Inconsistency of Ancient Skepticism

1. Inconsistency of Ancient Skepticism Renata Zieminska University of Szczecin, Poland zieminre[at]univ.szczecin.pl

2. Sextus Empiricus 2nd century CE

3. Sextus Empiricus’ extant works • Outlines of Scepticism, (PH) , transl. by J. Annas and J. Barnes, Cambridge 2000. • Against the Logicians (M VII-VIII), transl. by Richard Bett, Cambridge 2005. • Against the Ethicists (M XI)transl. by Richard Bett, Oxford1997. • Against the Physicists (M IX-X) and • Against the Professors (M I-VI) are accessible in R. Bury’s translation

4. Sextus presents arguments that • Our perceptual beliefs are relative • We can not be justified in any belief (we are in the trilemma of infinite regress, reciprocity or dogmatism) • We cannot establish the criterion of truth in a rational way • We cannot have any valid proof • That is why skeptics suspend all judgments (epochē)

5. The charge of inconsistency • All these arguments suggest that (p) no thesis is ever rationally preferable to its contradiction. • We may ask Sextus if he prefers (p) to (non-p). • Preferring (p) contradicts its content; not-preferring (p) means the lack of skeptical position. • Keeping skepticism in a rational way is inconsistent, self-refuting.

6. Varieties of inconsistency • Content inconsistency (clear contradiction, formal or in content); • Action inconsistency (contradiction between words and action); • Self-refutation (pragmatic contradiction between act of assertion and its content). • Castagnoli: self-refutation is not falsification.

7. Sextus' answer to the inconsistency charge • (p) is not a thesis accepted as true, (p) is not even preferred to non-p, because there is no rational preference . • A skeptic speaks or writes about her own impressions without accepting her own words as true (PH 1.4). • A skeptic has no beliefs (PH 1.24). • But how to live and philosophize without beliefs (apraxia charge)?

8. Three recent ways to defend the consistency of the Pyrrhonian skepticism • (1) allowing a skeptic to have weak beliefs about things (M. Frede) • (2) allowing philosophy to be practiced without beliefs, by disposition and therapy (R. Hankinson) • (3) taking inconsistency as the effect of development from the apprenticeskeptic to the mature skeptic (M. McPherran, A. Bailey, H. Thorsrud).

9. (1) Michael Frede’s interpretation Pyrrhonianepochē is limited to scientific, philosophical beliefs concerning what really is, the real nature of things (see PH 1.13). Epochē is limited to strong belief as “active acceptance as true”. Weak belief is “merely passive acceptance” (Frede 1998, 138). A skeptic has weak beliefs about things and can lead a normal life. Skeptical conclusions as weakbeliefscan be consistent with epochē.

10. Sextus is not a fallibilist Frede interprets Sextus (PH 1.13) consistently and reasonably but ascribes to him weak beliefs about things. But such an interpretation is not well supported bySextus’ texts (PH 1.15). Sextus criticizes Carneades for voluntarily approving of what is persuasive (PH 1.229) and suggests that there is no rational preference between appearances Skeptic can only accept passively appearances.

11. (2) Philosophy without beliefs (R.J.Hankinson) Skepticism is a practice (disposition and ability) without any beliefs. If so, there is no possibility of inconsistency among a skeptic’s beliefs. Skeptical thinking is a causal involuntary chain. Premises and conclusions are appearances. Epochē is not a second-order belief but a state of mind causally evoked by equipollent arguments (1995, 229). Arguments are therapeutic means.

12. Skepticism without rational force Skepticism under Hankinson's interpretation turned out to be the passive acceptance of stimuli. Hankinson’s interpretation cannot explain the logical power of skeptical arguments. If arguments are so worthless, why do skeptics devote so much attention to them?

13. (3) Development explains inconsistency (Bailey, Thorsrud) We must distinguish between the mature skeptic and the developing skeptic (Bailey, 42). The developing skeptic must have many beliefsand accept many arguments (Bailey, 43). Otherwise, we have no way to explain the rejection of natural beliefs and suspension of judgments. A mature skeptic has no beliefs. "It is simply a category mistake to accuse a practice of inconsistency” (Thorsrud, 146).

