Small farmers striving in a global agricultural region in Mexico: resistances and local alternatives

1. Small farmers striving in a global agricultural region in Mexico: resistances and local alternatives Hector O. Fletes Guadalupe G. Ocampo Universidad Autonoma de Chiapas, Mexico hctrfo@gmail.com guzocamgua@hotmail.com Objective Toanalyseresults of a longtermresearchabouttheimpacts, adjustments and resistancestakenbysmallfarmers in the Soconusco region (characterizedby global agriculturalcommodity links) in theMexico´sstate of Chiapas. Thisisexamined in thecontext of the neoliberal policy in the country, fromtheninetieson Thestudyisbased in ethnographicaland comparativeresearch (PROMEP-SEP; FORDECyT)

2. Importance: About small farmers • Small farmers (SF) are in the center of debates about food (in)security, concentration of value share in the commodity chains, the worn neoliberal policy, financial crisis and the global warming • AboutMexico, Appendini and Torres-Mazuera (2008) tellus: • A weakening of rural worldimportance in theeconomicdevelopmentstrategy • Eitherfoodsuppliesor labor forindustry´s roles, havechanged • Nowadays: “peasants and countryside are conceived as residualsfactors of a global competitiveeconomy, of hightechnology, in whichsmall rural producers no longerfit” • This has been a result of deeppoliticalchanges in Mexico, noworientedtointernationalmarkets • Otherperspectivesaboutit: • Otero and Pechlaner (2010) discus a “neoliberal foodregime”, centered in neoregulation and biotechnology, that has contributed in thepeasant and smallfarmersexodus We offer a concret regional analysis about this processes , focused in mango and palm oil industries and their actors

3. Soconusco, a global polarizedregion • Located in thepooreststate of Mexico, Chiapas • Historicallyconnectedto global commoditychains: rubber, coffe, cotton, banana, mango • Presence of Chiquita Brands(fruits), AMSA (coffee) • Contributes in the totality of banana exports and most of mango´s (26 thousand ton) • Polarization: in general, averagepropertyis 7 ha. But in mango industry, there are 12 firmsparticipating in exports (owingbetween 500 and 1300 has), and about 5 thousandproducers, withanaverage of 5 has (10 acres). Soconusco

4. A planthealthprogramformango, and the SF • A planthealthprogramwasreinforced in the 90´s, as a part of NAFTA strategies • Qualitywasbeingthenintroduced in theterms of internationaltrade, byStates and corporations • Plant health (or quality) has been officially understood as a safety program against fruit fly. • SAGARPA (agriculturesecretary) promoteddecentralization, and enhancedthecreation of local groups of producers (Known as local boards) managingtheplanthealthprogram • Thefirstaspectdisputingan idea of linear aplication of thisprogramisthatitoccursbesidethepresence and expansion of a new local variety of mango: Ataulfo • Ataulfo was a local hybrid (it was given a designation of origen in the region), promoted by local elites (entrepreneurs and State agents) in the sixties. Byninetiesitwasincreasingitsplantedsurface, and senttonational and international (in a lesserextent)markets • So, we observe theoperation of a technicalpackagehealth-ataulfo, notonly a qualityorhealthprogram • For SF, this package represented a renovated power, asociated with new technical regulations, a different variety, and costs of compliance

5. Adoption, adaptation, rejection, of the new rules • Theadoption of thetechnicalpackagewasinfluencedfor social and agroecologicalconditions: • Fromthediversity of agriculturalactors, itwaseasierforentrepreneurstoadoptthe new rules, thatimplicatedmonoculture (only ataulfo), new costs of compliance, maintenance, and surveillance of fruitflypresence in theirorchards • SF and peasants had to eliminate the crop diversity in their lots, which included corn, a local variety of banana, other local variety of mango known as “manililla”, sesame, soy, and rice • Polycultureisagainstthestricter rules, when mango ischanneledtoUnitedStates • For some SF the plant health program indicated increasing risks, taking in account the likelihood that their orchard be canceled because the finding of fruit fly • These situations led to a complex adoption process: adopting the Ataulfo and turn to monoculture, taking the rules but not the Ataulfo, not suscribing to health program, or rejecting any compliance to the rules • Whenthelasthappenned, therewasalwaysopportunityfor SF toselltheproduct, giventhenegotiationsoperatingbetweenthem and traders. Theycould use onedocumenttocertificatefruitfromdifferentorchards, orletthetraderstomanagetheirorchards(byrenting)

