Army 2020: Rationale for the Redesign Major General K D Abraham IISS 20 November 2012

1. Army 2020: Rationale for the RedesignMajor General K D AbrahamIISS 20 November 2012

2. Army 2020 : Why Necessary? • Same tasks but 20% smaller Regular Army (fiscal context) • Continuing the logic of the SDSR • An end to enduring stabilisation in Afghanistan • Independent Commission on Reserves: • Revitalize the Reserve: TA to 30K trained strength • Better Defined Roles • Connect with society through the Reserve • Withdrawal from Germany • Force Development and enduring lessons from operations

3. The core purposes of the future Army Contingent capability for defence and deterrence • Overseas • engagement • and capacity • building UK engagement and homeland resilience

4. Principal Force Development Deductions Separating the strategic from the tactical level – and resetting the brigade and divisional levels of command accordingly. Armoured infantry as the core capability on which manoeuvre is built with armour organized for intimate support. Institutionalizing the integration of ‘soft effect’ into manoeuvre. Resetting the precision / suppression balance of fires. Broadband connectivity to more points of presence. ISR integration / layering and the importance of understanding rather than simple situational awareness. Organizing for joint, inter-agency and multi-national integration. End to end approach to supply and distribution.

5. SDSR • “…direct more non-operational defence engagement overseas towards conflict prevention, security sector reform and capability building in priority countries, including through: establishing new training teams; running joint exercises; attaching senior civilian policy advisers to foreign defence ministries, and increasing our arms control engagement… • …plan our conflict prevention work several years ahead and to deliver more cross-government support to long-term conflict prevention and stabilisation programmes…”

6. Defence Planning Assumptions SDSR/Defence Policy requires our forces to be structured to conduct simultaneously: • A single non-enduring complex intervention • A single non-enduring simple intervention • An enduring stabilization operation Three non-enduring operations (eg one simple and two complex interventions) or At best effort, a non-enduring operation of up to three brigades, within a divisional context (noting that a warning time under 12 months is likely to limit best effort to two brigades) or

7. Use of Reserves in an Integrated Army • Reserves will provide: • Specialism (eg doctors, cyber, linguists). • Capabilities that do not require significant collective training to retain their readiness (principally the support and service support areas). • Combat Arms – principally for resilience and regeneration – but useable in formed bodies on lower risk, straight forward tasks given adequate notice. • Complement not supplement to Army: no longer a Strategic Reserve designed for use in extremis. • Graduated readiness: feasible and deliverable roles.

8. Army 2020 Constituents • Reaction Forces: • 1 x divisional HQ: • 4 x brigades (3 x Armoured Infantry and 1 x Air Assault) • Adaptable Forces: • 1 x divisional HQ • 7 x infantry brigades • Force Troops: 10 x combat support and combat service support brigades to support both RF and AF.

9. Force Troops and Logistic Support • Force Troops • 1st Artillery Brigade • 8th Engineer Brigade • 1st and 11th Signals Brigades • 1st Intelligence and Surveillance Brigade • 2nd Medical Brigade • 104th Logistic Support Brigade • Security Assistance Group • Divisions • 101 Logistic Support Brigade • 102 Logistic Support Brigade

10. Security Assistance Group Functions • Proponency for developing expertise in the fields of overseas military assistance to stabilisation/peace-building/state-building focusing on prevent. • Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE) • Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) • Military capacity-Building (MCB) • Subject matter experts to the land chain of command and Defence on stabilisation, specifically strategic, operational and tactical planning. • Remain the defence and land POC for the UK Govt. Stabilisation Unit. • Connected into the Single Intelligence Environment.

11. What the Adaptable Force is for: A pool of forces to deliver: • Endurance on stabilisation operations • National resilience • Defence engagement • Engagement with UK civil society • Structural and institutional resilience: regeneration • Best effort

12. Routine use of Reserves in an ‘integrated Army’

13. Taking account of demography

14. Transformation Requirements • An Adaptable Army • Being prepared routinely to change the structure as circumstances require: political, economic, threat... • Tactical adaptation: to meet a broader range of tasks. • Operational adaptation: to the specific mission requirement. • Strategic adaptation: ability to regenerate mass and scale: deterrence requirement. • An Integrated Army • Establishing a framework of strategic partnerships with private and public sector employers. • A basing plan that is optimized geographically and matched to civilian employers. • Appropriate legislation and liability to allow predictable use. • The “offer” to reservists and their families.

15. A2020 Risks: • Assured Support from Reserve: • Resource • Decision Making • Cultural • New reliance • Operationalizing Defence Engagement . • Institutional and Cultural Adaptability. • Internal Balance: combat vs combat support and combat service support.

16. Discussion