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Filling the Void: The Social and Informational Power of Legislative Member Organizations

Filling the Void: The Social and Informational Power of Legislative Member Organizations. Prof. Jennifer Nicoll Victor University of Pittsburgh June 2011 Political Networks Conference Ann Arbor, MI Nils Ringe , University of Wisconsin, Madison

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Filling the Void: The Social and Informational Power of Legislative Member Organizations

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  1. Filling the Void: The Social and Informational Power of Legislative Member Organizations Prof. Jennifer Nicoll Victor University of Pittsburgh June 2011 Political Networks Conference Ann Arbor, MI Nils Ringe, University of Wisconsin, Madison Christopher J. Carman, University of Strathclyde

  2. Motivating Questions Do legislators have sufficient access to information to be “good” lawmakers? Do lawmakers have unresolved collective action problems?

  3. Relationships Matter “As an organization, Congress functions in large part because of the regular and personal interactions among Members as they work to build consensus on issues ranging from procedural matters to the budget and appropriations legislation.” - U.S. Congressman David Dreier (R-CA). “Personal relationships, face-to-face negotiations, building of trust and reciprocity in human behavior on the Hill necessitates being together in one room.” - James Thurber, Director, Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, American University.

  4. Why Caucuses? Legislatures have collective action problems. Formal Institutions may not be sufficient. LMOs are voluntary and unlimited. LMOs have proliferated and exist cross-nationally.

  5. Existing Literature Caucuses counterbalance the committee system (Ainsworth and Aiken 1997) Information and Communication Networks (Fiellin 1962; Stevens, et al. 1974) Caucuses can affect voting behavior and facilitate information exchange (Hammond, et al. 1995; Hammond 1991; 1998). Caucuses and networks (Victor and Ringe 2009)

  6. Theory: Caucuses Create Networks LMOs solve an institutional collective action problem not already addressed by existing legislative institutions (i.e., committees and parties). LMOs connect legislators who would not otherwise be connected. LMOs allow for the exchange of information not otherwise accessible.

  7. How Do LMOs Differ from Committees? • LMOs are voluntary. • (-) Less expertise than committees. • (-) Poor voting coalitions. • (+) Low transaction costs for dissemination of information. • (+) Exogenous sources of information; specialized.

  8. Expectations Compared to LMOs, Committees are designed to produce credible information. Compared to Committees, LMOs exhibit ties that cut across existing institutional barriers. LMOs provide legislators with resources that increase productivity.

  9. Data • Caucus membership data for the 109th -111th Congresses (2005-2010) • Source: Congressional Yellow Book • Legislative Attributes • Party, committee, leadership, race, gender • Legislative productivity

  10. Descriptive Data

  11. Caucus Proliferation

  12. Predicting Caucus Membership

  13. Most Central MCs 111th Congress

  14. 111th CongressCaucus Membership Density =0.75

  15. 111th Committee Membership Density =0.22

  16. Committee and Caucus Membership—111th Congress Committee network Caucus network

  17. Testing Expectations

  18. Measurement

  19. Testing Network Closure: ERGM • Cursory glance, committee network appears to have less closure. • Density Committee: 0.23, 0.24, 0.22 • Density LMO: 0.36, 0.77, 0.75 • Use triadic closure terms in two models: • Predict the LMO network with common covariates and GWDSP. • Predict the committee network with common covariates and GWESP.

  20. Testing Brokerage • Two glances • Calculate Burt’s (2002) structural holes measures at ego-level. • Use ERGMs

  21. Testing Legislative Productivity Calculate legislative passage rates for individual MCs. Does an MC’s centrality in the caucus network predict their legislative success? Use eigenvector centrality (normalized) of the LMO network.

  22. Legislative Productivity

  23. Legislative Productivity

  24. Centrality (normalized eigenvector)

  25. Interpretation

  26. Caveats 2-mode data converted to 1-mode. Limits to inference because of exogenous forces on network structure. Test for fit and degeneracy. Use edgewise betweenness (not nodal).

  27. Do Caucuses Matter? • Caucus impact is largely indirect. • Transmission of information. • Getting/keeping items on the agenda. • Keeping contacts within and outside Congress. • When are Caucuses influential? • When they’re active. • When they’re supported by outside groups. • When the co-chairs take an active interest.

  28. Conclusions • Legislating is an inherently social process. • Legislatures have collective action problems. • Caucuses fill gaps in formal solutions. • Mixed method and cross-national research design helps to discern indirect influence.

  29. EXTRA SLIDES

  30. Most Central MCs 109th Congress

  31. 109th CongressCaucus Membership Density =0.36

  32. 109th Committee Membership

  33. Most Central MCs 110th Congress

  34. 110th CongressCaucus Membership Density =0.77

  35. 110th Committee Membership

  36. 109th CongressCaucus by Caucus Network Density =0.29 Density =6.54

  37. 110th CongressCaucus by Caucus Network Density =0.5

  38. 111th CongressCaucus by Caucus Network Density =0.49

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