6. SF and peasants had to fight for creating their own local committees and to manage plant health, and they did it, and they could take some shares paid by traders to local boards • By 2010, States agencies werealreadytaken back most of the control of theplanthealthprogram, notonly in Chiapas but in Mexicobroadly, as a result of technical and financialobservationstosome of the local boards • So, new rules compliance, derived in soilcompetence, increasingrisks , and no impact in improvingthe SF position in thecommoditychains

7. The trading sphere • As traders (a variety of them) rentnumerousorchards, they can coordinatetheplanthealthcompliance. Thissituationlimits a possiblepriceincreasefor SF whentheygetbetterqualityfruits. Tradershavetakenadvantage of healthprogramto reduce pricefor SF, thatmeansthatitisusedas a powermechanism • Fruitforexportischannelledby 12 firms, most of themfromMexico, but outsiders totheregion • Landpropoerty has polarized, as firmshavegoneto a vertical integration. Theyhavedecidedtobecomeland´s (orchards) owners (not a normal process in agribusiness in Mexico), whichisdirectlyrelatedtothestrategyforplanthealthprogramcompliance

8. Regional conditions in the 2000´s, and the promotion of a palm oil program In theperiod 1999-2012, Soconusco suffered a decreasing in thelandoccupiedbybasiccrops , and anincrease in thatplantedwith industrial orexportcrops

9. In the middle of the first decade of 2000, federal and state (Chiapas) administration started (renovated, in fact) a palm oil plantation program, oriented to renewable energy production, specially biofuels • Bothadministrationsdeclaredagriculturehadtogofarfromfoodproduction, and accomplish new functionslikeenergyproduction • Itwasprogrammedtoestablish 300 thousand ha. in Mexico (between 2009-2012) , of which 100 thousandwould be planted in Chiapas state (2007-2012) • In Chiapas, palmsurfacewentfrom 16,760 ha. in 2005, to 46,406 in 2012 (only 20 thousandalreadyproducing), thatwasfewerthanprogrammed • State government has imported plant from Costa Rica, and delivered it to farmers • Italsoestablishedgreenhouses • Seven private firms (5 of them in Soconusco) are working to produce crude palm oil • Itseemseverybody (firmas, farmersorganizations, oficials, and firms) are optimisticwithincreasingincomes • But ….

10. Contradictoryresults • New social and environmentalproblems are generating: • Extractors control prices, associated to international markets (even so, they are good for SF). Two of thesefirmshavetherefiningprocess in otherstates in Mexico • No-marginals lands have been used for plantation, some next or in corn or vegetables lots, using chemical fertilizer • Basic and staple crops have been displaced, so SF have to buy them in the local market, coming from other states or regions • Palm has beenplanted in biosphere reserve namedEncrucijada • The great contradiction and inefficiency is the impossibility to produce biodiesel, because Mexico imports about 80% of its palm oil needs

11. SF responses • A SF group in themunicipality of Villa Comaltitlán, could: • First, todeliverfruit as a colective (in thenineties) • After that, take in comodato (free loan) an old private extractor to produce their own crude palm oil , and selling to their own clients • Workfinancialstrategiestoincreasetheir capital • By 2012, theygettobuildtheirownextractingplant, gathering new membersfromall Chiapas state

12. Conclusions We found that despite the importance that some agencies as the World Bank and the FAO give to small farmers, beside States, there is still a long way forward to recognize their agroecological, social and economic value. Both State projects revised gave advantage to great firms, against small farmers improvement. They led to land and value concentration, in spite of the relationships, powers, disputes, adaptations and resistances, between the different actors. They conducted to local food and environmental problems, so we have to reactivate small farmer’s knowledge and experiences