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Kevin Smith (BAE Systems) Brian Spedding (QinetiQ)

21 ISMOR: The Use of Objective Analysis for the Prioritisation of UK Equipment Plan Options for TST. Kevin Smith (BAE Systems) Brian Spedding (QinetiQ). Presentation Structure. Time Sensitive Targeting - the military task Analysis Challenge Assessment of Baseline military capability

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Kevin Smith (BAE Systems) Brian Spedding (QinetiQ)

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  1. 21 ISMOR:The Use of Objective Analysis for the Prioritisation of UK Equipment Plan Options for TST Kevin Smith (BAE Systems) Brian Spedding (QinetiQ)

  2. Presentation Structure • Time Sensitive Targeting - the military task • Analysis Challenge • Assessment of Baseline military capability • Assessment of Enhancement Options • Critique of Approach • strengths & weaknesses • opportunities

  3. Time-Sensitive Targeting:the Military Task

  4. Time Sensitive Targets Those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a serious and imminent threat to friendly forces or are high payoff, fleeting targets of opportunity

  5. Imminent Threat TST Categories TST Examples • Limited window of vulnerability • Enemy Forces in transit • Aircraft refuelling/rearming • TBM in launch position • Surface-Air defences • TBM operations • “Terrorist in a Taxi” • Aircraft on the ground • Helicopter FOB • High pay-off • Limited window of opportunity • HQs/command centres • Early Warning sites • Leadership targets • Target at range/endurance limit • Timely intelligence • Operational environment (weather)

  6. The Analysis Challenge

  7. Analysis Challenge • “What” do DECs need to do in order to make TST work? • assess likely performance of possible Kill Chains and impact of potential enhancements • Facilitate objective, analysis-based TST Decision Conference • Analytic definition of TST • Evaluation of UK baseline capability • Enhancement Options many and varied (aircraft sensors, C2 support tools, new comms bearers .... etc) • Assess impact of these Options in a consistent way • Within resource & timescale constraints

  8. Assessment of Baseline Military Capability

  9. CCD weather day/night tgt mobility urban environment threat (S-A & A-A) Baseline Capability Assessment- Overview of approach • “Operational Analysis in a Systems Engineering framework” Operational Requirement System Definition attack the target, in its environment, under constraints end-to-end kill chain, comprising equipment and military process, implemented as a functional chain sensitivity analysis Evaluate System against Requirement

  10. sensors C2 nodes shooters Kill Chain Elements

  11. Kill Chain Examples • Shallow Targets • IPB: Nimrod R > ASTOR > Fast Jet • IPB: Land EW > WatchKeeper > MLRS • IPB: Formation recce > Attack Helicopter • Deep Targets • IPB: Surveillance UAV > Fast Jets • IPB: Overhead > RAPTOR > Fast Jet • IPB: Special Forces > Fast Jet

  12. Level 1 - Preparation of a ‘capability map’ (traffic light analysis) using existing information - basic performance data - SME opinion Metrics: - Kill Chain element compliance - overall Kill Chain compliance - overall Kill Chain timeliness Level 1 Full Compliance Uncertain Compliance Further Analysis Required Non-Compliance Kill Chain Evaluation - Analysis Levels Level 1 Level 2 Simple probability Analysis Level 3 Constructive Simulation Level 4 Synthetic Environments (NITEworks) Level 5 Trials / Warfighting Experiments

  13. Kill Chain Functions Search/ Detect Locate Identify Assess Decide Plan/ Re-Plan Transit Acquire Disseminate Effect/Deny BDI

