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Quantum Cryptography. Alice. Bob. Eve. Ranveer Raaj Joyseeree & Andreas Fognini. Classical Algorithms. 1. Asymmetrical (public-key) cryptosystems:. Message. Encrypted message. Message. Public. Private. - First implementationnn RSA (Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman) 1978
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Quantum Cryptography Alice Bob Eve Ranveer Raaj Joyseeree & Andreas Fognini
Classical Algorithms 1. Asymmetrical (public-key) cryptosystems: Message Encrypted message Message Public Private - First implementationnn RSA (Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman) 1978 - Very convenient, Internet - Idea is based on computational complexity f(x) = y, x = ?. - rely on unproven assumptions
Classical Algorithms Classical Algorithms 2. Symmetrical (secret-key) cryptosystems: Distribute key over secure channel M M S XOR XOR - only provably secure cryptosystem known today - not handy, key as long as message - key only valid for one transmission - how to send the key in a secure manner?
Quantum Cryptography: The BB84 Portocol Ingredients: 1) One photon no copying, 2) Two non orthonormal bases sets 3) Insecure classical channel; Internet What it does: Secure distribution of a key, can't be used to send messages How it works: 50% correlated Physikalische Blätter 55, 25 (1999)
Eve's copy machine Copy machine: e.g. 50% decrease in correlation! Alice and Bob recognize attack from error rate!
Conclusion • Quantum cryptography means just the exchange of keys • Actual transmission of data is done with classical algorithms • Alice & Bob can find out when Eve tries to eavesdrop.
Hacking Quantum Key Distribution systems • QKD systems promise enhanced security. • In fact, quantum cryptography is proveably secure. • Surely one cannot eavesdrop on such systems, right?
Hacking QKD systems • Security is easy to prove while assuming perfect apparatus and a noise-free channel. • Those assumptions are not valid for practical systems e.g. Clavis2 from ID Quantique and QPN 5505 from MagiQ Technologies. • Vulnerabilities thus appear.
Hacking by tailored illumination • Lydersen et al. (2010) proposed a method to eavesdrop on a QKD system undetected. • The hack exploits a vulnerability associated with the avalanche photo diodes (APD‘s) used to detect photons.
Avalanche photo diodes • Can detect single photons when properly set. • However, they are sensitive to more than just quantum states.
Modes of operation of APD’s • Geiger and linear modes
Geiger mode • VAPD is usually fixed and called bias voltage and in Geiger mode, Vbias > Vbr. • An incident photon creates an electron-hole pair, leading to an avalanche of carriers and a surge of current IAPD beyond Ith. That is detected as a click. • Vbias is then made smaller than Vbr to stop flow of carriers. Subsequently it is restored to its original value in preparation for the next photon.
Linear mode • Vbias < Vbr. • Detected current is proportional to incident optical power Popt. • Clicks again occur when IAPD > Ith.
Operation in practical QKD systems • Vbias is varied as shown such that APD is in Geiger mode only when a photon is expected • That is to minimize false detections due to thermal fluctuations. • However, it is still sensitive to bright light in linear mode.
The hack in detail • Eve uses an intercept-resend attack. • She uses a copy of Bob to detect states in a random basis. • Sends her results to Bob as bright light pulses, with peak power > Pth, instead of individual photons. • She also blinds Bob‘s APD‘s to make them operate as classical photodiodes only at all times to improve QBER.
The hack in detail • Cis a 50:50 coupler used in phase-encoded QKD systems. • When Eve‘s and Bob‘s bases match, trigger pulse from Eve constructively interferes and hits detector corresponding to what Eve detected. • Otherwise, no constructive interference and both detectors hit with equal energy. • Click only observed if detected current > Ith.
The hack in detail • Clicks also only observed when Eve and Bob have matching bases. • This means Eve and Bob now have identical bit values and basis choices, independently of photons emitted by Alice. • However, half the bits are lost in the process of eavesdropping.
Performance issues? • Usually, transmittance from Alice to Bob < 50%. • APDs have a quantum efficiency < 50%. • However, trigger pulses cause clicks in all cases. • Loss of bits is thus compensated for and Eve stays undetected
Other methods • Method presented is not the only known exploit. • Zhao et al. (2008) attempted a time-shift attack. • Xu et al. (2010) attempted a phase remapping attack.
Conclusion • QKD systems are unconditionally secure, based on the fundamental laws of physics. • However, physical realisations of those systems violate some of the assumptions of the security proof. • Eavesdroppers may thus intercept sent messages without being detected.
Used Material • Rev Mod Phys 74, 145 (2002) • PhysikalischeBlätter 55, 25 (1999) • Nature Photonics 4, 686 (2010) • Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system. Xu et al. (2010) • Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination. Lydersen et al. (2010) • Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems. Zhao et al. (2008).
