Disaster Risk: From Research to Practice – A Summary of the IRDR Programme

1. Disaster Risk: From Research to Practice – A Summary of the IRDR Programme Jane E. Rovins Executive Director Beijing, China

2. Religion Wind speed Wave action Key question: Why, despite advances in the natural and social science of hazards and disasters, do losses continue to increase? How do we address the lack of sustainability in current disaster practices? Ethnicity Risk Reduction rainfall Age Ground motion gender

3. The Science Plan • Addressing the challenge of natural and human-induced environmental hazards • An integrated approach to research on disaster risk through: an international, multidisciplinary (natural, health, engineering and social sciences, including socio-economic analysis) collaborative research programme IRDR Science Plan at: http://www.irdrinternational.org/

4. Scope of IRDR • Geophysical and hydro-meteorological trigger events • Earthquakes – tsunamis – volcanoes – floods – storms (hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons) – heat waves – droughts – wildfires – landslides – coastal erosion – climate change • Space weather and impact by near-Earth objects • Effects of human activities on creating or enhancing disasters, including land-use practices • NOTtechnological disasters, warfare

5. Research Objectives • Characterization of hazard, vulnerability and risk • Effective decision-making in complex and changing risk context • Reducing risk and curbing losses through knowledge-based actions

6. Cross Cutting Themes • Capacity building • Case studies and demonstration projects • Assessment, data management and monitoring

8. Partners • ICSU Unions • ISSC Unions • Regional Offices • UN organizations • IRDR National Committees • IRDR International Centers of Excellence • National and international science institutions • National and international development assistance agencies and funding bodies • Other research organizations

9. Disaster Loss Data WG • Identify what data and quality are needed to improve integrated disaster data management • Bring together loss data stakeholders and utilize synergies for recognized standards to minimize uncertainty • Define of “losses” and creation of methodology for assessing it • Educate users on data interpretation and biases • Increase downscaling of loss data to sub-national geographies for policy makers

10. Forensic Disaster Investigations (FORIN) • In depth investigations into complex and underlying cause • Common template and methodology • Fundamental cause of disasters • Trace out and assign causal explanation of losses and intervening conditions that increased or reduce losses • FORIN relies upon the actual evidence found and applied scientific methodologies and principles to interpret the disaster in all its facets

11. Introduction • Debunking “natural” of disaster. • From nature to society; from natural construction to social construction of risk. • Deficiency in many past efforts to understand disaster • hazard or technological focus • sectorial or disciplinary based • emergency response

12. The knowledge that exists about disaster risk reduction has not been communicated effectively Hypothesis • Risk reduction hypothesis • Responsibility hypothesis • Communication hypothesis • Integration-participation hypothesis New and more integrated and participatory research required to yield more useful and effective results New and more probing research and understanding of the reasons for increase in public vulnerability and wider exposure would enable and stimulate improved DRR Responsibility for continued increase of vulnerability and exposure is locally specific and diffuse over individuals, organizations and over time

13. Approaches to Research • 20 core case specific • 10 generic questions • 6 additional questions • Grouping according to framework concerns • Critical cause analysis • Meta analysis • Longitudinal analysis • Scenarios of disaster • FORIN Narratives

14. Algiers Flood & Mudflow10 November 2001

15. Event Info • Exceptionally high rainfall (~ 262 mm/24h) • High winds (120 KM/H) 714 Deaths • >312 Injured • 116 MISSING • ~ 10,000 HOMELESS • > 1500 housing units damaged • >350 vehicles buried w/ passengers • 2.5-10m of mud $USD 250M 1M m3 of mud

16. Water Mudflow

19. State of construction Ancient Housing – state of decay Lack of maintenance Illegal housing Previous flood damage Deforestation

20. Causes No single cause Several failures Lack of warning system – most affected were in transit/did not reside in impacted area Travelling to work or school

21. Causes Good construction – no damage but deviated water onto others Uncontrolled urbanization Passivity and laxness of local government Uninformed citizens