  14. JFACHQ-JAOC-Intell JFACHQ-JAOC- Combat Plans/Operations Nimrod-R Aircraft Nimrod-R Gnd Stat ASTOR Aircraft ASTOR Gnd Stat Tornado GR4 Target Confirmation Attack sequence Initial Target Detection Exploitation, tasking of additional information Possible Communication Decision to attack; retasking of GR4 Initial assessment of attack effectiveness Example Kill Chain - Simplified Search/ Detect Search/ Detect Search/ Detect Search/ Detect Decide Decide Assess Assess Assess Assess Plan/ Re-Plan Plan/ Re-Plan Locate Locate Locate Locate Assess Assess Identify Identify Search/ Detect Search/ Detect Decide Decide Locate Acquire Plan/ Re-Plan Plan/ Re-Plan Identify Identify Effect/Deny Effect/ Deny BDA BDI Assess Assess

  15. Detailed Kill Chain Definition Functional Definition IERs - Kill Chain Delivered and Others External to Kill Chain

  16. T1 T3 T2 T4 Overall Kill Chain time analysis including identification of critical path How long does it take for the KC to complete? Time for this part of the KC = T1+T2+Fn(T3,T4) Kill Chain Analysis – Integration NimrodR DIV HQ Nodal Performance Analysis Nodal Resource Analysis Information Identify Time Time • Solution Analysis • KC delivered IER Analysis • IPB/Background delivered IER Analysis • IER Time Analysis Assess IPB

  17. JFACHQ-JAOC-Intell JFACHQ-JAOC- Combat Plans/Operations Nimrod-R Aircraft Nimrod-R Gnd Stat ASTOR Aircraft ASTOR Gnd Stat Tornado GR4 Possible Communication Example KC Assessment Search/ Detect Search/ Detect Search/ Detect Search/ Detect Decide Decide Assess Assess Assess Assess Plan/ Re-Plan Plan/ Re-Plan Locate Locate Locate Locate Assess Assess Identify Identify Search/ Detect Search/ Detect Decide Decide Locate Locate Plan/ Re-Plan Plan/ Re-Plan Identify Identify What do we need to do to make this part work? What do we need to do to make this part work? What do we need to do to make this part work? Effect/Deny Effect/ Deny BDA BDI Assess Assess

  18. Time Budgets & delays Insight for ‘process re-engineering’ Baseline Analysis outputs - by KC, by tgt Functional deficiencies

  19. Assessment of Enhancement Options

  20. Analysis of Enhancement Options • Embedded Option in appropriate node in relevant KCs • e.g. new effector sensor • Consider Savings Measures also - buy back Re-evaluate node or link, and IER - compliance - time • Determine effect on overall Kill Chain

  21. Baseline KC now feasible, leading to more engagement opportunities plus Option “X” PRIORITY Baseline some within KC improvements SECONDARY plus Option “Y” Effect on Overall Kill Chain

