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Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol (MAKEP). Reporter: Jung-Wen Lo ( 駱榮問 ) Date: 2008/4/1 8. Outline. Introduction ES-MAKEP: Efficient & Secure MAKEP Fuw-Yi Yang and Jinn-Ke Jan (2004) ES-MAKEP-Forward Secret Attack F-MAKEP He Yijun, Xu Nan and Li Jie (2007) Comment.
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Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol (MAKEP) Reporter: Jung-Wen Lo (駱榮問) Date: 2008/4/18
Outline • Introduction • ES-MAKEP: Efficient & Secure MAKEP • Fuw-Yi Yang and Jinn-Ke Jan (2004) • ES-MAKEP-Forward Secret Attack • F-MAKEP • He Yijun, Xu Nan and Li Jie (2007) • Comment
Introduction • MAKEP: Mutual authentication and key exchange protocol • L-MAKEP: Linear MAKEP • Author: D. S. Wong and A. H. Chan • Title: Mutual authentication and key exchange for low power wireless communications • Src: Military Communications Conference, 2001. MILCOM 2001. Communications for Network-Centric Operations: Creating the Information Force, IEEE, Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 39-43 • IL-MAKEP: Improved L-MAKEP • Author: K. Shim • Title: Cryptanalysis of mutual authentication and key exchange for low-power wireless communications • Src: IEEE Communications Letters, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp.248-250, 2003. • I-MAKEP • Authors: Jinn-Ke Jan and Yi-Hwa Chen • Title: A new efficient MAKEP for wireless communications • Src: In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Application (AINA’04), IEEE, Volume 2, pp. 347-350, 2004 • ES-MAKEP: Efficient & Secure MAKEP • Authors: Fuw-Yi Yang and Jinn-Ke Jan • Title: A Secure and Efficient Key Exchange Protocol for Mobile Communications • Src: Cryptology ePrint Archive 2004/167, July 2004, http://eprint.iacr.org • F-MAKEP: Perfect forward secrecy • Improved ES-MAKEP
A Secure and Efficient Key Exchange Protocol for Mobile Communications Authors: Fuw-Yi Yang and Jinn-Ke Jan Src: Cryptology ePrint Archive 2004/167, July 2004, http://eprint.iacr.org
Notation • εpk(): an asymmetric encryption functionδSK(): an asymmetric decryption function • EK(): a symmetric encryption functionDK(): a symmetric decryption function • SKS: a private key of server SPKS: a public key of server S • IDU: the identification of a client entity UIDS: the identification of a server S • p, q: a private key pair of Ug ,n: a public key pair of U • x || y: string x concatenates string y • |n|: bit length of n • rUK, rUF, rUR:three random numbers selected by UrSK: a random number selected by Sr∈RG : r is a random number selected from the set G • l: the length of session keys
ES-MAKEP Server S User U (PKS,SKS) rUK,rUR,rUFC1rUK=εPKS(rUK)CMT=grUF||rUF mod n M1={C1rUK,CMT,IDU} rUK = δSKS(C1rUK)Random rskσSU=rSKrUKC2rUK=EσSU(rUK) σUS=rUKrSKr’UK=DσUS(C2rUK) =DσUS(EσSU(rUK))r’UK?= rUKSF=h(rUK,rSK,IDU,IDS)C3=EσSU(IDU)SR=2|n|(rUF-SF)+rUR mod λ(n) M2={rSK,C2rUK} SF=h(rUK,rSK,IDU,IDS)CMT’=gSF||SR mod nCMT’?=CMT M3={C3,SR} ※n=pq ;λ(n)=lcm(p-1, q-1)
A Secure Key Exchange and Mutual Authentication Protocol for Wireless Mobile Communications Authors: He Yijun, Xu Nan and Li Jie Src: The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, 2007. ARES 2007, 10-13 April 2007 pp. 558 – 563
ES-MAKEP-Forward Secret Attack Attacker Server S User U Conceal SKS (PKS,SKS) rUK,rUR,rUFC1rUK=εPKS(rUK)CMT=grUF||rUF mod n M1={C1rUK,CMT,IDU} rUK = δSKS(C1rUK)Random rskσSU=rSKrUKC2rUK=EσSU(rUK) σUS=rUKrSKr’UK=DσUS(C2rUK) =DσUS(EσSU(rUK))r’UK?= rUKSF=h(rUK,rSK,IDU,IDS)C3=EσSU(IDU)SR=2|n|(rUF-SF)+rUR mod λ(n) M2={rSK,C2rUK} SF=h(rUK,rSK,IDU,IDS)CMT’=gSF||SR mod nCMT’?=CMT M3={C3,SR}
F-MAKEP Server S User U (PKS,SKS) rUK,rUR,rUFC1rUK=εPKS(grUK)CMT=grUF||rUF mod n M1={C1rUK,CMT,IDU} rUK = δSKS(C1rUK)Random rskσSU=grSKrUKC2rUK=EσSU(rUK) M2={rSK,C2rUK} σSU=grSKrUKr’UK=DσUS(C2rUK) =DσUS(EσSU(rUK))r’UK?= rUKSF=h(rUK,rSK,IDU,IDS)C3=EσSU(IDU)SR=2|n|(rUF-SF)+rUR mod λ(n) SF=h(rUK,rSK,IDU,IDS)CMT’=gSF||SR mod nCMT’?=CMT M3={C3,SR} ※n=pq ;λ(n)=lcm(p-1, q-1)
Comment • Conceal secret key is difficult • ES-MAKEP & F-MAKEP: PKI system=> Inefficient=> Not suitable for wireless devices
DoS-Resistance Protocol Server A(pw1,pw2) Client B(pw1,pw2) IDA,IDB,X, H(IDA,IDB,X) 1. rBX=pwi⊕rB 2. Try pwi 3. rAY= rA⊕rBσ=H(rA,rB,IDA,IDB) Y⊕H(pwj),σ⊕H(pwi) 4. r’A =Y⊕rBσ’=H(r’A,rB,IDA,IDB)H(σ’) ?= H(σ) 5. H(σ’) 4.H(σ’) ?= H(σ)
y’=cy Unknown key-share attack on L-MAKEP(?) σ’ =rAy’Eσ’(x)
IL-MAKEP Eσ(x,IDA,IDB)
A new efficient MAKEP for wireless communications Authors: Jinn-Ke Jan and Yi-Hwa Chen Src: In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Application (AINA’04), IEEE, Volume 2, pp. 347-350, 2004
I-MAKEP Server S User U RegisterPhase ID,v xv=g-x mod N y=(v-ID)d mod N SessionKey GenerationPhase ID,Y v= ye+ID mod N Random rs rs Random w,ku=gw mod Nt=EPKS(k)s=w+xH(rs||t||u)σ=ks u,t,s gsvH(rs||t||u) ?≡u mod Nk’=D(t)σ=k’s H(k’) H(k’)?=H(k)