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The European Theater in World War II. The Use of Airpower in Europe: An Overview. US enters the war -- background Allied strategy for winning WW II The role of airpower in European Theater and lessons learned North African campaign Strategic bombing of Germany.
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The Use of Airpower in Europe: An Overview • US enters the war -- background • Allied strategy for winning WW II • The role of airpower in European Theater and lessons learned North African campaign Strategic bombing of Germany
US Enters WW II -- Background • Relations between US and Germany deteriorate -- US destroyer sunk in Oct ‘41 • Relations with Japan worsened in 1941 • Japan continues Asian aggression • Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in US and halts all American trade with Japan -- Jul ‘41 • Japan attacks Pearl Harbor -- Dec 7, 1941
Allied Strategy for Winning World War II • Priority One -- Safeguard Britain and US • Priority Two -- Fight a decisive air offensive against the Axis powers in Europe and fight defensively in Asia • Priority Three -- Sustained air offensive against Japan after the Axis powers weredefeated in Europe • Use land forces when, and if, necessary
US First Offensive Action of WW II North Africa • First use of US ground forces against the Germans • Provided valuable combat experience for ground and air forces • Opportunity for British and US to fight a combined arms campaign • First defeat of the German forces since 1930
North Africa • US learned some valuable lessons concerning the employment of airpower in tactical situations • Initial problems experienced by the Allies • Air units were split among ground units • Ground commanders didn’t share aircraft • Airpower was used defensively • Airpower was fragmented and inflexible
North Africa (Cont) • Allied airpower was reorganized in 1942 • Command of the air forces went to airmen • The air officer decided the missions and allocated forces • Missions became offensive in nature • Flexibility of Allied airpower was restored and air superiority was attained • Allies achieve victory in North Africa in May ‘43
US Strategic Bombing of Germany • Heavily influenced by ACTS and bomber advocates • Some felt strategic bombing alone would defeat Germany • Others believed strategic bombing would weaken Germany and a ground invasion would be required for her surrender
US Bombing Strategy • Committed to high-altitude, daylight precision bombing • Belief heavy bombers, flying in formation, could fight their way to the target and back • Fighter escorts were not necessary • Targets identified by AWPD were best hit in day time • Strategy ignored weather conditions, target obstruction, fighter opposition and anti-aircraft artillery
Strategic Bombing of Germany Early Efforts • Strategic bombing of Europe was responsibility of the 8th Air Force • First raid were against marshaling yards in France • little effect • Late ‘42 and early ‘43 -- 8th attacked small targets in Europe -- good experience, little effect • Casablanca Conference (Jan ‘43) established strategic bombing (destruction of German industry) as a major objective
Strategic Bombing of Schweinfurt Germany • 8th Air Force bomb the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt in Summer 1943 • Aug ‘43 -- 8th inflicts heavy damage but lost 36 B-17s and 360 crewmen • Oct ‘43 -- AAF lost 60 bombers, had 138 aircraft damaged and 600 men lost • Losses were unacceptable • No fighter escorts - bombers vulnerable to enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery
Strategic Bombing in Europe: Ploesti • Aug ‘43 -- USSAF launch attacks against oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania • 180 aircraft launched, 55 aircraft lost • Raids were costly but needed to shorten the war • Attacks were designed to reduce Germany’s oil and lubricant production • Generally ineffective and deliveries increased until ‘44 when attacks resumed
Strategic Bombing in Europe (Cont) • Long-range fighter escorts arrived in theater in Dec ‘43 • Took significant toll on German aircraft and their experienced pilot force • 8th resumed raids into Germany in Feb ‘44 • Launched a 1000 plane raid by end of Feb ‘44 • Attacked Berlin in Mar ‘44 • German POL production was reduced to 25% capacity by Sep ‘44
Strategic Bombingin Europe: Lessons Learned • Target list was not what it should have been • Attacks on sub-pens and ball bearing plants were ineffective • Best targets were the POL production facilities and sources of electrical power • Terror bombing of civilians was ineffective and did little to lower morale • Bombers needed fighter escorts to and from the target