Demobilization and Re-integration of Security Sector Personnel

1. Demobilization and Re-integration of SecuritySector Personnel 3 November 2005

2. Marc Remillard • Denmark • Program Manager • Demob & Reintegration + Parliamentary Support • Copenhagen Office • At DCAF since Aug 2001 • BiH • Academic/mil background

4. What is Demobilization and Re-integration? • …………………………………………. • …………………………………………. • …………………………………………. • ………………………………………….

5. Why Demobilization and Reintegration? • …………………………………………. • …………………………………………. • …………………………………………. • ………………………………………….

6. Putting it into context (the environment) • On-going Conflict (Pal, NI, Congo, Columbia…) • Post conflict reconstruction / State-building (East Timor, BIH, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq…) • Transitional reform / Democratization (Eastern Europe, Central Asia, SEE…)

7. Different objectives • Disarming combatants, registration and weapons collection • Integration of combatants into regular Def force structures • Confidence & security building measure • Lack of funds / changed security environment • Periodic defense reforms /modernization • PfP/ NATO aspirations (obligations: PAP/MAP)

8. Key factors • Socio-Economic Aspect – multi-dimentional • Linkage to overall SSR strategy • National coordination (change mngt team) • Dedicated national funding • Legislation • International involvement (expertise/funding)

9. BiH • Early pre-war disarmament and demobilization in 1995/96 • Downsizing, demanded by IC 1999 • Reality/affordability 2002-03 • On-going defense personnel reductions • Final structures: 8000

10. SaM • Long overdue decision to demobilization Late in the process • Reality/affordability in 2003 • Well thought-out and structured programming: PRISMA • Need for additional personnel reductions • Current 65,000) • Total (affordable/realistic) structure: 20,000

11. MK • Same challenges, only much smaller

12. CRO • Realizing what it actually costs • Well structured • Modt advanced in the process

13. The introduction of a Demobilization & Reintegration Program for the security sector is a complex process, which goes to the heart of good governance. Effective implementation depends on government policy across the spectrum of government ministries and agencies.

14. Given SEE’s very weak economic environment, it is improbable that effective security sector reform and demobilization can be realised without IC support. That support should be based on the principle of the indivisibility of socio-economic development and security sector reform; a principle now endorsed by the EU.

15. Kosovo • ……………………………… • ……………………………… • ……………………………… • ……………………………… • ……………………………… • ………………………………