Latin American Panel November 1, 2011

1. Latin American PanelNovember 1, 2011 UPDATE ON PIRACY JOSEPH ANGELO MANAGING DIRECTOR

2. PIRACY - Somalia • 2009 Statistics (IMB) - 217 attempted incidents - 114 fired upon - 1 boarded (not hijacked) - 47 hijackings (21% of incidents) • 2010 Statistics (IMB) - 219 attempted incidents - 100 fired upon - 16 boarded (not hijacked) - 49 hijackings (22% of incidents)

3. PIRACY - Somalia Most recent 2011 statistics (21 Oct) • 208 incidents • 24 hijackings (12% of incidents) • 400 seafarers taken hostage • Currently 13 vessels and 249 seafarers being held hostage

4. TRANSIT PATTERNS • N / S transit of Arabian Sea vessels keeping ever further East – running out of Ocean! • Many vessel now transiting up the 200m contour of the Coast

5. 2010 vs. 2011 Piracy Incidents 27% (88 v. 121) Piracy Success Rate 11% Merchant Aversion Rate Rising above 60% GOA Activity 38% SP Success Rate 0% -- 0 Hijacks in ’11 -- Arabian Sea Activity 5-fold Hijacks 4-fold - Extended Mother-Ship Ops - Somali Basin Activity 5% SP Success Rate 83% NE Monsoon SW Monsoon Transition Period JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG Operation Ocean Shield Situation & Statistics • Cooperation With Industry • Armed Security Teams (very effective) • BMP Compliance / Self-Defense Ability • Info-Sharing (NATO Shipping Center Web) • Revised Best Management Practices (BMP4) DEFENSE in DEPTH NATO/EU/CMF COORD BOARD OP KETTING • International Integration • UN CGPCS, SHADE, TRADE (130+ nations) • NATO Cooperation with PRC, RF, RoK • NATO’s MPRA Deployments; French AWACs • Focus on engagement w/ India, RSA • 2011 $85 mil • 2010 $90 mil Released Hijacked

6. NATO Focused Operations • Deny pirates freedom to maneuver and deploy • Part of the combined planning for the Somali Basin • Desired effects: • Short to medium term: LIMIT the ability to deploy to their area of operation (AOO) through disruption • Long term: deny the ‘safe haven’ status of pirates operating bases.

7. FOCUSED OPS MAY/JUN Current Assessment for next transition period Yemen Last focussed ops effect: • Pirate freedom of manuever to deploy disrupted. • Pirate seasonal tempo broken. Pirate’s evolvement: • Logistic build-up dispersed. • Use of forward operating bases. • Use of North Arabian Sea and Eastern African Approaches as Hunting Ground. • In this area, BMP not followed and perhaps not perceived as a high risk area by Merchant Community. Somalia

8. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS • Military assessment is Somali pirates will resume a high level of operations when the southwest monsoon subsides in September and corresponding seas become conducive for small boat operations • Reports that pirates are now banding together in some areas in large numbers to attack vessels in ‘swarms’

9. OVERALL PHILOSOPHY • Eliminating piracy is a SHARED RESPONSIBILITY between the maritime industry and governments, BUT, • Establishment of LAW AND ORDER on the high seas is the responsibility of governments

10. INTERTANKO FOCUS • Actions members can take to protect themselves • Actions we want governments to take to protect our members

11. FOCUS AREAS - INDUSTRY • Best Management Practices (BMP) • Citadels • Armed guards

12. BMP Three essential requirements that cannot be over emphasized: • Register with MSCHOA • Report to UKMTO • Implement Self Protection Measures

13. BMP4 • Produced in consultation with EUNAVFOR, the NATO Shipping Centre, MSCHOA and UKMTO • Very close cooperation with all military players in the BMP4 revision • Funded by Industry and available free of charge

14. BMP4 • Released August 15, 2011 (BMP3 issued 6/2010) • Updates in BMP4 include: - Revision to the boundaries of the High Risk Area - Clarification of reporting requirements for MSCHOA and UKMTO - New subsection on “Prosecution of Pirates – Assisting Law Enforcement Authorities”, produced with INTERPOL - Guidance on the assistance provided by INTERPOL. - New section on Armed Private Maritime Security Contractors

15. COMPLIANCE WITH BMP • MSCHOA – currently issuing regular Monthly Compliance Report to Industry • Report lists vessels which are not compliant with BMP by either: 1. not Registering with MSCHOA 2. not Reporting to UKMTO 3. having no visible self protection measures

16. COMPLIANCE WITH BMP Industry is responding by: • Contacting Shipping Companies on list • Emphasising need for compliance with BMP, in particular the 3 major elements in order to harden a vessel against attack • Urging compliance even if armed guards are being carried • Requesting feed-back as to why vessels are not complying • Offering advice and support

17. CITADELS • Since January 2010 there have been 27 recorded incidents of citadels being used by merchant crews under attack • Reporting suggests that the citadel was decisive in foiling 23 of these attacks • For 4, not all in citadel and/or no 2-way coms • Pirates developing tactics to breach citadels • Advise issued by the military regarding the use of CITADELS on MSCHOA web site

