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Single Sign-On Solutions. Nicole Harris. Programme Manager – JISC. Thanks. To Brian Gilmore, who provided much of the material for these slides! JISC report can be found at: http://www.jisc.ac.uk/uploaded_documents/CMSS-Gilmore.pdf .
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Single Sign-On Solutions Nicole Harris Programme Manager – JISC
Thanks • To Brian Gilmore, who provided much of the material for these slides! • JISC report can be found at: • http://www.jisc.ac.uk/uploaded_documents/CMSS-Gilmore.pdf. • Disclaimer: speaker has no direct experience of implementing SSO solutions! • Questions via the WIKI please: • federation.pbwiki.com • Login: shibboleth
Corporate Services - Login The Problem Other External Services -Login ATHENS -Login WIZARD eFinancials etc ESP -Login Staffmail -Login WebCT/ EEMEC -Login E-Diary -Login PC Login School Web Site - Login • College Intranet • Login
What is Single Sign-On? • Used to refer to many different approaches, such as: • LDAP look-up; • Shared name / password; • One sign-on, one database.
Approaches to Single Sign-On • LDAP Look-Up: • A number of sites claim they have single sign-on by having a single LDAP database which a number of services access. • Not true SSO as the user is challenged individually by each service. • Shared Name / Password: • Multiple, separate name/pass stores, possibly with synchronisation; • User experience may be the same as true SSO; • But, higher risk, different security levels, compromise one equals compromise on all, possibility of unencrypted passwords in system and/or across the network. • True Single Sign-On: • There is a single, well protected, store of user names & passwords • Interrogated by multiple services • User enters (particular) credentials once, and only once • Consistent, overall timeout can be applied – how long is an issue!
Do We Want SSO? • If a user is compromised then all the resources open to that user are compromised. • Important to consider a Risk Analysis to determine the balance between usability and security.
Potential Sign-On Model • Sign-on at 3 distinct levels: • External Network Logon • ‘Normal’ Internal level • ‘High Risk’ Areas • Can be other models! • Federated Access Management concentrates on web-based resources, although successful trials with network level access.
Pre-requisites for SSO • You have to know who *all* your users are. • SSO implies automation, therefore ‘special cases’ are a problem: • Students • Staff • Alumni • ‘Others’ • ‘Others’ problem area: • Casual staff visitor to a department • External Uni PhD students working in your institution • Medical staff who teach • Retired staff casually still working in a department • Refers to ‘stage two’ in the JISC Roadmap document!
JISC Web-Based SSO Study - 2004 • Note that carried out in 2004 – looking to update. • Systems evaluated: • CAS (Yale) • Pubcookie (Washington) • WebAuth (Stanford) • Cosign (Michigan) • KX.509 (Michigan) • Systems not fully evaluated: • A-Select (not fully) • Shibboleth as an SSO (not at all)
JISC Project Experience • CAS: LSIP at Liverpool • http://www.liv.ac.uk/LSIP/Documentation/ImplementationofYaleCASSSO.html • Pubcookie: IAMSECT at Newcastle • http://iamsect.ncl.ac.uk/deliverables/docs/shib_install/ • Webauth: SPIE at Oxford • http://spie.oucs.ox.ac.uk/Wiki.jsp?page=Outputs • Cosign: AMIE at Edinburgh • www.ucs.ed.ac.uk/projects/amie • A-Select: • No existing UK experience (to the knowledge of JISC and Google)
Edinburgh in Focus • Decided to implement Cosign • Strong links with kerberos (strong linux presence) • Liked the support • No single-point of failure • But no IIS support (yet) • 29 services now covered by SSO • 23 services not covered • 6 of them soon! • Individual machines • Departmental services • Commercial Packages • Takes time and significant buy-in from depts etc
Reflections from Edinburgh • Implementing a SSO system is loved by the users • Which system, original SSO or Shibboleth will depend upon your circumstances • You really do need to know who all your users are!