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The Value of Value Transparency in Teaching Applied Ethics. Diana buccafurni Aapt conference July 30, 2010. Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department of Psychology and Philosophy Sam Houston State University dianabuccafurni@gmail.com. Starting Assumptions.
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The Value of Value Transparency in Teaching Applied Ethics Diana buccafurni Aapt conference July 30, 2010 Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department of Psychology and Philosophy Sam Houston State University dianabuccafurni@gmail.com
Starting Assumptions • The principle of student autonomy: students should be able to freely investigate and adopt moral viewpoints that align with their moral viewpoints, not those of their professor. • The normative analytic objective: a goal of philosophical applied ethics is that students are able to develop analytic abilities in the way of being able to construct, analyze, and evaluate philosophical arguments.
The Claim • Explicit disclosure of professors’ moral values (value transparency) is pedagogically valuable in teaching applied ethics. The functions of value transparency: • Value transparency is integral to respecting student autonomy. • Value transparency facilitates the normative analytic objective.
Naïve Value Neutrality Naïve Value Neutrality (NVN) Justification for NVN • Instruction in the university classroom ought to be entirely value free. • No values of an instructor should be brought into the classroom. • Course material should be presented in an impartial, objective manner. • Students should be evaluated in a similar manner. • An instructor’s values should not compromise two above goals.
The Problem with Naïve Value Neutrality The Problem The Conclusion • Does not account for the reality of a professor’s pedagogical values that are inherent to course design. • Such values are a good thing! • It is not charitable to suppose this is what VN defenders have in mind.
The Target: Informed Value Neutrality • Neutrality with respect to substantive moral values. • Value neutrality allows for non-moral value judgments to direct course design.
Justifications for Informed Value Neutrality • Impartiality and objectivity • Fairness in evaluating students on merit only • Protecting students from indoctrination • Protection of student autonomy
Value Transparency • Value transparency protects student autonomy in ways that informed value neutrality cannot. • Value transparency facilitates the normative analytic objective in ways that informed value neutrality cannot.
Value Transparency in Research Ethics • Claim: value transparency in science publication protects reader* autonomy. • If value transparency can operate in the research context to protect autonomy, it may operate in other relevantly similar contexts to protect autonomy.
Value Transparency in Research • Authors submitting manuscripts for review are required to disclose all actual and perceived conflicts of interest. • Default is disclosure in questionable cases. • The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE): uniform manuscript disclosure standards.
Justification for Disclosure According to the ICMJE: “Public trust in the peer-review process and the credibility of published articles depends in part on how well conflict of interest is handled during writing, peer review, and editorial decisionmaking. Conflict of interests exists when an author (or author’s institution), reviewer, or editor has financial or personal relationships that inappropriately influence (bias) his or her actions...These relationships vary from being negligible to having great potential for influencing judgment.”
Justification for Disclosure • According to the ICMJE statement disclosure lends confidence to the scientific process so that a reader’s belief in the truth of the published conclusions is justified. • Disclosure (should) call attention to external influences that may prejudice the impartiality and objectivity of results. • Thus, disclosure should caution readers that results may be influenced by values other than truth.
Disclosure and Autonomy • Respect for autonomy requires truthfulness and consent that is voluntary and informed. • Disclosure of factors that may influence the truth of research outcomes is necessary for autonomous decisionmaking. • Disclosure policies contribute to respect for autonomy insofar as they contribute to conditions required for autonomous decisionmaking.
An Example • Scientific research as an important tool for decisionmaking. • GlaxoSmithKline (maker of Avandia) funds a study on Avandia. • Awareness of parties that may have an interest in research outcomes allows* decisions to be made in view of such interests. • * necessary condition
Value Transparency in the Classroom • Professor is value transparent with respect to her moral values on topics discussed in the course. • This disclosure allows students to be aware of the professor’s bias/filter through which she views the issues. • This awareness can be integral in a student’s self-reflection on whether she endorses or rejects moral viewpoints, arguments, theories, etc. on the basis of reasons she finds plausible and values with which she identifies.
Shortcomings of Value Neutrality • Value neutrality requires self-monitoring. Value transparency offers a third-personal accountability that value neutrality does not. • We have some reason to think that first personal self-monitoring won’t work because biases often operate at the edge of our awareness.
The Normative Analytic Objective • With value transparency, students can critically evaluate an instructor’s disclosed viewpoints with more philosophical rigor. • An increase in the “performance bar” for students. • Graduate school example of assignment design based on transparency. • Value transparency in the aim of focusing on the logic of the argument (not the substantive conclusion only) in class discussion and in course assignments.
Other Potential Benefits • External accountability to students for fairness and consistency in evaluation. • Challenges for the Professor • Philosophically rigorous defense of viewpoints contrary to disclosed values • Philosophically rigorous criticism(s) of viewpoints/values endorsed. • These two challenges above can apply to students too; (approximate) reciprocity of expectations?
Selected Bibliography • American Association for University Professors. (2006, October 26). Retrieved July 2010, from AAUP Website: http://www.org • Angell, M. (1996). The Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind of Right to Die Case. In T. L. Veatch, Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (pp. 373-375). Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc. • Baumgarten, E. (1982). Ethics in the Academic Profession: A Socratic View. The Journal of Higher Education , 282-295. • Benjamin, A. C. (1962). The Philosophy Instructor: Teacher or Preacher? The Journal of Higher Education , 409-416. • Camenisch, P. F. (1986). Goals of Applied Ethics Courses. The Journal of Higher Education , 493-509. • Churchill, L. R. (1982). The Teaching of Ethics and Moral Values in Teaching: Some Contemporary Confusions. The Journal of Higher Education , 296-306. • Gostin, R. C. (1996). Futility: A Concept in Search of a Definition. In T. L. Veatch, Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (pp. 357-361). Upper Saddle River : Prentice-Hall, Inc. • Harris, G. (2010, June 28). Diabetes Drug Linked to Higher Heart Risk. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/health • Intemann, I. d.-M. (2009). How do disclosure policies fail? Let us count the ways. The FASEB Journal , 1638-1642. • Speck, J. R. (2007). Teaching Controversy: Advocacy, Indoctrination, and Neutrality in the Classroom. In J. R. Speck, Rights and Wrongs in the College Classroom: Ethical Issues in Postsecondary Teaching (pp. 23-56). Bolton: Anker Publishing Co., Inc. • Spicer, R. M. (1996). Futile care: Physicians Should Not Be Allowed to Refuse to Treat. In T. L. Veatch, Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (pp. 392-400). Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc. • The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors. (n.d.). Retrieved July 24, 2010, from http://www.icmje.org/ethical_4conflicts.html • Youngner, S. (1996). Who Defines Futility? In T. L. Veatch, Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (pp. 353-356). Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc.