Cultures of Accountability at Local Level

1. Cultures of Accountability at Local Level What does accountability mean for the wananchi? Tim Kelsall, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, for Oxford Policy Management

2. Introduction: Patandi District Hospital • ↑ Community contributions> Improvements in buildings; new maternity ward; x-ray ; ultra-sound • Centralised revenue collection • Notice boards displaying transfers from central govt • Notice board detailing correct hospital charges

3. However: • X-ray and ultra-sound stolen with collusion of hospital staff • Patients two to a bed; no running water on ward; no toilet facilities • Medical staff conduct cursory examinations; are harsh to patients; accused of soliciting bribes • Hospital widely criticised in community

4. The view from the wananchi • ‘There are no good services at the Arumeru District Hospital. The hospital is dirty, and the nurses and doctors are impolite. Patients must provide something in order to get service. And during weekends and holidays there is no service at all. At the fund raising we contributed 10 000 each, but we still don’t get good services. If someone goes to the hospital, one is required to pay some fees, like the cost of opening a file. And every time one goes there, the payment is Tsh. 500.

5. The view from the DMO • ‘Most of our deaths occur because of mismanagement. People can say it is because of lack of drugs, but it is often because the staff lacks commitment to patients. The staff is not committed!’ ‘Would an increase in salaries help?’ ‘No, it is a question of attitude’.

6. Section One: the study • Ethnographic survey provided an account of processes of accountability in action inside local institutions. • Situate hospital and other institutions in general accountability context of local Tanzania • Shed light on local cultures of accountability.

7. Methodology • General observation in diverse fora: eg farms, bars, market, roadwork, dispensaries • Focused observation in key institutions, ie village and ward office, district council, DC’s office, school committees, church, clan, district hospital • Focus groups; targeted interviews

8. Caveats • Data depth • Heisenberg uncertainty principle • Geographical scope

9. Section Two: Findings: Entitlements and Governance • People believed the government had a responsibility to provide them with services.

10. services such as education, health and schools • loans to start businesses • training and loans for unemployed youth • loans and employment; • roads • a village police station • agricultural equipment • loans for farmers • agricultural inputs

11. One farmer likened the problem of getting funds from central government to the villages to that of getting water from the mountain to the lowlands: all along the pipeline people were putting taps and drawing water, until there was nothing left for those at the end of the line.

12. Democratic Scrutiny • To some extent democratic channels functioned to secure entitlements • DMO and other officers ‘cross-examined’ in council meeting • VEO criticised in village meeting • Health officer criticised in ward meeting

13. Bureaucratic Scrutiny • To some degree administrative channels worked to secure effective delivery of services • DED admonished by RAS • DED disciplined a certain VEO • DMO suspended a certain health officer • DC toured district checking on school construction, etc

14. Shortfalls in scrutiny • insufficient information on resource transfers and allocations. • lack of transparency over school capitation grant • village council had not received a financial report for five years • rules were enforced according to political contingencies or informal payments • officials sometimes failed to hold meetings, or evaded questions, or decided things in secret, or communicated decisions in a top-down fashion, or they received letters and didn’t respond. • many complaints about poor government performance, but rather few examples of officials being disciplined. • Evidence of corruption and misuse of funds

15. > Cynicism • ‘Politics is about telling lies and making people believe that what you say is true, even when it isn’t’ • CCM leaders look for high positions to benefit themselves (CCM imeota mizizi). They are thieves and have no compassion for the people they lead. They are liars; also in the opposition parties. • ‘You know we are tired with these people who call themselves leaders….These people live in a good house, well varnished, filled with water, electricity, so they don’t bother. So we are left without water because of these contented leaders…. I hate these people; they create problems for us – especially the women – they are the ones who suffer more…I don’t expect to vote for anyone because it seems we are creating jobs for stupid people’ • ‘[People become leaders] So as to get something to eat (Ili apate kula)’. • ‘Some come who are not obese, but after a week in leadership they already are. They manage to build houses after they come to power’ • ‘There are benefits, there is corruption, there is food’ (kuna maslahi, kuna rushwa, kuna chakula).

16. The EthnographicValue Added • But our findings were not simply that local officials were failing to live up to liberal democratic ideals of accountability; they were that officials and community were sometimes operating with alternativeideas or standards of accountability. In short, an alternative culture of accountability.

17. Cultures of Accountability • Liberal democratic cultures • Social democratic culture of entitlement • Patriarchal culture of ‘father, family, food’

18. Fatherhood • ‘Now my parents would you allow me to take a form to contest for another chance?’ • ‘…if our case is not resolved fairly at District level we will go to the Father of the Region’ • ‘Fortunately I am talking to people who know custom and tradition: a person can’t reject his or her father [ie the government]’. • ‘Do you want him to eat that money only with his children? We are also his children’. (Unataka ale tu na watoto wake? Hata sisi ni watoto wake).

19. Family, the household and farm • An accountable person was someone who worked hard on his farm and provided for his family: ‘A person who makes sacrifices to work for himself and his family • ‘A person who can really devote himself to his family and his/her governmnet’ • ‘A person who is hard working, starting from his household’ • To be accountable was, ‘[T]o ensure that you finish the activities that you are supposed to do properly, for instance to feed the cows, to work on the farm. • ‘Accountability means to engage in performing daily productive activities. For example, if I have cows, I am supposed to feed them, and I am supposed to cultivate my farm. It also means to serve the community, the people who surround us, for example neighbours, relatives, or the people who do not have anybody to assist them.’ • ‘His accountability (uwajibikaji) starts at his home as he is a good father. For example at Ngaramtoni he has a big wheat farm and it is well maintained and its yield is always good.’ • the father of a child who had died in hospital was ‘not accountable’ to his family

20. Eating ‘If somebody who wants to be MP comes and brings things to eat – eat! If it is drink – drink! And if he asks you to vote for him, say “Yes!” But you should know that you are going to vote for me.’ • We were told that the MP himself was hoarding food for the forthcoming election campaign. • ‘The councillors are with [the Council Chairman] for the sake of their stomachs’. • ‘as soon as the councillor has been voted in, he will eat chicken with the MP and forget about the ordinary people they are supposed to lead’.

21. Eating Alone • Notice that ‘eating money’ (kula hela) was the preferred term for misusing public funds, though kula rushwa (eating corruption) was also heard. By linking ‘eating’, a term that normally carries positive connotations, with ‘corruption’, an imported and pejorative term, Meru suggest some of the ambivalence that attaches to misuse of government money. • The point about eating is that it should not be done alone. Sometimes Meru will slaughter a goat or cow in honour of a distinguished person in the community. They then invite that person to take it to his home to eat. The man who accepts that invitation and eats alone is literally and metaphorically turning his back on the community. The appropriate gesture is to share the meat publicly.

22. Implications • The family is an institution governed by norms rather than rules • Within the family there is no clear distinction between public and private resources • Though everyone is entitled to subsistence within the family, norms of material and gender inequality prevail

23. Illustration: a tale of two MPs • The MP for the West: associated with detailed allegations of corruption but very popular • The MP for the East: no detailed allegations of corruption but extremely unpopular.

24. Visibility and generosity • We hear of an event to raise funds for a new X-ray room at Arumeru District Hospital. A poor woman contributed 4kg of maize which was auctioned at 75 000 shs. The Regional Commissioner provided 1 million shs, the District Commissioner 500 000 shs, and other individuals contributed, for example a businessman who offered over 500 000 shs. The MP thanked everyone and gave only 10 000 shs! • ‘He doesn’t hold meetings with the people…He is very stupid’ • ‘Do we have an MP? Do we have a councillor? We don’t know them’

25. Some implications • Public servants (esp elected) face pressure to acquire and distribute resources far in excess of their salaries. • Public servants may spend more time trying to acquire resources for distribution through personal networks than they do scrutinising public service provision. • Public servants who neglect personalistic networks may suffer, even when fulfilling scrutiny roles

26. Possible solutions • The American model: Increased checks and balances; improved democratic oversight. • Problem: democratic institutions work imperfectly in an imperfectly democratic culture • Increased institutional differentiation may increase social conflict

27. Illustration: school c’ttees in Arumeru • Successes: generally speaking school c’ttees have overseen an explosion in school construction in response to potential PEDP funding

28. Problems: • In many cases unable to resist political interference • C’ttees dominated by elites • Inadequate transparency in resource management • Some of the poorest children still denied access

29. Root problem • At local level a small number of opinion leaders tends to straddle party, government, clan, church, and school c’ttees. • The boundaries between these institutions are consequently blurred. • Adding yet more c’ttees is unlikely to change this.

30. Alternative solutions • Injecting increased capacity in financial accountability/publicity into existing institutions, eg church, NGOs, clan, school c’ttees. • Involving ‘traditional’ accountability mechanisms: eg ritual specialists • NB micro survey shows institutional maps vary geographically

31. Working with local cultural currents • Finding ways for public servants to take personal credit for increased resource transfers at local level. • Eg Rituals of resource transfer • Performance related rituals • Purification/restitution for corruption • The challenge is to present improved financial accountability and resource transfer in a language local people understand, thereby indigenizing good governance

32. Recap • Increased resources are making a difference at local level • There is some evidence of a culture of democratic scrutiny and accountability • Also much evidence of resource leakage, poor governance etc • This is partly legitimated by a local accountability culture of father/family/food • Challenge is to bring local and ‘good governance’ cultures of accountability closer into line