SURPRISE, SECRECY, AND DECEPTION

1. SURPRISE, SECRECY, ANDDECEPTION Topic #12

2. Preface: Dilbert on Tactical Warning

3. Surprise Attack • Nations are often surprised and/or successfully deceived in international relations. • German Strike in the West, May 1940 • German Strike in East, June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa) • Pearl Harbor, December 1941 • Korea War • North Korean invasion of South, June 1950 • Inchon Landings, September 1950 • Chinese intervention, November 1950 • Cuban Missile Crisis • SU surprised US prior to October 14, 1962 • US surprised SU on October 22, 1962 • Israeli pre-emptive attack on Egyptian Air Force, Six-Day Way • Egyptian attack on Israeli forces at Suez Canal, Yom Kippur War • Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, August 1990 • 9/11 attacks on US

4. “Signals vs. Noise” • Why do surprise attacks (etc.) so often succeed? • A few “signals” are buried in a lot of “noise.” • Signals : in this context, bits of information giving advance indications about an upcoming attack (or other surprise). • Noise (or static): the much more numerous bits of information that are essentially random or meaningless, in any case • are not advance indications of anything unusual or threatening. • Signal are typically (and “naturally”) hidden in or camouflaged by noise.

5. Kermit Tyler: RIP 1913-02/24/2010

6. Signals, Noise, and Expectations • Because of noise, a variety of expectations about the immediate future are plausible, and • usually the most plausible one is that the immediate future will be the same as the present (and recent past). • Decision makers usually have premises/predispositions/mind sets) that lead them to overlook signals inconsistent with the most plausible expectation. • It is difficult to “look at evidence with an open mind,” • vs. “the doctrine of immaculate perception.” • “Things must be believed to be seen [quickly].”

7. Signals, Noise, and Expectations (cont.) • US before Pearl Harbor: “Japan would be crazy to directly tangle with the U.S.” • SU before Barbarosa: “We have a non-aggregation with Germany – and Germany’s main lesson from WWI was: don’t get into a two-front war.” • US before Chinese intervention in Korea: “The Communist regime needs time to consolidate its rule.” • US before Missile Crisis: “SU would not run the risk of stationing nuclear weapons outside of the SU.” • Also Cuban refugee reports had been “crying wolf” for months. • Such expectations sometimes work the other way. • US in Vietnam: “China intervened unexpectedly in Korea – they may do the same in Vietnam.”

8. Signals, Noise, and Expectations (cont.) • The “signals vs. noise” distinction can also work in the opposite fashion. • What might be interpreted as signals of hostile intent may really just be meaningless noise. • In the middle of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a US U2 spy plane accidently overflew the Chukotka Peninsula (eastern Siberia). • This can lead to “self-fulfilling prophecy” of hostile intent. • “The Spiral Model” • Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August [origins of WWI] • Rationale for “appeasement” prior to WWII. • Historical controversy regarding origins of the Cold War. • Stable vs. Unstable Nuclear Deterrence. • “War-by-Accident” scenarios: Failsafe, Dr. Strangelove. • Schelling, Arms and Influence, Chapter 6 (“The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm”)

9. Warning and Decision • In summary, it is hard to pick signals out of noise (to “connect the dots”) in advance, • though it may be easy to identify and connect them later. • And, on the whole, a false sense of security is more prevalent than a false sense of insecurity. • To avoid spiral model: “look ahead and reason back” thinking of ExCom in Cuban Missile Crisis.

10. Secrecy • We saw earlier that a player may have (though does not always have) an incentive to keep his strategy (plan of action) secret from the other player, • particularly in a non-strictly determined zero-sum game. • In the D-Day Game, the Allies wanted to deceive the Germans as to where the invasion would take place and therefore needed to keep their actual plans secret. • In a Chicken Game, a player may be ostensibly committed to a “stand firm” strategy, • but if this really is a bluff, this fact must be kept secret. • So while there is tendency toward “natural deception” resulting from the signal vs. noise distinction, there are also incentives for “artificial [player-made] deception” as well, • that is, to “damp down” signals indicative of their intentions.

11. “Signals vs. Indices” • Another pair of concepts is relevant to consideration of secrecy and deception. • “Signals” vs. “Indices,” • due to Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in IR. • Unfortunately, the term “signal” is used here in a somewhat different sense from the “signals vs. noise” distinction. • Signals and Indices are both means that can be used by a player (an “actor” in IR) to project an image of itself that induces preferred perceptions and actions by other players.

12. Signals • A signal is conveyed by words, actions, or other communi-cations the meaning of which is established by convention, i.e., • tactic or explicit understandings among players. • In game theory, signals are now commonly referred to as “cheap talk,” • because it is as easy project a false image when using signals as it is to project a true image. • Examples of signals in IR include: • “words” such as public speeches and messages, diplomatic notes, press releases, confidential messages sent through intermediaries, etc., and • routine “actions” such as expelling diplomatic personnel, extending or breaking diplomatic relations, good will visits, conspicuous military maneuvers, etc.