  22. Baseline Kill Chain Capability Brigaded Option (A+B+C) KC 5 - Vignette 1 Kill Chain B Version 1.4 UC00001 - Updated 03 June 2003. KC 5 - Vignette 1 Kill Chain B Version 1.4 UC00001 - Updated 03 June 2003. ISTAR Co-ord DIV HQ ISTAR Co-ord DIV HQ Div Recce (UK) LCC HQ (US) 16 AAB HQ Avn Regt HQ AH TG Div Recce (UK) LCC HQ (US) 16 AAB HQ Avn Regt HQ AH TG Cell G3 Ops Cell G3 Ops Note: For this KC many of the processes are shared between Note: For this KC many of the processes are shared between G2/ISTAR, G3 Ops and other cells/groups within the Div HQ. G2/ISTAR, G3 Ops and other cells/groups within the Div HQ. The distinction shown is only intended to reflect who is likely The distinction shown is only intended to reflect who is likely KC 5 - Vignette 1 Kill Chain B Version 1.4 UC00001 - Updated 03 June 2003. Search and Detect Search and Detect to lead the activity. to lead the activity. Option C Option B Option A ISTAR Co-ord DIV HQ Div Recce (UK) LCC HQ (US) 16 AAB HQ Avn Regt HQ AH TG Cell G3 Ops Locate Locate Note: For this KC many of the processes are shared between G2/ISTAR, G3 Ops and other cells/groups within the Div HQ. The distinction shown is only intended to reflect who is likely Search and Detect to lead the activity. Identify Identify Locate Disseminate Disseminate Assess (TST, Collateral Assess (TST, Collateral (Create Tgt (Create Tgt Assess Assess Damage, AGM, DALO) Damage, AGM, DALO) Report) Report) Identify Decide (Re-task Strike Decide (Re-task Strike Asset) Asset) Disseminate Assess (TST, Collateral (Create Tgt Assess Damage, AGM, DALO) Report) Plan / Replan (Deconfliction) Plan / Replan (Deconfliction) Decide (Re-task Strike Asset) Decide (Finalise Plan) Decide (Finalise Plan) Disseminate Disseminate Target Updates Target Updates Plan / Replan (Deconfliction) Disseminate Plan Decide (Strike Mission) Disseminate Plan Decide (Strike Mission) Decide (Finalise Plan) Disseminate Disseminate Tasking Disseminate Tasking Target Updates to AH TG to AH TG Plan / Replan (Mission Plan / Replan (Mission Routing) Routing) Disseminate Plan Decide (Strike Mission) Decide (Finalise Decide (Finalise Mission) Disseminate Tasking Mission) to AH TG Plan / Replan (Mission Routing) Transit to Target Transit to Target + + Decide (Finalise Mission) Acquire Acquire Transit to Target Effect Effect Acquire BDI BDI Effect BDI BDI Disseminate Disseminate BDI Disseminate Disseminate BDI Disseminate Notes/Comments Notes/Comments Green Text Timing - tbd. Disseminate Green Text Timing - tbd. TST Processes - V1 KC B TST Processes - V1 KC B Based on: Range of data: Based on: Range of data: Purpose of report: Purpose of report: Creator: M Ballone /P Wainwright Creator: M Ballone /P Wainwright Notes/Comments QINETIQ Malvern QINETIQ Malvern Green Text Timing - tbd. TST Processes - V1 KC B CONCEPTUAL PROCESS MODEL - 2006/8 Based on: Range of data: CONCEPTUAL PROCESS MODEL - 2006/8 Purpose of report: Creator: M Ballone /P Wainwright QINETIQ Malvern Created: 05/06/03 10:37:43 UK RESTRICTED Created: 05/06/03 , 10:37:43 UK RESTRICTED CONCEPTUAL PROCESS MODEL - 2006/8 Created: 05/06/03 10:37:43 UK RESTRICTED Brigading Options - Synergy

  23. Decision maker selects & manipulates weightings Interaction with the Decision Maker • For each option, or group of options: • score capability increments • Hi-Priority used to combine scores Overall Rating weightings KC Capability ΔT weightings Environment Target chars Threat level Environt Sensitivity Size Weather Light Depth Mobility good cloud rain

  24. Critique of the Approach

  25. Strengths & Weaknesses of the Approach • WEAKNESSES • Limited to mission-level analysis of a single Kill Chain • Limited to the functional Kill Chain boundary • target detection to initial BDI assumed • prior ISR operations equally important • STRENGTHS • Highly transparent & traceable • End-to-end assessment across multiple DECs • Based on whole system-level analysis, not individual equipment • Inherently scaleable - targets, Kill Chains, analysis fidelity • Generates database of analytic results providing objective evidence

  26. Critique - Opportunities • Though branded ’TST’ this approach is equally applicable to other missions / targets • flexibility of capability chain methodology • ‘Simple’ analysis highly valuable to focus detailed analysis & SE experimentation • e.g. NITEworks Kill Chain experiments • Effective input into multi-mission and campaign analyses • multi-mission addressing resource conflicts with parallel Kill Chains • selection of effective Kill Chains at campaign level

  27. Any questions? Brian Spedding bpspedding@QinetiQ.com 01252-396635 Kevin Smith kevin.smith@baesystems.com 01772-855168 QinetiQ/KI/CIS/Pub042262

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