PERSONAL IMPPRESSIONS BY BRIG GEN GORDON MZWANDILE YEKELO

1. CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING AND INFORMATION SHARING: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE FOR DETERRING AND RESOLVING COMPLEX EMERGENCIES • PERSONAL IMPPRESSIONS BY BRIG GEN GORDON MZWANDILE YEKELO • MEMBER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE (SANDF)

2. INTRODUCTION • Changed strategic environment has made it imperative that Africans continuously search for effective solutions to problems and challenges facing the continent • Effective solutions are only possible through collective action, co-operative arrangements and alliances • African approaches to Development, Peace and Security are premised on co-operative arrangements Continental (AFRICA), Regional (RECs) and global strategies and initiatives

3. SITUATION IN MANY STATES IS CHARACTERISED BY: • Underdevelopment and poverty • A grinding debt burden • Instances of corruption and undemocratic governments • Humanitarian crises • Lack of mutual confidence and consensus between populace and state, with resultant suppression of minority or majority groups and ethnic tensions • Mil support for these regimes and/or rebel formations by neighbours and/ or by northern powers etc • Fragile/collapsed States and intrastate conflict

4. SITUATION IN … • Fracture intorebellions: opposition /rebel groups, quasi-rebel groups, warlords … • Development of “war economies” • CONCLUSION: African social, economic and political structures have the potential to generate conflict

5. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? • Having recognised the abovementioned potential what are the options? • Do you focus on Preventivemeasures? • Do you focus on management of conflict? • Do you focus on Resolution of conflict? • THESE SHOULD BE SEEN AS A CONTINUUM, BUT THAT INCREASED EFFORTS SHOULD BE INJVESTED IN PREVENTION

6. EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY RESPONSES AND ARCHITECTURE • The vision of the OAU’S 23rd Ordinary Session WHILST establishing its MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION,MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION was encapsulated in the following words: “…To bring to the process of dealing with conflicts in our Continent a new institutional dynamism enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts”

7. EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY RESPONSES AND ARCHITECTURE • The OAU went on to state that: “Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource demanding peacekeeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance.” • COST!! EXISTENT AND NON-EXISTENT BUDGETS?

8. A CURSORY GLANCE AT THE SUDAN • Initial estimates indicated that: • UNMIS (UN Mission In S Sudan)budget estimate would be about USD279.50m. Though a CPA had already been signed and in place. • AMIS (African Mission in Sudan) budget estimate of USD252m. Though without a “holding”ceasefire. • Consider: What would Conflict Prevention cost? • Such costs are indeed beyond the capacity of both the OAU then, and the AU at present!

9. OTHER FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE OAU VISION AND MECHANISM • The following guiding principles impacted on the Mechanism: • Non interference in the internal affairs member state • The sovereign equality of member states • The inalienable right to independent existence • Consent and cooperation of the parties to a conflict • The peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of borders.

10. CONSEQUENCES FLOWING FROM THE ABOVE • The factors translated into the following reality: • The undertaking of Conflict Preventive measures constrained by the requirement for consent from the government concerned and/or parties to the conflict. As a result mostly Conflict management and resolution efforts could be undertaken

11. CONSEQUENCES FLOWING FROM THE ABOVE • The lack of clarity in defining clear entry points for OAU involvement in conflict situations • Failure to create an environment conducive to the enhancement of Early Warning of potential conflict • Consequently inability to undertake proactive and effective action in instances of complex emergencies (eg Rwanda, DRC, Darfur)

12. NEWENVIRONMENT: NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS: • The Constitutive Act of the AU defined a new guiding principle on peace and security viz: “…the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in response to grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity…and the right of Member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.” • This represents a departure from long-held OAU positions – However reference to “Grave”may be interpreted as referring only to “worse case” situations

13. NEWENVIRONMENT: NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS: • A common security policy • A security policy that encompasses human security and the rule of law. • The common security agenda further defined strategies for: • Collective security and mutual defence from internal and external threats. • Development of capacity for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

14. NEWENVIRONMENT: NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS: • Establishment of an Early Warning System in order to facilitate prompt response and action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict. • Mediation in intra-state and interstate conflicts and disputes. • Development and enhancement of capacity for Peace-making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This gives priority to the development of African Standby Force Arrangements (ASF).

