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Corruption in Ukraine: Behind and Beyond the Orange Revolution. Vladimir Dubrovskiy. CASE Ukraine www.case-ukraine.kiev.ua. CASE Ukraine. The 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index . Out of 147 countries. http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html .
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Corruption in Ukraine: Behind and Beyond the Orange Revolution Vladimir Dubrovskiy CASE Ukraine www.case-ukraine.kiev.ua
CASE Ukraine The 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Out of 147 countries http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html
CASE Ukraine Out of 204 countries Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi The World Bank, May 2005
CASE Ukraine Petty corruption: medicine, education, traffic enforcement …. Just increase the salaries and improve the control Embezzlement and abuses of procurement Improve the transparency and control Corruption in state-business relations Hellman, 1998 Extortion Bribing Karklins, 2002 Collusion “State Capture” by Corrupt Networks
CASE Ukraine Is it the “bribe tax” that makes a difference? Investment Climate Assessments survey. IFC, 2002
CASE Ukraine “Business Environment in Ukraine”.IFC,Septamber, 2003
CASE Ukraine Corruption is perceived as a serious impediment for doing business… … while the other impediments are connected to it “Business Environment in Ukraine”.IFC, December, 2004
Institutional legacy (following North; Putnam) CASE Ukraine Karamsin, 19th century Russian historian Institutional memory of the former empire: “The severity of the Russian laws is alleviated only by discretion in their enforcement” “… just this disorder makes life in Russia possible” Gertzen, 19th century Russian social thinker Legislation is designed (intentionally?) in such a way that almost EVERYONE must become a lawbreaker “Laws are written for the fools” Discretion is the only resort from such a “total guilt” “Who are the boss, we or the law?” Every business is subject to the authorities’ arbitrary, discretionary power
CASE Ukraine Corruption is embedded into the structure of post-Soviet society Forced modernization, especially the Communist regime: Legislation violates the natural law Normal economic activities are considered illegal No contract enforcement is officially available Ledeneva, 1998 Reputation-based informal networks of interpersonal mutual exchange with “favors of access” (blat) Emerge to facilitate the illegal transactions of all kinds Litwak, 1991 (!) “One has to deserve a right to pay a bribe” BUT Weak rule of law
CASE Ukraine INTEREST INTEREST ENHANCES Decreasing the demand for improvements Corruption ALLEVIATES ALLEVIATES FACILITATES Legislation (flawed, ambiguous, impracticable) Discretion
Officials: not a bureaucracy Bureaucracy (Weber) Administrative power in Ukraine Highly-paid professional public servants facilitating rational processes of control. Implements legislation in a strictly formal (impersonal) way Poorly-paid and dependent upon administrative rents (in money or barter) Relies upon discretionary power and vague and arbitrary informal rules Operates under constant public scrutiny and political oversight Controls politicians rather than vice versa. Tries to control mass-media to avoid public scrutiny No decision-making power Clear separation of “powers” from branches of State Possesses the political power to magnify ambiguity and non-transparency in legislation Strictly controlled and separated from business Uncontrolled and mostly affiliated with business
CASE Ukraine Consequences Inhibited business selection through the entry and exit Suppressed entrepreneurship and FDI Poor governance Distorted political representation Misuse and misallocation of resources High social cost
CASE Ukraine “Business Environment in Ukraine”.IFC, December, 2004
Whither “captured state”: a dead end? Administrative power: Provides protection and patronage for business Residual rights of control Business: a “Milk caw” or a “Rent pump” for officials Orange Revolution November, 2004 Sources of rent; permissions Perceived totally rent-seeking Perceived totally corrupted Public: a passive player
CASE Ukraine As a result of the revolution: Public is not passive any more Authorities are committed to fight corruption seriously Executive power officials have lesser impact on the legislature Political market emerges BUT “While we’re numerous, we’re invincible!” Societal structures are persistent Further closing of corrupt networks Legislation did not change significantly Without a truly systemic and well-designed anti-corruption policy, the loses from corruption increase whenever a government tries to fight it