13. Indices • An index is a statement or action that carries with it some inherent evidence that the projected image is a true one, • because the index is believed to be inextricably linked to the capabilities and/or intentions of the actor. • Example of indices in IR include: • intercepted private messages; • major actions involving high costs or risk, e.g., • putting US soldiers in West Berlin or South Korea, • putting a US Navy “quarantine” around Cuba. • Homely examples of signal vs. index: • in driving, turn signal vs. slowing down/shifting lanes, etc. • pitcher’s mannerisms indicating next pitch.

14. Indices Can Evolve into Signals • Do “actions speak louder [have more credibility] than words”? • Deeds/indices may evolve into mere signals, • e.g., car with hood up; • expelling diplomatic personnel, etc. • Using signals, it is as easy to lie as to tell the truth. • Using indices, it is harder to lie than tell the truth, • but it is not impossible, and so • indices may be manipulated.

15. Signals Can Evolve into Indices • In some contexts, what would be otherwise be a mere signal becomes an index, • especially in the context of “repeated play” of a game: in particular • because the actor has an established reputation for telling the truth (even in awkward circumstances), or • because the actor would be subject to severe social or other penalties for being found out as lying. • This is exemplified within established (and non-“dysfunctional”) families, work groups, academic departments, circles of friends, etc.

16. Lying vs. Deceiving • Using signals, it as easy to lie as to tell the truth. • This does not mean that it easy to deceive using signals, • precisely because others recognize that you may have an incentive to lie and it is easy to do so. • An actor cannot deceive by signals, if he has a reputation for lying. • Moreover, an actor cannot tell the truth and be believed by signals ,if he has a reputation for lying. • “The boy who cried wolf”: • Repeated false fire alarms, etc. • If you want to be believed in the future, “honesty is the best policy” for the present. • But also, if you want to deceive in the future, “honesty is the best policy” for the present.

17. Lying vs. Deceiving (cont.) • Games with “incomplete information”: • Players don’t know each others payoffs/preferences. • You suspect someone A is lying and trying to deceive you. • A may be either of two “types”: • someone who wants to tell you the truth, or • someone who is trying deceive you. • You ask A: “Are you telling the truth?” • A’s answer is uninformative, because A’s best reply (answer) will be the same (“yes”) regardless of his type. • However, asking this question may produce somewhat informative indices. • mannerisms, evident tension, embarrassment, etc. • polygraph tests. • “A diplomat is a man who's sent abroad to lie for his country.” • JFK/Gromyko talks, October 18, 1962

18. Indices and Intelligence • Especially good indices of A’s intentions are intercepted and decoded signals among members of A’s “team.” • They are playing among themselves a zero-conflict coordination game in which there is no incentive to lie. • If B can intercept and decode A’s internal signals, B can get a big advantage. • Baseball signals (coded vs. uncoded) • MAGIC (disclosed 1960) • Enigma Machine / Ultra-Secret (disclosed 1974) • Venona Project (disclosed 1995). • Radio phones (vs. runners, etc.) on battlefield • Navajo Code Talkers (disclosed 1985)

19. Using Secret Intelligence • Breaking an enemy code • may seem to present marvelous opportunities, but • it also generates many paradoxes, dilemmas, and risks requiring strategic choices. • Having broken the codes, what do you do? • Keep the fact that you have broken the code secret. • The is the purest kind of national security “ultra-secret.” • What must be kept secret from the enemy is not his decoded messages but the fact that you can read them. • If the enemy discovers you have broken his codes, his most obvious (though not necessarily best) response is to change his codes. • So you cannot disclose your achievement publically • U-571 movie (fictionalized): • A few weeks before D-Day, US forces capture a U-boat with its Enigma Machine and codes intact. • The US forces almost wish they had not done this. • They have to keep secret from the Germans the fact that the U-Boat was captured, not sent to the bottom, or else the Germans are likely to change their codes just before D-Day.

20. Using Secret Intelligence (cont.) • You must keep the fact that you have broken the code secret • and also the intelligence derived thereby, • not only from the press and public, • but also almost everyone in the government. • For example, the MAGIC decrypts were distributed • to only about a dozen people • only in Washington, and • they were then shredded and burned. • This made it hard to see broad patterns and to “connect the dots.”

