and frequency Frequency Unacceptable risk Acceptance criterion Acceptable risk Negligible risk ALARP region (As Low As Reasonable Practicable) Consequence

15. Fan location Leakage location Gas dispersion simulation • Leakage 9.1 g/s • Fan starts 10 s after leakage start • Walls removed for visualisation • LFL extents visualised • Animation approx. 6 x actual speed

16. Explosion risk analysis conclusions and results • Explosions with frequencies of 10-6, 10-5 and 10-4 y-1 will all detach wall panels from container steel frame • Explosions with a frequency of 10-3 y-1 or more often will not damage the container • Explosion pressures from the 10-6, 10-5 and 10-4 y-1 events will not harm humans, but may break glass up to 15 m away • Assumed that falling wall panels will cause damage to bystander, which lead to risk contours • Missiles were assessed to consist a minor hazard due to short explosion duration (small impulse) if walls were secured • Modifications of container design: • Split wall panel to reduce safety distance • Isolation valve to prevent backflow from buffer tank to electrolyser container Pressure as function of distance

17. Approvals • The hydrogen station is built and operated in accordance with BetrSichV • CE marked • Directives 1999/92/EC: Explosion Protection Document (EPD) from TÜV based on EPDs from Hydro and Linde • First permission from LAGetSi, to operate the hydrogen filling station, August 28th 2003 • Updated permission from LAGetSi based upon the one from 2003, August 13th 2004 • Final inspections certificates of TÜV and LAGetSi done after station was built

18. Lessons learned • Establish clear and common objectives • Both for the design-phase and the operating phase • Ensure safety work is part of the project plan and safeguard a common approach to safety activities • Agree upon risk acceptance criteria • Involve authorities at an early stage

19. More information contact: Hydro Oil & Energy N - 0246 Oslo + 47 2253 8100 Bjorn.Gregert.Halvorsen@hydro.com Stian.Hoiset@hydro.com www.hydro.com

20. A viable society. A need. An idea. 36,000 • professionals. Energy. Cooperation. Aluminium. • Determination. Pushing boundaries. Respect. • Nature. Courage. 100 years. Thinking ahead.