15. NEW ENVIRONMENT: NEW SECURITY CONCEPS • Establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) with the following instruments: • Continental Early Warning system (CEWS) • Military staff committee • Panel of the Wise • African Standby Force • Peace Fund • N.B. PSC established as a Collective security and EW set-up to ensure timely and efficient response • Note: Early Warning = Warning plus Response

16. BUILDING BLOCKS FOR EFFECTIVE EARLY WARNING • Both at the Continental and Regional level there is a critical requirement for: • Co-operative and collaborative arrangements both inter and intrastate • X-cutting info-sharing (eg between the various Divisions of the AU and RECs, Govt dept’s, agencies within states, between the above and IG/CSO/NGOs • Orchestration of all efforts be it preventive, management and resolution

17. BUILDING BLOCKS FOR EFFECTIVE EARLY WARNING • Effective and efficient utilisation of instruments such as: African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Panel of the Wise, Mediation by Regional governments, Fact Finding Missions, Election Monitoring etc • Establishment of linked databases at both regional and Continental level • N.B. Info-sharing obviously should be guided by Procedures and guidelines, not excluding confidentiality, and allow for decision-making

18. DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS • The establishment of the REWS is premised on the 5 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) setting up REWS which become building blocks for the CEWS • There is uneven development between the RECs ito their establishment and operationalisation • Establishment and development of REWS is influenced by each region’s historical conditions and situation:

19. REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS • ECOWAS: History of intrastate conflict with grave implications for interstate conflicts • IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on development- Horn of Africa): History of interstate conflict, internal conflict with implications for regional security and humanitarian emergencies(famine etc) • ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States): History of inter and intrastate conflict • SADC (Southern African Development Community): Evolved from the former Frontline States

20. WHY REWS ? • To anticipate and identify emerging conflict situations and crises • To monitor, report on and facilitate decision making and responses to ongoing conflict situations and crises • To monitor , report on,facilitate decision making and responses on countries/states emerging from conflict (transition period and post-conflict situation) • To translate intimate knowledge of situation in regional and contiguous states into warnings against instability

21. “IDEOLOGICAL”APPROACHES TO EARLY WARNING • Statist: EW should be state-centred ie within the framework of state organs or agencies • Civil society: EW should be based and centred around CSO/NGOs • Is it an either or matter? • EW should be based and developed around co-operative and collaborative arrangements without an either/or scenario • Guidelines! Procedures! Principles!

22. APPROACHES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS • Debates over such approaches delay the operationalisation of effective responses to situations with dire consequences • Provision of indispensable donor support can be sacrificed on the alter of semantics and diplomatic manuevring

23. ENHANCING CAPACITY • The establishment and development of Early warning Mechanisms requires: • Resources (incl. Equipment - communication means eg internet) • Funding (operational costs) • Training • Simplicity • Utilisation of all available resources for example: Use of SMS as warning and response planning in case of flooding (The key requirement is innovative solutions)

24. ANY ROLE FOR THE MILITARY? IS THERE A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE? • An unqualified Yes!!: • There is a keen recognition of the fact that the military should play a supportive roleto all political, diplomatic etc . And that doctrine should be informed and guided by such principle throughout the conflict continuum • They define and inform scope for operational and tactical initiative and responses • This constitutes a firm rejection of the view that: “…(political) power grows out of the barrel of the gun” • Any lessons from history?

25. THE RSA EXPERIENCE • ‘FLASHBACK’ 1964: • Height of the power of the apartheid regime characterised: • Defeat of thedemocratic movement and the resultant “triumphalism” • Rise of military power • Acquisition of nuclear technology(Valindaba, Pelindaba- as terminology of metaphoric militarism)

26. RESPONSES BY THE RESISTANCE • ‘FASTFORWARD’ 1970s AND 1980s: • Integrated strategic responses: Appropriate strategy and tactics • Clearly defined goals and objectives • Military playing a supportive and ‘armed propaganda role’ • Clear definition of the nature and character of the problem/conflict • As mobilisation and propaganda (read- information sharing and distribution) as“focus of main”

27. Thank you !!! • SIYABONGA!!