21. Using Secret Intelligence (cont.) • Even if you do not (deliberately or in advertently) disclose your intelligence coup, • if you make “too good” use of the intercepted messages, • your enemy will conclude that you must have broken his code, and therefore either • will change his code, or • send deceptive messages using the old code (see =>). • So you probably should not exploit the intelligence as fully as you might. • You need to continue to make “normal mistakes” in order not to arouse suspicion. • But down the road, this may produce “Monday morning quarterbacking.” • Controversy and recriminations regarding bombing of Coventry, England, November 14, 1940. • Ditto some Merchant Marine convoys. • Cuban Missile Crisis: great effort to maintain normal routines prior to October 22.

22. Deception: The Man Who Never Was • After clearing German forces from North Africa, the most obvious next Allied target was Sicily – a stepping-stone to Italy. • But the Allies wanted to convince the Germans that Sardinia and Crete were the next targets, • so the Germans would defend Sicily less strongly. • Allied intelligence planted fake documents and identity papers on a body floated ashore in Spain. • German found the documents and evidently believed them, and therefore interpreted Allied preparations to invade Sicily (which could not be hidden) as an attempted deception.

23. Deception (cont.) • The Allies had an intelligence network in occupied Holland. • The Germans got control of this network. • The Allies discovered that their network was actually under German control. • The Allies put naïve allied agents into Holland, • with orders to get information about German forces in the Calais area, • which the Germans would interpret as more evidence that the D-Day landings would be in Calais.

24. Cycles of Deception: Interception • Suppose your opponent learns that you have broken his codes and are intercepting his messages, and he believes (correctly) that you don’t know this. • Now your opponent has his own “ultra-secret.” • Since you regard intercepted messages as highly credible indices, your opponent can now turn the tables on you. • While your opponent can merely change his codes, • he can also start generating out deceptive coded messages. • But again they cannot exploit this opportunity “too much,” because • you will figure out • that they have found out • that you have broken their codes • and you will therefore no longer believe their coded messages.

25. Cycles of Deception: Double (etc.) Agents • A has an agent X spying on B • B “finds out” that X is an enemy agent • B can arrest X but also • B can (try to) “turn” the agent into a “double agent” feeding (partially) false messages to A through X. • If A finds out his agent has been turned, • A will discount all the information coming from X, but • A should stay in contact with X, because it is useful for A to know what B wants A to believe. • But if B finds out that A knows X has been “turned,” B can feed true information though X, expecting that B will discount it.

26. Cycles of Deception: Double (etc.) Agents (cont.) • Jervis, Logic of Images: in WWII there was a French colonel in Algeria working as a German agent. • The Allied discovered he was a German agent. • The Allied “turned him” and used him to feed false information to the Germans. • After a while, the Germans figured out he had been turned. • The Germans kept in contact with him, because it was useful for them to know what the Allies wanted them to believe. • Shortly before D-Day, the Allies discovered that the Germans knew the colonel had been turned. • The Allies had the colonel tell the Germans that the D-Day landings would take place at Normandy on June 5, 6, or 7. • To the Germans, this was conclusive proof that the landings would take anywhere except Normandy and any time except June 5-7. • On June 7, the colonel’s credibility shot up with Germans. • The Allies to resumed feeding false information through the colonel.

27. The Double-Cross System • In the early days of WWII, British (counter) intelligence identified (many) German agents in Britain. • Rather than arresting these agents, the “Twenty Committee” “turned” and “ran” these agents. • This had to be very carefully orchestrated, so the German would not realize their agents had been turned. • The Double-Cross System had to feed some true and useful information to the Germans. • This obviously created difficult relationships with Allied military decision makers.

28. The Double-Cross System (cont.) • The XX Committee “ran” the system conservatively, because they expected the Germans to check information from Double-Cross agents against information from other agents not under British control. • In fact, after the war it was discovered that the Double-Cross System controlled all German agents in Britain. • Once the XX Committee deliberately ran an agent to show that he was under British control, • in order the give German intelligence a false impression of how the British would run double-agents. • But the Germans continued to regard the agent as reliable. • The XX Committee “shot its wad” leading up to D-Day, but the Double-Cross System still didn’t collapse.

29. The Double-Cross System (cont.) • Some ironies: • The success of the Double-Cross System and similar deception operations gave the Allies a large stake in the influence of German intelligence on German decision making. • But Hitler made the final choices, • and did so more on the basis of intuition than intelligence. • The Allies were fearful that defectors from German intelligence would inform the Allies about German agents in Britain, • whom the Germans would then expect to be arrested and put out of commission..

30. A Bodyguard of Lies • In war-time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies. Winston Churchill • Virtually all Allied deception efforts built up for the great (tactical) deception for D-Day. • That it would occur later rather than sooner. • That it would be in the Calais area, not Normandy. • That after a first attack, the main blow would be elsewhere. • Some forces were identified as landing in Normandy (as they did). • An entire “phantom” 3rd Army was built up in southeast England.