22. Causes Wild urbanization No preparedness for effective response Lack of knowledge of flood risk at the population and administration levels No warning system Inadequate communication system Inappropriate urban planning, legislation, etc. Lack of a clear disaster management system Lack of maintenance of the sewage system

23. Risk Interpretation and Action (RIA) • How actors attempt to make sense of experience and information from various sources as a basis for decision • Estimation of the likelihood, magnitude of event and vulnerability of physical infrastructure • Social and behavioural factors leading to greater or lesser risk

24. Mega Disaster in a Resilient Society The Great East Japan (Tohoku Kanto) Earthquake and Tsunami 2011 Earthquake Tsunami Nuclear Power Stations RIA The role of risk interpretation – responses?? FORIN Complex disaster – technological interface??

25. Forensic Investigation onGreat East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) 25

26. Event Summary • M9.0 earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011 at 14:46 • Massive ground motion was observed throughout Japan • Mega-tsunami of about 1,000 year return period and subsidence led to enormous damages • Complex disaster (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear accident) • Historic Tsunami Events in the region • 1897: [M8.5] 21,959 dead • 1933: [M8.1] 3,064 dead or missing Seismic Intensity Japan Meteorological Agency

27. Overview of Damages Hirono(0) Kuji(4) Noda(38) Fudai(1) Tanohata(31) Iwaizumi(7) Tarou(180) Iwate • Inundated area by tsunami：561km2 • Human casualties: 15,829 dead, 3,745 missing, 5,942 injured (as of Oct 25) • Building damages: 118,790 completely destroyed, 184,343 half destroyed, 280 burned down, 10,961 inundated (above floor), 13,867 inundated (below floor) • Agricultural land losses: 23,600ha • Direct damages to infrastructure stock： approx. 16.9 trillion yen (US$200 billion) Miyako(362) Yamada(823) Otsuchi(1,397) Kamaishi(1,091) Ofunato(452) Rikuzentakata(1,951) Kesennuma(1,405) Miyagi Minamisanriku(901) Higashimatsushima(1,145) Ishinomaki(3,959) Matsushima(2) Rifu(50) Onagawa(963) Shiogama(21) Shichigahama(71) Tagajou(189) Miyagino-ku, Sendai(293) Taihaku-ku, Sendai(53) Natori(984) Wakabayashi-ku, Sendai(332) Iwanuma(184) Watari(270) Fukushima Yamamoto(691) Shinchi(110) Soma(459) Minamisoma(663) Namie(184) Futaba(35) Okuma(81) Tomioka(25) National Police Agency （As of Oct 25, 2011) 2011 White Paper on Disaster Management Naraha(13) Hirono(3) Iwaki(347) Human losses in coastal municipalities Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011)

28. Human Losses Tsunami was the main cause of death • 92.4% of people died in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima due to tsunami. Crushed by buildings, etc 4.4% Unknown 2% Fire 1.1% 65% of fatalities were 60 years or older Tsunami 92.4％ Death causes in GEJET (Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima) Source: 2011 White paper on disaster management Age structure of population and people died in GEJET （Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima）

29. Critical cause analysis of human losses due to delayed evacuation Why were so many people not able to escape from the tsunami? The critical points for human losses and delayed evacuation were analyzed by reviewing various reports published after GEJET.

30. Effectiveness of Structural Measures Structural measures proved to be effective & protected lives in areas Hirono, Iwate Fudai, Iwate • City located far from the coast was protected by the gate. • Coastal levee (T.P.+12.0m）was higher than the tsunami height (tsunami run-up height T.P.+9.5m) Town center No inundation Inundated area Fudai Gate Fudai Gate Levee height T.P.+12.0m Inundation height near the gate T.P.+22.6m Estimated overflow depth 7.2m Gate height T.P.+15.5m Tsunami height T.P.+9.5m Source: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake Upstream of the gate