14. Skepticism is not limited to the mature stage • The developing stage of skepticism is the only brand of skepticism suitable for rational discussion. And itisinconsistent. • Mature skepticism is outside any rational discussion, even if it is consistent in some sense. • I will try to demonstrate this with the self-refuting argument against proofs.

15. Sextus' arguments against proofs • All premises are uncertain, because we have no criterion of truth (M 8.356). • Reciprocity between premises and conclusions (contained in premises and sometimes support premises), PH 2.196. • A proof needs another proof to show its validity (infinite regress), PH 2.203. • This suggests that there are no valid proofs.

16. Self-refutation charge • The argument against proofs either is a proof or is not a proof. If it is not a proof is uncertain, while if it is a proof, there is a proof. (M 8.465)

17. Non-assertionanswer • Sextus says that he does not accept the conclusion of his argument against proofs and that the argument is only involuntarily persuasive for him at the moment of speaking. • Such answer is the self-cancellation of his own conclusion. • Sextus also presents two metaphors of self-cancellation: the purgative drugs and the ladder.

18. The metaphor of the ladder • “Just as it is not impossible for the person who has climbed to a high place by a ladder to knock over the ladder with his foot after his climb, so it is not unlikely that the skeptic too, having got to the accomplishment of his task by a sort of step-ladder – the argument showing that there is not demonstration – should do away with this argument” (M 8.481).

19. The metaphor of purgative drugs • Skeptical arguments “can be destroyed by themselves, being cancelled along with what they are applied to, just as purgative drugs do not merely drain the humours from the body but drive themselves out too along with the humours” (PH 1. 206).

20. Accepting self-refutation? • The metaphor of a ladder, is a kind of acceptance of the self-refutation of his own conclusion (Hankinson, McPherran and others). • "Hence he [mature skeptic] can be perfectly happy about the self-refuting (or as Sextus prefers to say, self-cancelling) nature of his expressions” (Hankinson 1995, 299). • Problem: how accepting self-refutation can be consistent?

21. L. Castagnoli: Sextus never accepts self-refutation • "Sextus never accepts, and so much the less embraces, the dogmatic charge of self-refutation; what is interpreted by McPherran and many others as an admission of self-refutation is best reconstructed as a refined dialectical tool that Sextus used against the dogmatic charges of inconsistency and self-refutation” (252).

22. Castagnoli's analysis of self-refutation • Castagnoli makes distinction between self-refutation (peritrope) and self-cancelation (perigrafe). • Self-refutation is the reversal of the previously accepted thesis. It requires dogmatic assertion. • Self-cancelation is not a reversal, because it is the rejection of one's own assertion. • A skeptic does not accept any thesis and so can not reverse her thesis.

23. Against Castagnoli • But, self-cancellation is a very similar dialectical disaster. A skeptic self-cancells her own words (PH 1.15). • Self-cancellation is cutting off any discussion and rational discourse. It is a dodge to escape from self-refutation. It can not be accepted in a rational discussion. Castagnoli exempts skeptic from the dialectical requirements.

24. Inconsistency If a skeptic takes part in a serious rational discussion, her thesis „there are no valid proofs” is self-refuting. Only developing skepticism can be seriously discussed, and it is, as a dogmatic position, inconsistent. Mature skepticism is outside the discussion and outside the problem of inconsistency.

25. Inconsistent rationalism • In the case of Sextus Empiricus it is better to accept the basic inconsistency in his philosophy then treat it as irrationalism. • Skepticism in Sextus’ version seems most reasonable when we construe it as an overly ambitious rationalistic philosophy that falls into inconsistency.

26. Literature • Bailey Alan 1990 Pyrrhonean Scepticism and the Self-Refutation Argument, “The Philosophical Quarterly”, vol. 40 no. 158, 27-44. • Bett Richard ed. 2010 The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge University Press. • Burnyeat Myles, Frede Michael eds. 1998 The Original Sceptics: A Controversy Hackett Publishing Company. • Castagnoli Luca 2010 Ancient Self-Refutation. The Logic and History of Self-Refutation Argument…, Cambridge University Press. • Hankinson R.J. 1995 The Sceptics, Routledge. • McPherran Mark, 1987 Skeptical Homeopathy and Self-refutation, „Phronesis” vol. 32 no 3, 290-328. • Perin Casey 2010 The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Oxford University Press. • Thorsrud Harald 2009 Ancient Scepticism, University of California Press.