18. CITADELS Key essential elements if citadels are to be used: • Everyone on the ship must be in the citadel • Must have self-contained, 2 way communication capabilities in the citadel • Pirates must be denied access to propulsion • Must have food and water provisions for 3 days minimum • Use of a citadel does NOT guarantee a military response

19. CITADELS Industry developed guidance on citadels • Describes the construction and use of a Citadel in order to provide effective protection against determined intrusion • Guidance does not recommend or endorse the use of a Citadel; aim to present the relevant facts to enable the Ship Owner/Operator to reach a reasoned conclusion as to whether or not to utilise a Citadel • Guidance has been approved by NATO, EUNAFOR and CMF and will be available on their web sites

20. ARMED GUARDS • 30+ recorded incidents where onboard armed security teams were involved • No recorded incidents of vessels with onboard armed security teams being pirated • Military report use of armed guards rising • If embarked, military request it is reported • Military position – decision between shipowners and flag state

21. ARMED GUARDS Major concerns • Legality for flag states and port states • Serious potential safety concerns • Major liability and insurance issues in the event of death or injury • Risk of collateral damage • Potential to provoke an escalation of fire power by the pirates (now using RPGs)

22. ARMED GUARDS INTERTANKO position regarding the use of armed guards • INTERTANKO believes it is the responsibility of the international navies to ensure the right of free passage on the high seas including the use of vessel protection detachments on merchant ships • INTERTANKO does not advocate the arming ships' crews • INTERTANKO believes that the use of private armed guards or private security forces onboard merchant ships has to be a matter for each individual owner or manager to assess as part of their own voyage risk assessment

23. ARMED GUARDS • Recognition of a need for Industry guidance • May 2011 – Industry produces a set of Draft Guidelines for the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel • Submitted draft guidelines to IMO Maritime Safety Committee for consideration • MSC adopts interim guidance

24. ARMED GUARDS IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 89) • MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Ship Masters on the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area • MSC.1/Circ.1406 – Interim Recommendations for Flag States regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area

25. ARMED GUARDS MSC Maritime Security WG – Sept 2011 • Revised MSC.1/Circ.1405 and MSC.1/Circ.1406 • Developed MSC.1/Circ.1408 – Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area

26. FOCUS AREAS - GOVTS • Increased "Government Will" to eradicate piracy off Somalia • Cease the use of mother ships • Increased prosecution of convicted pirates • Increased naval assets in the region • Increased public awareness to drive the desired increase in "Government Will“ • Action to address the root cause of piracy ashore in Somalia

27. MOTHERSHIPS • Mother ships give the pirates operational range, duration and tactical use of hostages in almost the entire Indian Ocean • Motherships must be controlled/immobilised • Major concern is reprisals against crew held hostage on motherships • Controlling /immobilising action on the high seas is preferred • It is for the military to decide on the nature of the action and for politicians to indicate their acceptance of the need for action to be taken.

28. PROSECUTION • Few countries involved in counter-piracy activity have "conspiracy to commit piracy" on their statute books • For others, carrying fire arms, grappling hooks, ladders, etc. is not a criminal offence on the high seas • Capture and release policy has no effect upon piracy • All countries must increase prosecutorial action

29. ASSETS Currently about 30 assets in the region • European Union established an EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta • Combined Maritime Force established CTF 151 • China, India, Malaysia, Rep of Korea, Russia and others • Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) For one hour response time – 83 warships How long will the assets remain???

30. CONVOY ESCORT PROGRAM • Pilot project initiated by insurance industry • 18 assets to provide convoy service in IRTC • Assets under flag of legitimacy • Under tactical command of military • $27 million initial start-up costs (EU funded?) • Average cost for transit $27,500 for three days escort • Cost neutral for industry – would include 7 day War Risk Additional Premium and Kidnap/Ransom Insurance • Some concerns raised - would military assets remain in the region?? - should industry pay for eradication of piracy?? - is CEP cost-effective - legal implications related to international/territorial waters • INTERTANKO Council does not support CEP

31. SOS CAMPAIGN • SaveOurSeafarers (SOS) campaign initiated by INTERTANKO. Joined by BIMCO, ICS, ITF and INTERCARGO • Contracted with PR firm to increase public, business and government awareness • Phase One – - Ad in Financial Times and World Street Journal - www.SaveOurSeafarers.com web site - Letters to UN SG, Heads of State and EU President - Interviews with press and news media - Press releases after incidents

34. SOS CAMPAIGN • Phase Two – - Social media (Blog, Twitter, Facebook, etc) - Actively engage policy makers - Further ads, press releases and interviews - Seek high profile name to assist in cause • Wider industry involvement, now includes support from 28 maritime associations/organizations • Steering committee established to brainstorm ideas, prioritize work items and manage budget

35. RESULTS Results, thus far – • 75,000+ visits to SOS website • From 180 countries • 23,000+ letters sent in 86 countries • 4,100+ Facebook fans and 750+ followers on Twitter

36. FINAL THOUGHTS • Register with MSCHOA • Report ship position to UKMTO • Utilize the Best Management Practices • Employ Self Protective Measures • Encourage your staff (ashore and on your ships) to visit the SOS web site and send the letters

37. MILLE GRAZIE!! WWW.INTERTANKO.COM