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An Experimental Test of House Matching Algorithms

An Experimental Test of House Matching Algorithms. Onur Kesten Carnegie Mellon University Pablo Guillen University of Sydney. Mechanism Design Overview. FCC spectrum auctions (McMillan (1994), Cramton (1995), McAfee & McMillan (1996), Milgrom (2000) )

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An Experimental Test of House Matching Algorithms

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  1. An Experimental Test of House Matching Algorithms Onur Kesten Carnegie Mellon University Pablo Guillen University of Sydney

  2. Mechanism Design Overview • FCC spectrum auctions (McMillan (1994), Cramton (1995), McAfee & McMillan (1996), Milgrom (2000) ) • NRMP (Roth (2002), Roth & Peranson (1999)) • School choice (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez (2003), Chen & Sonmez (2004), Abdulkadiroglu, Sonmez, Pathak, & Roth (2005), Kesten (2005)) • House allocation Chen & Sonmez (2002) • Kidney exchange (Roth, Sonmez, & Unver (2004, 2005), Sonmez & Unver (2006))

  3. House allocation with existing tenants • Problem components - newcomers - existing tenants - priority order • Main application: Graduate housing Examples: Michigan, Princeton, Rochester, Stanford, CMU, MIT, etc.

  4. Outline of the Talk • Model • Real-life Mechanisms 1. Random serial dictatorship with squatting rights 2. MIT-NH4 • A mechanism from recent theory 3. Top trading cycles mechanism • Main result

  5. The Model • Agents: I={1, 2,…, n} - Existing tenants: IE - Newcomers: IN • Houses H={h1,h2,…,hm} - Occupied houses: IO - Vacant houses: IV • A list of strict preferences R=(Ri)i€I • A priority order f:{1,…,n} -> I

  6. A house allocation problem is a pair consisting of • List of agents’ preferences (R) • A priority order (f) • An allocation is a list s.t. • every agent is assigned at most one house • no house is assigned to more than one agent

  7. What is a mechanism? Allocations µ1 (R, f) Mechanism µ2 (R, f) µ3 (R, f)

  8. What is a good mechanism? 1. Individual rationality (existing tenants) 2. Fairness (priority order) 3. Efficiency(e.g. Pareto) 4. Incentive compatibility (no gaming)

  9. Properties of Mechanisms 1. Individual Rationality:No existing tenant is assigned a house which is worse for him than his current house.

  10. Properties of Mechanisms 2. Fairness:An agent prefers someone else’s assignment (to his own) only if either of the following holds: • The other agent is an existing tenant who is assigned his own house • The other agent has higher priority

  11. Properties of Mechanisms 3. Pareto Efficiency:It is not possible to find an alternative allocation that makes • All agents at least as well off • At least one agent strictly better off However, an inefficient mechanism need not always select inefficient outcomes!!!

  12. Properties of Mechanisms 4. Strategy-proofness (Incentive compatibility): It is always a dominant strategy for each agent to truthfully reveal his preferences.

  13. Trade-offs between properties Proposition 1:There is no mechanism which is individually rational, fair, and Pareto efficient. Individually rational Fair Strategy-proof Pareto efficient

  14. Real-life Mechanisms 1. Random serial dictatorship with squatting rights (CMU, Duke, Harvard, Northwestern, Upenn, etc. ) • Each existing tenant initially decides whether to participate or not. If participates, gives up his current house • A priority ordering f of participants is randomly chosen • First agent (according to f) is assigned his favorite house, second agent is assigned his favorite house among the remaining houses, and so on.

  15. Random serial dictatorship with squatting rights Properties 1. Individual rationality 2. Fairness 3. Pareto efficiency 4. Incentive compatibility

  16. Real-life Mechanisms 2. MIT-NH4 Mechanism 1. The first agent is tentatively assigned his top choice among all houses, the next agent is tentatively assigned his top choice among the remaining houses, and so on, until a squatting conflict occurs. 2. A squatting conflict occurs if it is the turn of an existing tenant but every remaining house is worse than his current house. That means someone else, the conflicting agent, is tentatively assigned the existing tenant's current house. When this happens, solve the squatting conflict as follows: • Assign the existing tenant his current house and remove him • Erase all tentative assignments starting after the conflicting agent 3. The process is over when there are no houses or agents left.

  17. MIT-NH4 Mechanism Proposition 2: 1. Individual rationality 2. Fairness 3. Pareto efficiency 4. Incentive compatibility

  18. The best fair and individually rational mechanism Corollary: TheMIT-NH4 mechanism Pareto dominates any other fair and individually rational mechanism.

  19. A mechanism from recent theory 3. Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez) • Assign the first agent (according to f) his top choice, the second agent his top choice among the remaining houses, and son on, until someone demands the house of an existing tenant. • If at that point the existing tenant whose house is demanded is already assigned a house, then do not disturb the procedure. • Otherwise insert him to the top and proceed. Similarly, insert any existing tenant who is not already served at the top of the line once his or her house is demanded. • If at any point, a loop forms, (it is formed by exclusively existing tenants and each of them demands the house of the tenant next in the loop), remove all agents in the loop by assigning them the houses they demand, and proceed.

  20. Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Properties 1. Individual rationality 2. Fairness 3. Pareto efficiency 4. Incentive compatibility

  21. SUMMARY Individually rational Fair MIT-NH4 RSDwSR TTC Strategy-proof Pareto efficient

  22. TTC vs. RSDwSR: An interesting experiment Chen & Sonmez (2002) find that • TCC is significantly more efficient than RSDwSR • Basically, because existing tenants decide to participate in TTC more often than in RSDwSR • There is no significant difference in truthtelling between TTC and RSDwSR

  23. Our Experiment: Which is better? TTC or MIT-NH4 Individually rational Fair MIT-NH4 TTC Strategy-proof Strategy-proof Pareto efficient

  24. TTC vs. NH4: Experimental design • Two treatments, 5 groups in each treatment, 12 agents per group (8 existing tenants and 4 newcomers) • Existing tenants first decide whether to participate or not • Then subjects report their preferences. One shot game • The priority order is randomly determined, allocation computed and subjects paid

  25. TTC vs. MIT-NH4: An (even more) interesting experiment We find that • In the lab, NH4 is equally or more efficient than TTC • Basically, because existing tenants decide to participate in NH4 more often than in TTC • There is no significant difference in truthtelling between NH4 and TTC

  26. Our main result Individually rational Fair MIT-NH4 TTC Strategy-proof Pareto efficient

  27. Thank you…

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