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Multi-Track Diplomacy: Seen Through the Eyes of the Practitioner

The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, the Africa Program and the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Present:. Multi-Track Diplomacy: Seen Through the Eyes of the Practitioner. Preparing the Multi-Track Diplomacy:

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Multi-Track Diplomacy: Seen Through the Eyes of the Practitioner

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  1. The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, the Africa Program and the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Present: Multi-Track Diplomacy: Seen Through the Eyes of the Practitioner Preparing the Multi-Track Diplomacy: Building Stones for a Peaceful Israeli-Palestinian Two-State Solution – Lessons Learned from the 2003-2009 Experience by Yair Hirschfeld University of Haifa and Economic Cooperation Foundation, Tel Aviv

  2. Employing the Tools of Multi-Track Diplomacy in Support of an Israeli-Palestinian Two State Solution

  3. The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, the Africa Program and the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Present: Multi-Track Diplomacy: Seen Through the Eyes of the Practitioner Challenges and Dilemmas in Pursuing Public Diplomacy byJerry White Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State

  4. Conflict & Stabilization Operations (CSO) Strategic Framework Diagram Mandate: The Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO) was created in November 2011 to serve as an institutional focal point for the U.S. Department of State on conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization. The Assistant Secretary serves as the senior conflict advisor to the Secretary of State. Mission We break cycles of violent conflict and mitigate crises in priority countries Method We mobilize partners and leverage resources for governments and their citizens to address the causes of destabilizing violence. We focus operations in countries where we can demonstrate measurable results within twelve months. Agility with Impact: Innovative. Fast. Responsive. Results-Driven. RESEARCH & ANALYSIS Drive local analysis that shifts conversation about how to address causes of conflict STRATEGIC PLANNING Design rapid-response strategies and results-driven interagency plans COORDINATED ACTION Mobilize partners in and outside of government to build local coalitions across social divides CATALYTIC CHANGE Promote policies and practices that reduce violence and increase community resilience

  5. Our Mission To break cycles of violent conflict & mitigate crises in priority countries SYSTEMIC CHANGE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS STRATEGIC PLANNING COALITION DEVELOPMENT Our Method: Agility with Impact “Script” “Cast” “Perform” Theory of Change Reframe the Narrative Expand the Community Share the Benefits Bottom-Up (individuals) Middle Out (organizations) Top Down (govt/policymakers)

  6. Alignment for Transformational Diplomacy BEING Who We Are (Values-Principles) SEEING How We Work (Systemic Causes) DOING What We Know (Technical Solutions) Knowledge Understanding WISDOM

  7. The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, the Africa Program and the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Present: Multi-Track Diplomacy: Seen Through the Eyes of the Practitioner The Tools of Economic Statecraft in Supporting Palestinian State-Building by NorrinRipsman Concordia University and Northern Illinois University

  8. Economic Statecraft in Support of Palestinian Statebuilding (in Support of Peacemaking): Guidelines, Challenges and Dilemmas Norrin M. Ripsman Concordia University/Northern Illinois University

  9. Based on a study of successful peace agreements between regional rivals, I have concluded: * That peacemaking begins with states, rather than societies. * States make peace to secure their power positions, to fight more threatening adversaries, or when pressed by great powers. * Societies are often hostile to peacemaking and may be brought on board after an agreement is reached

  10. Why Peacemaking Requires States 1) States are more pragmatic and flexible than societies 2) States have access to the instruments of policy; societies do not. 3) Well-institutionalized states have access to the resources and policy instruments to help socialize a peace settlement after the fact.

  11. The Implication: Peace between Israel and the Palestinians may require a well-institutionalized Palestinian state apparatus (a strengthened PNA) to overcome Palestinian societal hostility toward Israel. (Caveat: Well-institutionalized state is necessary, but not sufficient) I will discuss the prospects and pitfalls of using economic statecraft to achieve this end.

  12. What is Economic Statecraft? Broadly speaking, it refers to the use of economic leverage by a state, group of states, or IO to extract policy concessions from a target state or entity. 1) economic incentives (the exchange of economic rewards – foreign aid, preferential market access, etc. – for a policy payoff; or 2) economic sanctions (the interruption of normal economic relations, or the threat thereof, to compel a policy payoff.

  13. Economic aid to the PNA could enable it to: * Reward individuals who support the peacemaking endeavor; * Improve the standard of living for Palestinians in general, which may reduce desperation and create vested interests in stability (PPP); * Compete with Hamas as a welfare-providing institution. * Bolster its internal security capability, which would enhance stability.

  14. Caveats: * This aid should flow directly to the PNA, rather to the population, since the purpose is state-building, rather than merely economic assistance (eco. gains as a basis of PNA legitimacy); * Economic aid should be concentrated on development (building infrastructure and creating the capacity to build exports) in order to build the PNA’s long-term legitimacy and capacity; * Some of this aid should not be exclusively economic, but should be geared at bolstering the institutions of state, esp. internal security apparatus.

  15. Caveats: * Aid must be linked to progress toward a peace agreement with Israel (although not publicly), and demands must be incremental, rather than excessive.

  16. Risks of Economic Aid to PNA: * It could alleviate economic pressure to reach a peace settlement; * If it is overt and directly linked to peacemaking, it could make the PNA look like a tool of the US/the West and consequently backfire ; * It could be used to purchase military goods, which would promote conflict. * It could be seen as rewarding intransigence.

  17. Conclusions: * If done properly, economic statecraft can play an important role in Palestinian statebuilding in the service of peacemaking. * Risks exist, but can be managed if aid is monitored carefully (to be sure that it is not diverted to military purposes) and re-evaluated on a regular basis, and if linkage is made privately, rather than publicly. * Linking it to incremental progress on peacemaking can avoid unrealistic expectations and overcome objections in the donor public that aid is undeserved.

  18. The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, the Africa Program and the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Thank You

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