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This study delves into the effects of campaign spending on voter attitudes, exploring the beneficial and adverse impacts of electoral competition on public perception. By examining political ad spending, accountability, mobilization, and engagement, this research sheds light on how competitive elections influence candidate recruitment, policy appeals, and ideological positions, ultimately shaping public opinion and candidate evaluation.
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The argument • Competitive US elections communicate with ‘negative’ information • $4b on TV ads • People ‘learn’ that candidates, representatives, and Congress up to no good • There are consequences of this • Not yet sure if they are interesting or important….
What effects of electoral competition (ad spending)? • Beneficial effects • Accountability (monitor, reward, punish…less corruption) • More information for public, deliberation • More information = better information • Mobilization, engagement • Broader policy appeals
What effects of electoral competition (ad spending)? • Less beneficial effects • Winner-take-all, more losers • Negativity, demobilization • ‘Corruption’ of candidates, parties motivated by re-election • They must seek/find campaign resources
Expectations about electoral competition (2 party system) • Competition (spending) ‘should’ produce effects on: • 1) Ideological position of parties • Convergence • 2) Candidate recruitment / candidate entry • Quality
Competitive district, each party same # of voters: Convergence
Candidate recruitment & $$ • “Quality challengers” and strategic entry • Fundraising experience • Emerge in competitive races where best chance to win • Parties recruit aggressively to field quality candidates in competitive districts • Send them funds
Context of competitive districts in US Congressional elections • More likely to be populated by moderate incumbents (??) • More likely to attract campaign spending • By candidates • By parties • By outside groups • More spending, more negative information • Also changed over past 15 years: Fewer marginal districts.
Congress, 2006: Narrow Margin = Moderate Representative In 2006 (etc.) incumbents in most expensive races more moderate
Expensive 2006 races (examples) • Nancy Johnson, CT 4th least conservative GOP ($7.6m) • Rob Simmons, CT 5th least conservative GOP ($5.6m) • Curt Weldon, PA 8th least conservative GOP ($6.0m) • Chris Shays, CT 9th least conservative GOP ($6.8m) • Jim Gerlach, PA 10th least conservative GOP ($7.6m) • Clay Shaw, FL 14th least conservative GOP ($9.4m) • Jon Porter, NV 23rd least conservative GOP ($4.5m) • Heather Wilson, NM 35th least conservative GOP ($8.3m)
Expensive 2010 races (examples) • CT Senate, Blumenthal (D) v McMahon (R) $48m • FL Senate, Crist (I) v. Rubio (R) $40m • CA Senate, Boxer (D) v. Fiorina (R) $30m • AR Senate, Boozman (R) v. Lincoln (D) $15m • FL22, $11.8m • NM 1 $8.8m • PA 15 $7.9m • SC 2 $7.9M • FL 8 $7.3m • CA 9 $6.1m
Expensive 2012 races (examples) • 1) MA Senate, Brown (R) vs. Warren (D) $82.4m • 2) CT Senate, McMahon (R) vs. Murphy (D) $65.4m • 3) OH Senate, Mandel (R) vs. Brown (D) $43.5m • 4) MO Senate, Akin (R) vs. McCaskill (D) $38.4m • 4) CT 5 $12.9m • 5) CA 30 (Dem vs Dem) $11.9m • 6) CA 33 (Dem v Ind) $11.0m • 8) NY 27 $8.8m • 9) IL 10 $8.5m
Spending as negative information • More money spent overall • Fewer competitive seats • Change in tone in 2000s • Little reason to inform votes other guy is OK, similar to opponent
Campaign information • 2006 DCCC against Chris Shays • Clay Shaw ad 2006 • DCCC hit on Shaw • DCCC hit on Sweeny • DCCC attack on Ozinga • Debbie Halvorson gun attack ad • Aikin hit on McCaskil • McCaskil hit on Aikin • Rove hit on Warren • Warren as Che • Scott Brown kills kids • Tea Party for Brown
Campaign information in competitive setting • X = extremist, not one of us • X = the bad guys • X =‘special interests’ • X raised taxes to pay her salary • X is a liar • X is not X, X= [George Bush; Bin Laden, etc] • [If Xinc.], Then Congress sucks • Y = extremist, not one of us • Y = the bad guys • Y =‘special interests’ • Y didn’t pay her taxes but is rich • Y is a liar • Y is not Y, Y = [Nancy Pelosi, Che Guevara, etc.]
Expectations • Awareness of candidates • Less approving of candidates • Perceptions of candidate’s ideology as distant • From respondent • From rival candidate
Data: Cooperative Congressional Election Study • 2006, 2010 CCES • 2006, ideological placement of candidates, approval of Congress • 2010: Assessment of candidate competence, integrity • 2012 CCES • Experiments on perceptions of campaign finance • Attitudes about influence of campaign funds, Approval of representative, Congress
Much shown with 2006 data could be endogenous: What about effects on challengers? Perceptions of challengers should suffer as well (despite ‘quality’ bias)
Summary of (apparent) effects • Information: To know them is to loath them • Awareness of candidates • Able to rate candidate ideology (accurate or not) • Candidates seen as more ideologically distant • Candidates seen as less competent, less integrity
Other consequences • 2006 CCES • What is the most important problem facing the nation today? • War in Iraq • Terrorism • Corruption • More likely response in competitive districts • 2010 CCES • Do you approve of Congress as an institution? • Respondents in competitive districts more likely to disapprove
Effects of expensive campaigns • Extend beyond the targets of the campaigns • Expensive campaigns highlight that candidates chase money • Being inundated with ads may trigger perceptions of quid pro quo corruption • Exposure to campaigns associated with perceptions of representation, corruption of public officials
Mostly corrupt if money spent independently, on behalf of candidate
So, • If people think campaign finance is corrupt, what if they are exposed to greater campaign spending? • Assume some ‘know’ TV is not cheap; candidates need & receive financial support to pay for it • How then, do campaigns affect perceptions of representation / institutions?
Possible consequences (other than mobilisation) • Perceptions of politics are affected • Accountability…not possible w/o competition • Institutional legitimacy – do these perceptions matter? • Political polarization • Why keep running moderate candidates?
So what…. • Suggests people make distinctions about what sources of $$ are more ‘corrupt’ (whatever that means) • Suggests perceptions of institutional legitimacy and corruption affected by real events • Meaningful variation in cynicism • Highlights a paradox: more information = less legitimate institutions