Making Sure that Science Serves Justice: The Case of the Houston Police Department Crime Lab

1. Making Sure that Science Serves Justice:The Case of the Houston Police Department Crime Lab Michael R. Bromwich Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson National Institute on Science, Technology & the Law September 2005 Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

2. Independent Investigation of the HPD Crime Lab and Property Room • Background of the investigation • Our team • Structure of the investigation • Overview of the Lab’s problems and the themes developed during our investigation • What lies ahead for the investigation and the Crime Lab Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

3. Beginning of the CrisisNovember 2002 • KHOU-11 investigative series reports alleged errors in seven DNA or serology cases analyzed by the Lab • Professor William Thompson and Dr. Libby Johnson • Deficiencies identified included • Poor documentation of procedures and results • Mistakes in analyzing mixtures • Errors in calculating statistical probabilities, particularly in mixture cases • Mischaracterization of results in trial testimony Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

4. December 2002 Outside Audit • December 12 and 13 outside audit of DNA Section led by Irma Rios of Texas Department of Public Safety • DPS team concludes that the DNA Section was in extremely poor shape • Director of the Crime Lab claimed to be completely surprised to learn the DNA Section was pervaded by such far-reaching problems • DNA Section shut down almost immediately after the DPS audit Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

5. DNA Re-Testing Program • In early 2003, Harris County DA’s office and HPD begin process to re-test all cases in which DNA analyzed by the Lab was involved in a conviction • 403 cases identified for re-testing • To date, testing complete in 333 of the 403 cases • 248 confirmed with raw evidence • 75 confirmed with DNA extract or processed evidence • 8 confirmed, but with significant statistical differences • 1 case, Josiah Sutton, findings reversed • 40 “red dot” cases – “inconclusive” results Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

6. Decision to Commission theIndependent Investigation • September 2004, Chief Hurtt announced HPD would seek an independent review of the Crime Lab and Property Room • Stakeholders Committee formed • Houston-area public officials, civil rights advocates, academics, attorneys and scientists • February 2, 2005, our team selected • March 30, 2005, our contract was approved and we began the investigation Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

7. Our Team • Michael Bromwich • Inspector General DOJ 1994 – 1999 • FBI Lab investigation • District of Columbia MPD use of force monitoring • Team of experienced Fried Frank attorneys and support personnel • Scientific Advisory Board • Margaret Kuo, Orange County Sheriff-Coroner’s Office (ret.) • Douglas M. Lucas, Centre of Forensic Sciences, Ontario (ret.) • Bruce Vander Kolk, Illinois State Forensic Sciences Command (ret.) Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

8. Our Team (cont’d) • Roger Bolhouse – Scientific Team Coordinator and Trace Evidence • Robert Bianchi and Karen Irish – Controlled Substances • Michael A. Evans, Ph.D. – Toxicology • Edward Hueske – Firearms • Michael Sinke – Questioned Documents • Mark Stolorow and Pat Hamby – Serology • Carll Ladd, Ph.D. and Rick Staub, Ph.D (Orchid Cellmark) – DNA Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

9. Structure of the Investigation • Two Phases • Phase I • Completed in 90 days • 68-page Third Report issued on June 30, 2005 • Developed plan for the second phase of the investigation • Phase II • 2,800 case reviews • Half dozen intensive case reviews • Continued factual investigation into causes of Lab’s problems • Quarterly reports and final report Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

10. Overview of Our Findings • Lack of support for the Crime Lab within HPD and at the Houston city government • Ineffective leadership and management within the Crime Lab • Lack of adequate quality control and quality assurance • Isolation of the DNA/Serology Section from Lab and HPD management as well the forensic science community Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

11. Lack of Support for the Crime Lab • From the beginning in 1989, DNA Section dependent on grant funding for personnel, equipment and training • Difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified analysts due to low salaries and little opportunity for promotion • Lack of adequate supervision • No line supervisor over the DNA/Serology Section between August 1996 and December 2002 • No line supervisor over the Toxicology Section since 1992 Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

12. Lack of Support for the Crime Lab (cont’d) • Chronic roof leaks in the Lab since 1997 • Lack of support for punishment of analysts for serious misconduct • Two controlled substances analysts were caught drylabbing • Neither received significant punishment – one analyst was permitted to resign after his second incident, and the other was still with the Lab when our investigation began • One supervisor punished after confronting analyst with evidence of drylabbing • Appears Chief of Police intervened to restore one of the analysts to working cases Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

13. Lack of Strong and Effective Lab Management • Head of the Lab was isolated, detached and lacked the personality and skills to lead effectively within a law enforcement agency • Infrequent contact with Lab analysts • Shocked to learn the DNA Section was in shambles • Failed to make a forceful case for resources • Inadequate management of strong personalities in the Lab, which contributed to low morale Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

14. Lack of Quality Control and Quality Assurance • SOPs were disorganized, out of date, and incomplete • Lab-wide quality control audits stopped in 1997 • 2000 and 2001 reviews of the DNA Section applying FBI standards inconsistent with 2002 outside audit • Head of QC/QA function was incompetent and unwilling to work hard • Technical lead in DNA Section lacked sufficient training and experience in DNA analysis and knowledge of statistics Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

15. Isolation of DNA Section • Internal reviews of DNA Section masked problems with the Lab • Initial efforts towards accreditation abandoned by the end of the 1990s • No outside inspections of the Lab until 2002, which resulted in the closure of the DNA Section • Potential that problems in the DNA Section were purposefully hidden from command staff and the forensic science community Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

16. What’s next for the HPD Crime Lab? • May 2005, Lab received ASCLD/LAB accreditation in most areas except for DNA • Lab hopes to have DNA on-line by the end of this year • Phase II of the investigation Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP