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ABM Applications to the Social Sciences. Lars-Erik Cederman Department of Government, Harvard EITM Workshop, July 18, 2002. Outline: Applications. Three types of agent-based models Example: Barabasi’s Preferential Attachment Model Applications to political science
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ABM Applications to the Social Sciences Lars-Erik Cederman Department of Government, Harvard EITM Workshop, July 18, 2002
Outline: Applications • Three types of agent-based models • Example: Barabasi’s Preferential Attachment Model • Applications to political science • Example: GeoSim and the democratic peace • Validation
actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor actor Three types of emergent effects Emergent behavioral patterns D C actor actor actor Emergent boundaries and networks actor actor Emergent cultural configurations
Barabasi’s Preferential Attachment Model • A. L. Barabasi et al. 1999. “Mean-field theory for scale-free random networks.” Physica A 272: 173-187.
Applications to political science • Cooperation theory: Axelrod etc. • Voting and party politics: Kollman, Miller, & Page 1992 • Ethnic conflict: Bhavnani & Backer 2000; Epstein et al 2001; Lustick 2000; Cederman 2001 • Geopolitical models: Bremer & Mihalka 1977; Cusack and Stoll 1990; Cederman 1997
Modeling the democratic peace with agent-based modeling • Assume the democratic peace hypothesisto hold at the micro-level • How can the democratic peace spreadto the entire state system? • Reference: “Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Selection Process” Journal of Conflict Resolution (August 2001).
Outline 1. Modeling geopolitics 2. Adding tags 3. Adding alliances 4. Adding collective security 5. Replications 6. Conclusions
Modeling geopolitics: GeoSim • Hobbesian geopolitical environment • Cederman 1997 Emergent Actors=> RePast • 15 x 15 grid • local combat and conquest • two types of actors: • non-democratic states: power-seekers • democratic states: conditional cooperators
“Tagged” decision rule for democratic state i forall external fronts j do if i or j foughtor j attacked an ally of ithen attack j elsecooperate with j {Grim Trigger} ifthere is no action on any frontthen randomly select a non-democratic neighbor state j* with probabilityp(i,j*) factoring in alliancesdo launch unprovoked attack against j*
Threshold functions Probability Decision to attack p(i,j*) Combat victory Force ratio
Structural change: conquest • Conquest follows victorious battles • Each attacker randomly selects a “battle path” consisting of an attacking province and a target • The outcome depends on the target’s nature: • if it is an atom, the whole target is absorbed • if it is a capital, the target state collapses • if it is a province, the target is absorbed
Guaranteeing territorial contiguity Conquest... resulting in... partial state collapse "near abroad" cut off from capital Target Province Agent Province j* i
Geopolitical sample run: Time = 0 Time = 1000
Sample run with “tags”: Time = 0 Time = 1000
Sample run with alliances: Time = 12 Time = 1000
Sample run with collective security Time = 76 Time = 1000
Conclusions from DP-Model • It is indeed possible to “grow” the democratic peace in a Hobbesian world • All three Kantian mechanisms contribute to the democratic peace • Spatial context crucial for cooperation • But tagging does not always suffice • Counter-intuitive finding: democracy may undermine itself
Four types of validation Object of validation: End point Process Mode of validation: Qualitative Distribu- tional
The limits of ABM? ad hoc assumptions failure to yield predictions fragility of results lack of cumulation
General readings on agent-based modeling • Axelrod, Robert. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. Princeton: Princeton University Press. • Casti, John L. 1997. Would-Be Worlds: How Simulation Is Changing the Frontiers of Science. New York: Wiley. • Cederman, Lars-Erik. 1997. Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve. Princeton: Princeton University Press. • Epstein, Joshua M. and Robert Axtell. 1996. Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science From the Bottom Up. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. • Holland, John H. 1995. Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. • Special issue on “Computational Modeling”, The Political Methodologist, Fall 2001. • See also web pages http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~gov2015 and http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~gov2016