31. Immediaterecognition of necessity to evacuate About half of the people who survived tsunami evacuated immediately after the earthquake. Did not evacuate (already in safe area) Evacuated only after noticing that tsunami was approaching Evacuated after completing other actions Immediately evacuated Timing of Evacuation Source: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake

32. Findings • Many of the people that didn’t immediately evacuate were out of their homes. Instead of evacuating they went back home or went out to look for their families. • The disaster occurred during the day time when family members were scattered. People worried about the safety of their family and moved immediately to get together with their family members. • People who evacuated only after noticing that tsunami was approaching didn’t evacuate immediately because “tsunami didn’t occur in past earthquakes” or “tsunami never came up to their mind” • In Miyagi, about half of the people survived thought tsunami wouldn’t come or didn’t think about tsunami. Only 4% had seen tsunami hazard maps.

33. School Children Very small human loss rate in ages of 5 to 14 Source: ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake ※2: Survey Research Center “宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート” May 2011

34. Evacuation Communication • Average time required to obtain tsunami warning or advisory was 16.4 minutes. • In tsunami prone areas 13% did not know that tsunami warning was announced. • Many of usual communication methods became inaccessible due to power outage, overwhelmed phone lines, etc • Underestimated preliminary forecast was misinterpreted as “safe”. • Due to power outage, updated information was not accessible. • In average it took 17 minutes to begin evacuation. Almost 80% evacuated with others, 53% with their family members. • Among people who heard evacuation warnings clearly from disaster management radio, 70 to 80% felt the necessity to evacuate. • Many people lost their lives while convincing or guiding other people to evacuate, including over 300 fire and disaster department staffs, fire fighters and police officers delivering evacuation warnings or guiding evacuation.

35. Obstacles • Among those who evacuated from tsunami in Miyagi, 60.8% evacuated from the primary evacuation shelter to the next. Among them 55.5% said the first shelter was stricken by tsunami. • For most people the primary evacuation shelter was “publicly designated shelter such as community centers and schools”. About 40% moved further to evacuate to higher elevation or safer facilities • 60% evacuated by cars and 1/3 were caught in traffic. • Many used cars because they thought otherwise they wouldn’t make it, or they wanted to evacuate with family members. • In Miyagi, many people older than 60 or women used cars. Among those caught in traffic, only 7.3% changed the mean of transportation. • In 11 cities of Iwate prefecture 48 evacuation shelters out of 411 were inundated. • In Onagawa Town, reinforced concrete buildings often used as evacuation shelters were collapsed from the foundation. City Gymnasium was a designated evacuation center but was inundated to 14m depth. 100 persons evacuated to this facility and most of them lost their lives.

36. Summary • Risk or danger of tsunami and necessity to evacuate not recognized by all people. • Many prioritized actions to search for their family members over evacuation. • Disaster education in schools proved very effective. • Accurate and most up-to-date tsunami warning information was not accessible for many people due to power outage, etc. • Underestimated preliminary forecast lead to misconception that it is “safe”. • Evacuation warnings and evacuation advices by neighbors and families triggered evacuation actions for many people. • Use of cars during evacuation caused traffic congestion and many got trapped. • Pre-installed tsunami emergency routes in schools proved very effective. • Safety (location & structural) of evacuation shelters was insufficient in some sases • Many evacuated to safer location regardless of the designated shelters. • Human losses vary depending on the PHYSICAL SETTINGS AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS Of the communities

37. Assessment of Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (AIRDR) • First systematic and critical global assessment of published research on disaster risk • Provide a baseline • Use to identify and support longer-term science agenda • Provide scientific evidentiary basis in support of policy and practice

38. Science Committee

39. IRDR Legacy • An enhanced capacity around the world to address hazards and make informed decisions on actions to reduce their impacts. • Societies to shift focus from response-recovery towards prevention-mitigation, building resilience and reducing risks, learning from experience and avoiding past mistakes.

40. Thanks • Djillali Benouar • Junko Sagara • IRDR Japan • FORIN Working Group

41. Thank you www.irdrinternational.org jane.rovins@irdrinternational.org